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Cowboys, drug lords and desperadoes, with their unholstered guns, riding horses 
or trucks, roaming through the wide desert, represent key parts of the political mythology 
of the Mexican and American frontiers. This is a territory that, even as it has always been 
considered peripheral, has had a central role in shaping the central identities of both 
countries, as well as in the development of their attitudes towards violence and conflict, 
legality and illegality.  
My research focuses on these three figures and the territory in which they roam, 
eliciting from narratives that center around them theories of political exceptionality, 
legitimation, and substantiality. On the frontier regions of the liberal, representative state, 
its shortcomings become more obvious, and betray the blind spots of our political 
schema. I argue in my dissertation that the manifestations of violence that surround this 
territory do not arise in spite of the state and its notions of legality, but because of the law 
and the processes through which it comes into existence. To illustrate this point, I 
construct a narrative divided in three chapters, which develops the imaginary of each 
figure, focusing on the work of Cormac McCarthy, Clint Eastwood, Luis G. Inclán, Yuri 
Herrera, Américo Paredes and Rolando Hinojosa.  
 In my dissertation, I show the pathways through which these works represent the 
way the law becomes intertwined with the outlaw, affirming and negating itself through 
its exercise. Each chapter focuses on one of three of the main cultural identity groups that 
populate the region, Anglos, Chicanos and Mexicans, while analyzing the tenets of one of 
the branches of government. In this way, I want to call attention to how stories occupy 
political discourse and showcase the failings of our political systems. 
By virtue of being outside of the “civilized” centers of the Nation State, farther 
from the cosmetic institutions that hide inequality and injustice, the frontier helps us 
perceive the underbelly of representative democracy, revealing the nightmarish 
counterparts of the State’s generals, politicians and tycoons in the roaming cowboy 
gunslingers, powerful drug lords and landless desperadoes of the North American desert. 
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"I knew a very wise man so much of Sir 
Christopher's sentiment, that he believed if a 
man were permitted to make all the ballads, he 
need not care who should make the laws of a 
nation." 
 
  Andrew Fletcher An Account of a 
Conversation 
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HEROES: STORIES 
Bear with me.  
What you see on screen is a person stranded on an island, or a remote village full of 
savages. These backward sorts grab the hero and worship him like a god (in Star Wars it was 
little fuzzy bears and an android, but nevertheless). They proceed to give him all sorts of gifts 
and all the women in the village shower him with their attention. Now, our hero (usually a little 
dimwitted) believes he has finally found paradise, until he discovers he is being prepared as a 
human sacrifice and about to be tossed into a volcano as an offering to the gods. 
Let’s set this scene aside for a couple of minutes. 
The next thing you see is my father, and here your vision bifurcates in time. One of the 
strands is showing reruns of The Lone Ranger on TV. The hero rides his beautiful horse through 
a reddened desert with his faithful sidekick by his side. Of course, this was Mexico, so Tonto 
was not named Tonto (dumbass), but Toro (Bull). In the other strand, my father has put together 
a little black mask from a piece of cloth and string, and is playing the cowboy in a Cowboy vs. 
Indians game with his friends on the street. 
Let’s set this scene aside again for just a little bit longer. 
It’s me, and I’m barely four, and I’m laughing my ass off. I’m trying to use my arms as a 
jumping rope and failing. On screen (now it’s always on screen) a bunch of monkeys are dancing 
to a tenacious jazzy and swingy tune, scatting nonsensical sounds on screen, and dancing around 
a bear wearing coconuts as an ape disguise. This is, at this time, my definition of fun, and even 
more, Mowgli is the first character in an animated film that even remotely looks like me. And oh, 
I love him and Baloo. So when I find out King Louie, the orangutan, (what a funny word 
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orangutan is for a four year old) is trying to dupe Mowgli into giving him the secret of fire, thus 
letting him gain power, because he wants to be like me, walk like me, talk like me, oohoo, I 
realize he is the villain. I remember how out of place he would sound when he called Mowgli his 
cousin. 
Would you think, dear reader, these scenes might have some bearing on the way I think 
and live my life?  
How long would you think it would take me to realize the volcano in question was none 
other than the Popocatepetl volcano I’d be able to see on particularly clear days when I visited 
my cousins in Mexico City? And of course, that those blood thirsty, devious savages on screen 
were possibly my ancestors?  
How long would it take my father to realize that what he was doing in the school recess 
or in those sunny days of his childhood was pretending to kill some of his great-great-great-
grandparents, in all likelihood indigenous of some tribe or another of Comanche affiliation? How 
long would it have taken to realize he was pretending to be a man who responded to blind 
fidelity by calling his sidekick dumbass? 
How long would you believe it would take me to realize that Mowgli, that kid who 
looked like me, did not in fact, stand for me, but for Kipling, and those British sons, “bound to 
exile, to serve their captives’ need” (Kipling) in India, and those American soldiers who went 
over to the Philippine Islands to find peoples, who like me, would seem to them “Half-devil and 
half-child” (Kipling)? How grateful would I be now, that, this valiant knight would bring “us 
from bondage, Our loved Egyptian night?” (Kipling) How grateful would you believe me to be 
that they chose to take up the White Man’s burden, and take care of our needs, those heroic 
 4 
Mowglis of white skin, even if the idea of us strolling throughout town, holding the secret to the 
fire of civilization, was as absurd as an orangutan doing so? 
 
This is a study about the political usage of stories, about the ways in which stories are 
used to produce erroneous class identification, bad faith, and to subvert the interests of those who 
listen, watch or read in order to further the political gain of others. 
Would my father as a child have held the Lone Ranger as his hero, had he known him to 
be inspired in the Texas Rangers, an armed corps that burned my hometown in order to cover 
their retreat? Would I have been so amused at the stories of those heroes far from home who 
managed to defeat and overturn a savage civilization and mocked them so, had I known them to 
be inspired by my forebears? Would I have encouraged my parents to buy copies of The Jungle 
Book and fund the mockery of non-white folk, had I known it to be so? 
The stories we tell ourselves are not often this simple, but are often as influential and 
even more so. As Bourdieu dedicated his career to prove, symbolic capital is not only symbolic, 
not even primarily so. Most endeavors are fueled and developed through some sort of symbolic 
capital, which harnesses one of the strongest sorts of power. As Senator Roark states in Robert 
Rodríguez’ Sin City: “Power don't come from a badge, or a gun. Power comes from lying, lying 
big and getting the whole damn world to play along with you. Once you got everybody agreeing 
with what they know in their hearts ain't true, you get them by the balls” (R. Rodriguez) After 
all, if we explore the notion of might is right, we will eventually find that might is a very feeble 
claim to power, if it is that. Might, in the form of a gun, is dependent on the physical resources 
needed to produce bullets, feed the men who wield them, fuel their ambition, and keep them 
constantly on alert in order to use such guns. Power is something different. Power is a form of 
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accumulation exchangeable for other people’s compliance of their own accord. Even at its vilest, 
power is a way to keep people performing a role without the direct interference of those who 
wield power. As Senator Roark stated, it is the successful lie that wields power, and it often 
comes as a narrative, fiction being both a genre that lies to tell the truth and a genre that tells the 
truth in order to lie.  
One might look to Martin Luther King’s accomplishments as a way to observe the power 
of these stories:. “That is what Dr. King did [ended the terror of living in the south] —not march, 
not give good speeches. He crisscrossed the south organizing people, helping them not be afraid, 
and encouraging them, like Gandhi did in India, to take the beating that they had been trying to 
avoid all their lives. Once the beating was over, we were free. [Emphasis in the original]” (Rice) 
Once might was exercised, it was exhausted. What sustained the regime of racial segregation and 
violence in the south was not only the might of the white-operated state, but the fiction, the lie 
that its might would be greater than what African Americans could stand. Power is the ultimate 
form of cultural capital at its most solidified.  
Politics is the art of narrativizing social experience, in order to construct a naturalized 
framework for others to obey in their social interactions. The naturalization of this framework is 
essential, because politics is at its most powerful when it is unseen. As Žižek states, authentic 
political events occur when experience is resignified, when an unforeseen turn of events can’t be 
included into current narratives or when current narratives are reformulated to recreate social 
narratives. “The event is the successful imposition of a new narrative which makes a historical 
situation readable again to those caught in it” (Žižek, Slavoj Žižek: what is an authentic political 
event?). A political event, here, is not political action, such as getting elected or passing a law, 
necessarily, unless it is a response that was elicited by something outside of the sphere of the 
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prepoliticized. The integrity of political narrative becomes the realm of political action, while 
breaks in it become the realm of a political event. Žižek describes Julian Assange’s publication 
of classified documents as an authentic political event, narrativizing it as a true act of a 
dictatorship of the proletariat, since it was an act of espionage on the behalf of the people. 
Edward Snowden's revelations represent another such event, where the script of nation-state 
warring and spying was derailed, and Snowden has paid handsomely for his actions, as he is still, 
as of 2014 in a legal limbo, with execution or imprisonment looming on his horizon. One could 
also argue other events represented political events from other perspectives. The elections of 
both Vicente Fox and Barack Obama represent political events from some perspectives and 
nothing like a political event from others. As they represented actual access to power from those 
who had been excluded from it, they represented a political event, however, as it happened from 
within a pre-established power structure not so much. What they do have in common is that 
neither election was followed by much political action. Politics is a narrative that puts together 
the facts experienced by the constituents of a state. It gives coherence to their lives. However, as 
Žižek states: 
Problems arise when an unexpected shattering turn of events – an 
outbreak of war, a deep economic crisis – can no longer be included into a 
consistent narrative. At that point, it all depends on how this catastrophic turn 
will be symbolised, on what ideological interpretation or story will impose itself 
and determine the general perception of the crisis. (Žižek, Slavoj Žižek: what is an 
authentic political event?) 
Politics can thus be conceived as a competition of narratives, where political acts are 
shifts between what might be considered political. And these narratives not only take the shape 
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of political campaigns or treatises, but take on whatever varied shapes stories do. In our 
churches, in our colleges, in our music, in our films, in our books, in our conversations, we 
reproduce political narratives that inspire us to behave in one way or another. 
From the success of structuralists, like Lèvi-Strauss, who undertook the study of myth, 
we might learn that it is not necessary to travel to the Brazilian Amazon to visit the Bororo 
Indians, or to use the narratives of faraway natives to understand structures that inform the way 
we interact with each other. The narratives that fuel human behavior do so not through rational 
argument, but through the construction of a system of beliefs that underlies the points of 
departure of political discourse. Lèvi-Strauss’ project in The Raw and the Cooked, was to “show, 
not how men think in myths, but how myths operate in men’s minds without their being aware of 
the fact” (Lévi-Strauss 12) Likewise, what we see operating in the interaction of mythemes 
among the Bororo Indians may very well happen in Western mythemes as well. For we create 
systems of truths (self evident truths, sometimes) that fuel our political behavior, and the 
decisions we make, sometimes without our knowledge of how we came to such evidence.  
My ambition is not much different from Lévi-Strauss’, as different as our subjects, and 
methodologies may be, for I too, would see my “Ambition being to discover the conditions in 
which systems of truths become mutually convertible and therefore simultaneously acceptable to 
several different subjects” (Lévi-Strauss 11). I also believe there is much to be learned from the 
encounter among the mythemes of several communities as observed in the Mexican-American 
frontiers. It was there, in a place that featured very violent encounters between cultures that did 
not find their systems of truths to be convertible that where several of these cultures resorted to 
violent conflict to negotiate them. I choose this territory because of the conflict, for in the 
periphery of the power of both the United States of America and the Mexican United States we 
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find the discourse of justification of a political narrative to break down more easily, and to show 
its cracks more clearly, allowing us a privileged view of the inadequacies of our political 
institutions. As Žižek states: 
When the normal run of things is traumatically interrupted, the field is 
open for ideological competition – for example, in Germany in the late 1920s, 
Hitler won in the competition for the narrative which will explain to Germans the 
reasons for the crisis of the Weimar republic and the way out of it (his plot was 
the Jewish plot); in France in 1940 it was Marshal Petain’s narrative which won 
in explaining the reasons for the French defeat. And the same goes for the 
ongoing financial and economic crisis: which narrative will prevail? (Žižek, 
Slavoj Žižek: what is an authentic political event?) 
That the narratives we possess today survived seems enough justification of their fairness 
to more than one of us, producing an erroneous sense of self-evident truth. In order to see an 
example of this, we need not look any further than John Wayne’s films. Most of the old time 
cowboy films hinge on a cowboy rescuing settlers deep in Indian Territory, usually a woman and 
kids. But we never see them as trespassers who are stealing land from the Indians. That their 
descendants now inhabit those lands makes for the ethical self-evidence of that the behavior of 
the cowboy mytheme in film shows us. This led to a political usage of such myths that claims to 
be even more self-evident. For more than one President rode the image of the fearless cowboy 
into the White House, just as more than one Presidente rode the image of the caudillo into Los 
Pinos.  
I argue that the relationship between entertainment and politics is so deep as to warrant a 
distrust of the democratic process as actualized contemporarily. The right to vote amongst two or 
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more options could be absolutely meaningless if the people are not allowed to change either the 
options or the conversation. All the elements that shape political conversation and the influence 
in shaping those elements end up being more important than suffrage in shaping the political.  
Our myths, our entertainment, and our honor codes have great influence on the shape of 
our interactions. Jonathan Rosenbaum, in his book Movies as Politics reflects on  
how closely our news resembles our so-called entertainment and vice 
versa; and what sort of relation either sphere bears to reality sometimes turns out 
to be my main subject (…) my main purpose here and elsewhere in this book is to 
argue that what is designed to make people feel good at the movies has a 
profound relation to how and what they think and feel about the world around 
them. (Rosenbaum 3)  
People don’t check out their brains when they walk into a theater, turn on the radio, or 
grab a book. The same person who experiences pleasure in entertainment by recognizing himself 
and his reality on the screen goes out into the polls. But how is this recognition configured? 
Reality becomes a language in our cultural production, where the way we speak of it, the 
plausibility of reality becomes more important than the truth of reality. In his analysis of late 
80’s film, Rosenbaum reflects on why “Almost going to hell in a hand basket is what most of the 
characters in these movies [Die Hard, Batman and more] seemed to be doing. Are narrow 
escapes from oblivion and destruction the only form of utopia available to us—perhaps because 
we’re too jaded to believe in any others?” (Rosenbaum 87) The use of cultural capital is not in 
the workings of a system within its reality principles; cultural capital is the thing we use to 
determine the reality principles of our systems, what can be thought of, politically, spiritually 
and privately.  
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When we ask ourselves why would we think of narratives as politics, the answer seems 
pretty clear to me. What politics we can and can’t do is a decision that comes out of what I will 
call aesthetic points of departure, mostly informed by narratives. Whether we believe that a 
government can run a deficit during a depression or not is rarely informed by numbers or 
economic technology, even when it doesn’t turn out to be flawed, like Growth in a time of debt 
(Reinhart and Rogoff), which was used to justify the austerity measures that destroyed Western 
Europe during the Great Recession. Discussions related to deficits most often are framed as a 
narrative: “Can you live on a credit card forever?” Several leaps of logic are often made, trying 
to frame state narratives as if states could run on the same principles and rules as an individual, 
in blatant disregard of empirical knowledge and economics. Our reactions to the principles of 
verisimilitude in such narratives we are presented often determine the way our polis reacts to 
problems of great magnitude. 
Narratives contribute and shape the language itself that we use to describe the political 
issues that affect our lives. “There are times when our language becomes so overloaded with 
ideological assumptions that, however we use certain terms, they wind up speaking more than we 
do.” (Rosenbaum 14) It is not casual that the liberal movement spearheaded by the Kennedys 
was referred to as Camelot, or that the conservative movement requires a continuous cable news 
system in order to sustain its narrative. What becomes the center, feasible, productive, is always 
something we define based on shared narratives, on what we find aesthetically pleasing in them, 
and desirable. These narratives provide an affectual matrix from which we depart to action.  We 
create narrative myths in order to frame our desires for the polis, and experiment what ideas we 
have. When we imagine the modern state reaching ever deeper into our private lives, we 
experiment with such ideas, as Huxley did in Brave New World, Scott in Blade Runner, Orwell 
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in 1984, or Gilliam in Brazil. That the future we see has ended up more and more often in 
dystopic form also has an influence on the present we see. Our political myths frame what we 
expect from a State and how we interact with it.  
If the myths we are after rely on the recognition of a false political experiment, but never 
take place in its entirety, and are always spun one way or the other, in order to make one political 
argument or another, the question of how to approach them is of paramount importance. It is of 
great importance to resolve how, if the hero has a thousand faces, to choose which one to study, 
how to get to the bones behind the face. In turn, after studying how narratives come to influence 
politics, we might come to the point where we might recognize politics as a narrative, which 
provides principles of possibility for our coexistence. When our stories establish gory violence 
and gritty cynicism as a form of realism (see the Nomad Dystopia chapter), it influences the way 
we behave and choose, as Rosenbaum states in reference to Seven: 
 If mankind is hopelessly blighted and evil is both omnipresent and 
triumphant (…) it stands to reason that political change isn’t even worth hoping 
for and that legislation designed to make millionaires richer while increasing the 
suffering ot the homeless is the only ‘realistic’ kind we can contemplate. Yet if we 
accept this made-to-order postulate, we have to overlook the fact that Seven 
originally had an even grimmer ending than it does now—an ending revised as 
soon as preview audiences objected. (Rosenbaum 2) 
What the apparent solidity of realism does is to reorient the common good in order to 
comply with interests that appear unrelated to the narratives that we experience. What we 
experience as commercial might take place as the political, while what we experience as political 
might take place as the commercial. One of the things narrative does is to create attachment 
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between ourselves and characters, ideas, and experiences, to point us in the direction of an object 
of desire. 
Sometimes our narratives offer us happy resolutions for our troubles. One good example 
is the story about the de-narrativization of the political that arose out of the Enlightenment and 
that can be clearly observed in the casual legal tradition of the United States. In the United 
States, there has been a tradition pointed towards a denarrativization of the exercise of the law, a 
tendency to create a law that is as universal as possible, and that contains as little particularity as 
possible in order to push the particularization of it towards the realm of jurisprudence, a 
translation of the universal towards the case. Thus, universal law is only as universal as long as it 
has not set precedent, and the idea of equality under the law is relegated to the idea of universal 
law.  
This casual approach allows for forces of divergence in equality under the exercise of 
jurisprudence, which establishes a given set of particularities as rule for the law, ignoring those 
that might point in the opposite direction.  We might construct the narrative of denarrativizing 
the law in order to build a more abstract law that would be fairer as it would apply to more 
people equally. And yet the attribute we choose to establish equality will lead to inequality, as 
people might be equal, but never are identical, and the differences that inform the experience of 
the political and the legal are ignored. 
What is more problematic about political narratives is not so much that they exist, as it 
would be difficult to think about a way to organize and motivate people that did not include a 
narrative, but much rather, the fact that we naturalize the narratives, forming political 
attachments while erasing their trace. The lack of trace often leads to situations that are 
deceptively enticing, much like the attachments that Berlant describes in Cruel Optimism: “All 
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attachments are optimistic. When we talk about an object of desire, we are really talking about a 
cluster of promises we want someone or something to make to us and make possible for us.” 
(Berlant 23) We develop affect for our stories, which is the way that most political organization 
comes into play. The experience of political togetherness becomes an object, being reified. 
Through her analysis of a statement by George W. Bush, Berlant comes to the realization that “In 
his head [Bush’s] a public’s binding to the political is best achieved neither by policy nor 
ideology but the affect of feeling political together, an effect of having communicated true 
feeling without the distancing mediation of speech.” (224) Perhaps George W. Bush1 was an 
extreme in his tendency to despise policy and ideology in favor of affectual togetherness. 
Perhaps, rather than affectual togetherness becoming an alternative for ideology or policy, we 
could think of it as the starting point for both, a departure for the construction of the political. I 
arrive at this idea, as I believe that it would be only a caricature of President Bush that could be 
construed as absolutely uninterested in policy and/or ideology. Much rather, the idea of 
attempting to communicate through noise, and the frustration Bush shows as he strives to 
produce affectual glue, seems to be focused on the possibility of policy and ideology that are 
coherent with such affective constructions.  
Where I point to politics being an aesthetic rather than a philosophical construction, I 
point to an affectual distinction. I would venture to speak of aesthetics as an affectual matrix that 
determines a set of values that gives rise to political behavior. In this matrix, we would see the 
                                                
1 George W. Bush, 43rd president of the U.S.A.(2000-2008), son of George H.W. Bush, 
the 41st, (1988-1992) In this section, Berlant refers to a comment he made in October 2003 
“Somehow you just got to go over the heads of the filter and speak directly to the people” 
(Berlant 224) 
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conjunction of a narrative of utopian nature, of how life should be, and the affectual togetherness 
that would make a person want to remain within this narrative. Berlant brings up a quote from 
Freud, where she analyzes his take on melancholia, in which Freud states that: “People never 
willingly abandon a libidinal position, not even, indeed, when a substitute is already beckoning 
to them”. (Freud 244) I would claim that the attachment that libidinal positions produce is related 
to the conjunction of aesthetics and affect within the matrix I’m configuring. That is, I mean to 
claim that aesthetic guidelines are the manifestation of the limits of libidinal positions held in 
common with other people, and that these represent the fluxes allowed within an affectual matrix 
that leads to the construction of a political unit, and sets the limits within which its policies and 
ideology might flow. 
Harmony between a matrix and its products would be an obvious byproduct of this 
process. However, such a thing has a way of evading us. By allowing a political class to be in 
charge of producing the affects that lead to our political configurations, we relinquish control of 
political desire, and often find ourselves in a situation where: “A relation of cruel optimism 
exists when something you desire is actually an obstacle to your flourishing. It might involve 
food, or a kind of love; it might be a fantasy of the good life, or a political project” (Berlant 1). 
The great problem of affectual politics is that it takes advantage of a disjunction between what 
Berlant calls noise and content. All sorts of content can be hidden in the noise if it is strong 
enough. When contemporary teenagers in Mexican slums claim they’d rather spend “cinco años 
de rey que una vida de buey” (Muedano) or five years as a king, rather than a whole life as a 
schmuck, they are following a narrative fuelled affectively from both facts and fiction. It is 
fueled by the fiction of the lives of the famous druglords, which might or might not correspond 
to reality, but is made spectacular in fiction, gossip, and news circles. It is also fueled by the fact 
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that fewer and fewer Mexicans who are born into poverty make it out through education, as 
today the difference in employment rates between college graduates and non-college graduates is 
shrinking (Mahapatra). Within this affective matrix, the path of turning to five years as a king as 
a guideline sounds reasonable, in a way, but ends up very rarely successfully fulfilling its 
promise, and most often, providing a lifestyle that impedes the kind of celebrations and life that 
recruits associate with becoming a drug lord. Oftentimes, when Zeta sicarios are captured, what 
comes to light is the image of people who live on slightly over 600 dollars a month, camping in 
the desert, while eating out of tuna cans. (Beat). Average incomes for maquiladora workers also 
hover around 600 dollars a month (Sarmiento), however, and it doesn’t stand to reason that the 
behavior enticed is of help to anyone but the people at the top of the structure who benefit the 
most from the expendable lives of the grunts who make the bulk of cartel forces. 
Reason sometimes sends us plummeting into insanity. The murderers who manned the 
offices that managed the holocaust in World War II claimed to be following Kantian philosophy. 
Freedom can lead us to slavery. The rhetoric that advocates economic freedom in the post-Cold 
War world is gathering means of production and capital in very few hands, leading people into 
bondage and debt. Political resistance becomes an obstacle for itself. The Ché Guevara shirts 
sold all over the world as a symbol of political resistance have now become a profitable 
commodity within the economic system that its emblem despised so. In parallel guise, in 1970, it 
is told, that Michael Wadleigh was promoting his film Woodstock in Cannes. There,  
Wadleigh dedicated the film to the four students killed by National 
Guardsmen at Kent State only five days earlier; when the screening was over he 
stood by the exit doors and passed out black armbands. I took one myself, but two 
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days later some boutiques in Cannes started selling similar armbands. 
(Rosenbaum 8) 
Because I understand that the optimism often associated with identitary attachment is 
very often led astray into arguing for ideologies that not only do not aid those who build the 
identity constructs or that identify with them, I want to maintain some distance from them. What 
I want to point out in my analysis of the aesthetic-affectual matrixes that surround druglords, 
bandits and cowboys, is that I do not want to engage with identitary politics in what has become 
the typical way. Identities and cultures can be reified too far.  
Where I may be Mexican, that is a non-essential attribute, the choice, either explicit or 
implicit, to partake of a set of stories, a code of honor and a sensibility, amongst other things. It 
is something that I choose (or not) to be a part of, in transience. Using literature as an example, 
we might find a good explanation of the dangers of identitary politics. If “Mexican” literature 
were to be defined as literature of the Mexican, and such definition is taken to heart, it would be 
easy to spoil both the adherents and the rebels to such a definition. That is, adherents would write 
of the indigenous past, revolutionary caudillos, and magical relations of oppression between 
peasants and caciques. And rebels would undertake a literature of European subjects, World War 
II, Londonized or Brooklynized hipsters who play in rock bands, or abstract self-referential 
experimental novels that are to literature what American Expressionism is to painting. What I 
propose to analyze here is a different thing: representative samples of a corpus of stories that is 
shared, or representative reproductions of categories of cultural heroes shared through a culture; 
manifestations of codes of honor that inform political behavior; aesthetic or affectual sensibilities 
that are used in the world. None of them are essential or impossible to renounce.  
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A good example here might be the racism that is attributed to a section of the American 
people. In an opinion piece, a New York Times columnist analyzes a comment by Paul Ryan, 
related to how inner-city citizens were not even thinking about working. And then he proceeds to 
criticize the economic policy that is derived from following the narrative that minorities are lazy, 
and he says: 
American conservatism is still, after all these years, largely driven by 
claims that liberals are taking away your hard-earned money and giving it to 
Those People. 
Indeed, race is the Rosetta Stone that makes sense of many otherwise 
incomprehensible aspects of U.S. politics (Krugman) 
 Krugman marks conservatism as a movement that is heavily predicated on racism, 
because of narratives and sensibilities to which they have chosen to adhere. One of the many 
ideas that I think essential to analyze this situation is that this is a choice. It could be argued that 
someone who is racist does it unwittingly if he is never confronted with an alternative narrative. 
But most people in America would not have been raised in so much isolation. The choice to 
embrace racism is a non-essential part of a person who could, at any given point choose not to do 
so. He might refuse to do so because of intellectual laziness, because of a refusal to depart from a 
libidinal position, or because of whatever reason he chooses to offer. Even if his affectual matrix 
points him in one way, it is possible to resist, or to choose a different affiliation.  
 
All the narratives I analyze in this study interact with the myths of three figures that are 
key for the way we structure political narratives in North America. The three of them represent 
nodes for affectual matrixes that have been heavily used in politics. All of these chapters 
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represent fictive experiments that have been used as a rhetorical construction in order to solve 
problems. 
The first chapter, “Cowboys: Justiciar Exception“ focuses on the political uses of 
cowboy narratives and speaks of this figure, which has been central in the American imaginary 
after the Civil War. Building on the Frontiersman myths that Franklin incarnated for the benefit 
of European courts, and that was well represented in Fenimore Cooper’s Leatherstocking Tales, 
the cowboy became the cultural hero of America par excellence. In this chapter, I analyze the 
downfall of the cowboy myth, and how it sheds light on several aspects of Anglo-American 
culture: the fondness for exceptionalism, the myth of the cowboy, the erasure of the colonial 
wound and the relationship between exceptionalism and justice. 
The chapter is divided in two sections: “Knights Errant of the American Prairie”, 
centered on the decay of the cowboy as cultural hero and representative of the mythology of 
regeneration through violence. In it, I focus on two films directed by Clint Eastwood and their 
contextual ecosystem: High Plains Drifter and Unforgiven. The other section, “The Gavel and 
the Gun: Nomad Dystopias of Justice”, studies the dystopia of judiciary decisions. Through an 
analysis of Cormac McCarthy’s Blood Meridian I wish to challenge the common construction of 
the novel as an Antinomian construct. I argue that what McCarthy does is to denounce how the 
idea of justice espoused by our institutions is Antinomian, pleading for a space of resistance 
against the narratives that fuel the simultaneously all-powerful and helpless rule of violence and 
exceptionality. 
In “Knights Errant of the American Prairie” the problem I study is the way cowboy 
narratives and the frontier thesis work to make the violence of the conquest of the West (as well 
as more modern conflicts inspired in it) palatable to audiences. I chose the figure of Clint 
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Eastwood, because, as a director, he has filmed two of the most interesting Western films in 
history, both of them very critical of the cowboy film tradition; and also, because he is one of the 
most iconic figures of the genre, because he participated in several of the films that have been 
most successful, both economically and iconographically. For many people, the image of the 
cowboy is that of Eastwood, riding through the desert, in his poncho, chewing on his cigar, as 
portrayed in the Man with no name in Sergio Leone’s films. Even though the last picture was 
filmed after Blood Meridian was published, both High Plains Drifter and Unforgiven are 
engaged with the tradition of the representation of the cowboy in a way that Blood Meridian 
simply isn’t. Both films are constantly commenting on the tradition within which they belong.  
Unforgiven, in particular, is widely considered to be a eulogy for the cowboy genre. Only 
two post-Unforgiven (Django Unchained and True Grit)2 films make the ten top grossing 
Western film list3 (Lovece). The market for that myth, in that shape, died sometime around the 
date Unforgiven came out. The distrust towards metanarratives did have an impact on the 
effectivity of old political myths, which were deconstructed and had to take new shapes in order 
to find a new grasp on the public (Star Wars or Star Trek do make use of the structure of cowboy 
                                                
2 We should take into account that True Grit, the highest grossing of the two, didn’t even 
make a third of the money Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid, did. 
3 The two films that made it to this list were rather atypical westerns, with a very strong 
ironic approach to the genre. Tarantino’s Django Unchained is a film that uses the Western’s 
aesthetics to approach slavery. The Coen Brother’s True Grit is a remake of a 1969 Henry 
Hathaway film starring John Wayne. The Coen’s film ironically comments on the pointless 
heroics of both the Western genre and the Gritty Hero genre (i.e., Nolan’s The Dark Knight) 
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mythology). The myth however continues to be important and powerful politically, and is still 
perhaps the core of the Anglo-American political affectual matrix. 
The myths related to the cowboy become so popular amongst other things because they 
always feature a character who is a perfectly empty receptacle, and lets the spectator fall into a 
place in the narrative, often feeling himself the hero and savior of the precursor of an all-
American town. There is always a promise of further growth as the masses march West, which 
was the main point of the frontier thesis, that the expanse of land to the West was the definitive 
trait of American culture, rather than the approaches to slavery or indenture in the South and 
North. And in many a ways, Frederick Jackson Turner was right, since the territory acquired by 
violence to the West allowed for a constant economic growth, that economic factor allowed the 
wages of the working classes (white) to grow, despite the fact that elites back East continued to 
amass an ever larger part of the national wealth.  
Piketty describes this problem in his book Capital in the Twenty First Century, where he 
addresses the problems of structural inequality in capitalism and how it is that a certain level of 
growth is required to alleviate the pressure such inequality produces. (221) When slavery was 
ended and the economy was reorganized, the same structures sought reproduction in the West, 
using Asian-Americans and Mexican-Americans as underclasses. The violence was carried out 
on the frontier as not only the territory but its inhabitants were translated into economic terms.  
The films show how the myth of regeneration through violence decays, as the violence 
becomes inverted, affecting the very same body politic it was supposed to defend. The 
Gunslinger all too often becomes a tool of economic development, turning flesh into capital, like 
the old practice of slavery, rather than the Camelot Knight he allegedly represents. If the 
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Gunslinger comes into town to craft a rule of law through exception that is attuned to need, what 
happens when two valid needs confront each other? 
In “The Gavel and the Gun”, I explore aspects of what I believe to be American 
Antinomianism, as represented by Cormac McCarthy in Blood Meridian. This novel is very 
commonly described as antinomian, that is, a novel where salvation is unattainnable by our 
actions, and thus morality and action become a pair of ideas that bear no relationship to each 
other. Either our salvation or our condemnation are preordained, and so there is scarcely any 
importance to considerations of whether our actions are good or evil. While I recognize such a 
position within the novel, I argue that it is not the position of the novel, but rather that of its 
villain: Judge Holden. 
The novel problematizes one of the key tenets of political thought, that those who wield 
violence must do so to protect a group of constituents. In the novel, those who were called to be 
protectors (problematic as that protection might be) quickly show their faces as that of predators, 
just as soon as the protection was done, and sometimes even before. That, however, is a point 
that has often been made in many mediums. My argument in this chapter is more dependent on 
the philosophical underpinnings of such action, which often rely on the strife between 
Civilization and Barbarism. McCarthy, I believe, argues for the irrelevance of such terms, as the 
violence depicted is an outgrowth of the system brought forward to lessen it and dominate it.  
Whilst it has been argued that the Jewish Holocaust was the excess rather than the lack of 
European Modernity, I argue that this process was essayed much earlier, in the Amerindian 
genocide. The frontier thesis and the Nazi idea of Lebensraum are underpinned by the same idea: 
land and resources must be appropriated from lesser exterminable races in order to fuel 
capitalistic growth. The horrors of the Glanton crew, and the preindustrialized holocaust of the 
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West represent the horrors that modern political thought creates, even though its alleged purpose 
is to prevent them. For in its own discourse: What is a nation but an attempt to debase a Glanton 
crew? 
In the novel, the crew runs amok, headed by Judge Holden, an incarnation of the devil 
who leads the genocidal crew through the slaughter of uncounted people South and North of the 
Mexican-American border. My reflection on this character focuses on his use of a cult of war as 
a form of justice, where arguments much like Hegel’s Master-Slave dialectics are used to 
produce the horror of continually deciding on life and death, with life always leading to further 
indecision, and the only final word being death. A central question to the narrative, which is 
framed as “What’s he a judge of?” (McCarthy, Blood Meridian 135), is possibly answered as: of 
life and death, of everything. 
In order to increase the strength of his discourse, McCarthy uses a gritty realism that is 
grounded on the outrageousness of the violence depicted. While most of the violent acts narrated 
in the novel are actually inspired in a real life chronicle, Samuel Chamberlain’s memoirs, what 
McCarthy does, stylistically, is to produce such a gritty realism that it seems impossible as 
fiction. A novel is fueled by its realism, always peculiar to an author and a novel, and it 
represents its most powerful asset in the real world. I argue that realism is not construed from 
writing a recognizable reality in the novel, but by impressing a realism over our perception of 
reality. 
The use of optical democracy and grit as tools of verosimility in construction is in tone 
with the warning that the novel impresses upon us. Far as we may want to institutionalize justice, 
it always takes place in the outside of the law. The judge is the person that is most outside the 
law within a legal system, and in the outskirts of the law, in the optical democracy of 
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institutional decisions, justice is a game of domination. To follow justice is to follow one version 
of the cult of war. Such a cult might be ritualized, exorcised or contained on a case-by-case basis, 
but the danger imminent to a gavel and a gun is ever present.  
I argue that in this novel McCarthy’s viewpoint is not that morality is irrelevant, as the 
Kid does end up confronting the Judge, and resisting his brand of the Master-Slave dialectics. 
However, the novel does point us to the idea that morality, while not irrelevant, can only be 
played in resistance, good can hardly be triumphant. Much like his later novel, The Road, where 
in the face of a clearly evil environment, the father and the son resist death and suicide, to play a 
game much like that of Holden’s cult of war, but it is a game where resistance, and the continual 
choice of life, in the ever present face of death is what makes men out of them.  
In the second chapter: “Druglords: Executive Legitimacy”, I analyze the relationship 
between the state and organized crime. In order to do this, I choose the figure of the druglord, as 
he has been a characteristic sort of bandit in the Mexican imaginary. The image of him harkens 
back to the early tobacco smugglers of the Centralist Republic at the beginning of the XIXth 
century, and extends to the present, amidst the Wars on Drugs that currently produce great 
violence in Mexico. The other great bandit figure of the Mexican imaginaries, the revolutionary 
caudillo, has not been denied the political agency ascribed to the charro and narco, as the 
Revolution triumphed, and several of these former caudillos  sat on the Eagle Chair. The charro 
and the narco have often been denied a claim of political agency, and are often branded as 
outlaws and bandits, and thought of as a police problem, rather than one of political organization. 
In this chapter, I aim to reflect on their similarity to other political agents, both for good and bad, 
and to analyze how it is that they come to such agency, to a constituency and to political 
programs.  
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In order to do so, I divided my research in two sections: “Outlaw Utopias of the Interior”  
and “The Caudillo, the Bard and the Legitimacy of Republics”.  In the first section, I focus on 
the political agency of bandits, most specifically the charro, through the contrast of two novels: 
Luis G. Inclán’s Astucia and Ignacio M. Altamirano’s Zarco. Both of these novels have 
characters who exercise paramilitary powers in order to pacify a region, though they hold the 
opposite points of view. In Astucia, it is a tobacco smuggler who builds the utopia, while in 
Zarco, it is a deputized paramilitary officer who builds a utopic police force to root out the 
bandits. The second section, focuses on Yuri Herrera’s Trabajos del reino, a novel that follows 
Lobo, an artist who gains entry to the court of The King, a druglord in a town that is very much 
like Juárez. The novel follows the composer as he works at creating the affectual matrix 
necessary for the cartel to achieve political legitimacy. 
In “Outlaw Utopias” then, I study the political agency of bandits in the Mexican XIXth 
century. In order to reflect on this agency, the bandit, in this case the drug smuggler, must be 
understood within the concept and the problematization of the homogeneity of the people, and 
how it impacts the relationship between the Sovereign (people) and the Prince (state). I draw 
from Rousseau’s Social Contract in order to analyze the circular definitions of the people that 
underlie the homogeneity principle required to think of the possibility itself of a social contract, 
for the people can only be so by contract, and the contract can only be signed by the people, and 
so on and so forth. The cracks that form in this “homogenous” understanding of “the people” are 
the habitat of the bandit. 
In the Americas, considering the extraordinary difficulty of arguing for homogeneity, 
cracks abound. Mexico in that century posited a very interesting case study, as the liberals 
succeeded in deracializing access to power (to a degree) but withheld the privilege of power to 
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those acculturated to European modernity. Morelos, Guerrero, Juárez, Díaz, González and 
Huerta were all either black or indigenous and came to represent the republic at one point or 
another, but they were all also masons and liberals. Education became a way to create 
opportunities for social mobility so that the people could actually be incorporated in the national 
project, illustrating one of the most ironic traits of populist intellectuals. While they do believe in 
the people, they rarely do so without considerable suspicion. When Gramsci states that 
communist discipline will allow the people to attain that sought after power of being arbiter of 
their own destiny, he says that it will happen only so long as they decide to arbitrate in the way 
of socialist class consciousness. (Gramsci 37). 
It is because the people, in the context of the novel, are often foreign in their native land, 
that the cracks of homogeneity provide such fertile ground for bandits. I argue, along with 
Enrique Dussel, that it is not possible to speak of true politics within the coloniality that we 
observe in these circumstances (Dussel 170). Because the ideologies that are peddled rarely 
materialize in benefits to most of the people, those that fall through the cracks come up with their 
own version of order. The bandit organizes and protects (at least in theory) the people, 
organizing, even if criminally, a para-state.  
And here we see how the bandit in Astucia manages to become the head of a small para-
state in Michoacán. He appropriates the taxes and puts them to good use. He then organizes a 
small army to protect the land from roving bandits or ideologized revolutionaries (The State), 
and also proceeds to manage the economy efficiently. This bandit utopia rivals the state utopias 
politicians offer in their campaign speeches or in the revolutionary plans in the local popular 
imaginary. I argue that success in monopolizing violence is the main difference between 
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organized crime and the State, as they both fail to materialize their utopias in similar ways, 
leaving the people holding shiny beads and ideologies. 
In “The Caudillo and the Bard,” I analyze statecraft as practiced by the organization of 
Yuri Herrera’s druglord, El Rey. The problem here is how to understand social banditry and its 
statecraft without thinking of it as a primitive form of the state. Most studies of banditry regard 
their constituency as the stateless, and speak of the idea of proto-state as the most advanced form 
of statehood within banditry. 
That social bandits tend to work with less resources than most states, and their 
constituency tends to be less educated and prosperous than that admitted de facto in the state that 
has claims upon their territory, does not necessarily mean that they are any less sophisticated 
politically. I can’t claim the contrary either, for there are no publicly available records of their 
organizational prowess, nor am I a historian. However, from the traces that the cultural 
production that is related to Sinaloan and Chihuahuan social banditry, and definitely in Herrera’s 
depiction, there seems to be a quite complicated functional and territorial organization that is 
ignored at great risk to the state because of prejudice. 
For several decades now, the different iterations of bandit states in Northern Mexico have 
undertaken work in self-organization and self-representation, using corridos as a medium for 
creating affectual matrixes amongst their likely constituents that incline them in their favor. I do 
make a point that corridos and narcocorridos are not identical, that there exists an important 
difference between them. Corridos have always been songs of political strife associated with 
Northern Mexico and Aztlán, and from them arose the genre of the narcocorridos, which begun 
in the vein of “Pacas de a Kilo” and has evolved to the point where this musical form is now 
performing a major role as a medium of propaganda and communication. 
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Most of the affiliation with the cartel in Herrera’s novel has to do with the strife over 
bodies and subjectivity. Much like most young poor males during the Wars on Drugs, Lobo, 
Herrera’s corrido composer, has been excluded and objectified by the regime of what he calls, 
with scorn the decent folk. The criminalization of his kind leads him to side with El Rey, and to 
work to write corridos that justify his position in respect to the economic exclusions the state 
builds, and to craft the image of El Rey as a victim of injustice that metamorphoses him into a 
protector, a righter of wrongs. 
In this, a cartel makes the claim that it is closer to “original law” than the state is, that the 
cartel can respond to need much faster than law can, and it offers a promise of expedited defense 
and aid that the state refuses to offer. In his novel, the cartel arises out of the misery that the lack 
of a safety net or a welfare state produces, leading men into its ranks. In this fictional account, 
the cartel is founded upon the gaps in the nation-state, and the detritus that its decay and retreat 
produces is the fertile ground upon which social bandits grow like weeds.  
Finally, the last chapter, “Bandits: Ilegal representativity”, is built around the idea of 
Mexican American bandits as representatives of the people. In a territory that is so layered with 
cultures as the U.S. Southwest, racial and ethnic conflict have been common. Depicted as horse 
thieves or murderers by the dominant powers, bandits such as Joaquín Murrieta, Tiburcio 
Vásquez, Gregorio Cortez or Juan Nepomuceno Cortina have represented their people in a 
collective sense, in situations of violent outburst when Anglo American power has become 
unbearably violent.  
This chapter is divided in two sections: “Songwriter Masons of the Desert,” where I 
analyze Américo Paredes’s book: With His Pistol in His Hand, as a counterstory to Walter 
Prescott Webb’s Texas Rangers: A Century of Frontier Defense. In this section I display the 
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strategies of corridos for serving as cultural nexi and representing political conflict. In the other 
section, “Greeks in Roman Courthouses”, I analyze a crossing among theories of European 
universality, colonial modes of statehood, and legal practices in Southern Texas. In order to do 
so I rely on Rolando Hinojosa’s Klail City Death Trip Series, a group of fifteen novels coded as 
a counterstory of three hundred years of Texan history. I argue that universality under the law is 
a surefire path to injustice, because of the refusal to acknowledge the particularity of the 
disadvantaged within a legal system.  
“Songwriter Masons of the Desert” is focused on how corridos are a central literary 
tradition for borderers, preceding and informing what has later been known as the Border 
Renaissance, and what it means for this tradition that its literary forebear is a ballad of political 
strife and conflict. Some corrido characters grow into the status of cultural icons, as they 
represent stories that echo with the experience of the people and offer a model of citizenry. 
Paredes’s book, With His Pistol in His Hand, speaks of one such song, El corrido de Gregorio 
Cortez, which tells a representative story of a bandit, who begins his strife when his brother is 
executed summarily as a horse thief and then finds himself running from Sheriff Glover all 
throughout Southern Texas to save his life. This corrido serves Paredes as the motif for his own 
book-form corrido, a response to Webb’s racist version of Texan history. Paredes’s version of 
history shows the multilayered territories that exist in Texas, and alternatives to the narrative that 
has buttressed the dispossession of Mexican Americans. In his story, the broken treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo represents the border conflict that Gloria Anzaldúa would later characterize 
as an open wound. 
In order to study Texan history, the notion of displaced fear and its relation to the untold 
story of the frontier thesis is key. Most of the Anglo-Americans who settled Texas, and basically 
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all of the cattle barons, came from the slave states. In their own mytheme, slavers lived in 
perpetual horror, mostly producing it, because they feared the horror they had visited onto others 
would be visited upon themselves. They constructed an imaginary where their victims bore the 
face of their crimes. They raped the slave women, and crafted the image of the negro sex fiend; 
they took the land and cattle of Mexicans, and branded Mexicans as horse thieves; they invaded 
the land of Native Americans, and branded them invaders when they roamed the lands of their 
ancestors. The end result is that Anglo barons feared social engineering and class warfare, 
because they knew the results of such actions quite well, and along with the present plutocracy, 
feared destitution as the result of cries for equality. From their actions it follows that they 
considered destituting others as their right, and read the demand for equal rights as the right to 
have others destituted. 
Gregorio Cortez's story is significant in this context because it shows, inverted, the tales 
that were told of the Texas Rangers to justify the war of aggression that was fought in Southern 
Texas, denying full citizenship to Mexican Americans. The violence wielded against them is still 
not fully accounted for. Webb estimates some 500 or 5000 Mexican deaths at the hands of 
Rangers. The tenfold margin of error Webb accepts shows the utter lack of interest in historians 
and policemen for providing justice for Mexican-Americans.  
The story of these conflicts is the departing point for later writers, like Hinojosa, who 
amongst their political dilemmas ask themselves how to define their role in Texas, and how to 
find an answer to the question of which Texas is Texas? Can it be said that it is Texas, Tejas, or 
the sum of the two? 
In “Greeks in Roman Courthouses” I address a problem that results from Paredes’s 
cultural production. If we are to think of an egalitarian Texas, how can we conceive of it, how 
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can the ideas of universality, coloniality and the law be adjusted so that the system is not hedged 
against Mexican-Americans (or other groups in a power minority). This study focuses on two 
characters in Hinojosa’s series of novels: Jehú Malacara and Jesús Quieto Buenrostro. 
Quieto Buenrostro is a heroic character, but one that is construed in a rejection of the 
superhuman character of heroes associated with the West. Quieto is an everyman hero, who is 
involved in several key conflicts of the history of Hinojosa’s fictitious Belken County. He was 
the head of one of the few Chicano landowning families left at the beginning of the XXth 
century. In order to prevent the cattle barons from taking over his lands peacefully, he undertakes 
a legal strategy that preserves the land. He then resists the attempts to take it over by force until 
he is murdered in his sleep. His struggles comment on the difficulty of living the political. A 
difficulty that gets accentuated when conflicts between legal and honor codes abound. This 
produces a disjunction between the letter and the substance of the law. This leaves those who are 
underrepresented in the institutions that make the law at a serious disadvantage that can end up 
turning them into an underclass. 
This situation, where a people decides to join the fantasy of drone-like institutions, which 
could give certain guidelines to their actions and then be set to operate, automatically is very 
troubling. For those who have no part in deciding what guidelines will be used to make people 
equal under the law are at great risk in such a system. The San Elisario Salt War near El Paso, 
greatly resembles the Buenrostro conflicts, and is a good example of the privatization of land 
legally held in common. It was a conflict that surrounded a communal salt mine which was 
claimed by an Anglo as private land. In his conflict, Chicanos were arrested for crimes that did 
not even exist, while Anglos executed elected officials in public and retained Rangers as 
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personal bodyguards. The institutions built by Anglo-Americans apportioned means of 
production along racial lines and then pretended equality. 
In this environment of pretended equality we find Jehú Malacara, a distant relative of 
Quieto. Jehú sees the myth reincorporated in everyday life. In the conflict between institutions 
and people, Jehú becomes a hero of guile and wit in Odysseus’s tradition. He grows up 
straddling the communities of Anglos and Chicanos and experiences both, allowing him to think 
along the lines of systems of value relativization. He too participates in strategies of resistance in 
relation to land, renovating the reparceling of the Buenrostro lands, and also working within the 
KBC Bank and instructing Chicanos on how to secure loans and operate the financial aspects of 
their businesses. 
Through Jehú, I reflect on the otherness that is forced upon minoritary (in population or 
in participation in power) groups. To ignore the particularity of the disadvantaged is to further 
discriminate against them. What terms are found to be the grounds for equality is of the utmost 
importance to ensure it. If a group does not have significant participation in the crafting of laws, 
its rule is not government but tyranny. 
I argue, along with Robert Cover, that for every constitution there is an epic (4). The 
stories we tell ourselves are coherent with the political behavior we witness. If the behavior of 
the Rangers or the barons seems difficult to understand politically, it may be easier if we follow 
two presuppositions: That the Castle Doctrine4 is valid, and that Texas was privately owned land. 
                                                
4 The Castle Doctrine is a legal doctrine that designates a person's abode (or, in some 
states, any legally-occupied place [e.g., a vehicle or workplace]) as a place in which that person 
has certain protections and immunities permitting him or her, in certain circumstances, to use 
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Where people form part of a community they become engaged in it by being and belonging, as is 
evidenced by people who choose to become a part of a different community. For those who cross 
such social and racial boundaries lies a process of othering, a becoming other than themselves. A 
different system built around the possibility of multiplicity is needed in the globalized world, to 
be able to account for the multiplicities now implicit in most of the world. 
 
This project is not about crafting a prescription for using narrative in politics. Such a 
prescription is unlikely to make much sense, for politics is the chameleonic art of adjusting to 
circumstances. No matter what the problem is in the political, our actions continually redefine 
the parameters of what the political is. When addressing income inequality as the most important 
problem in economics, Piketty claims that economics cannot be conceived of as a simply 
mechanical tool to predict and reduce the complexity of the world at large; our decisions 
continually redefine what is and what should be: 
The history of the distribution of wealth has always been deeply political, 
and it cannot be reduced to purely economic mechanisms. In particular, the 
reduction of inequality that took place in most developed countries between 1910 
and 1950 was above all a consequence of war and of policies adopted to cope 
with the shocks of war. Similarly, the resurgence of inequality after 1980 is due 
largely to the political shifts of the past several decades, especially in regard to 
taxation and finance. The history of inequality is shaped by the way economic, 
                                                                                                                                                       
force (up to and including deadly force) to defend themselves against an intruder, free from legal 
responsibility/prosecution for the consequences of the force usedInvalid source specified. 
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social, and political actors view what is just and what is not, as well as by the 
relative power of those actors and the collective choices that result. It is the joint 
product of all relevant actors combined. (490) 
Our stories, our cities, and our nations are always ours to change and adjust and to bring 
closer to justice or further into injustice. The study of the past, what we have done to the way we 
configure our nations, and what we tell ourselves leads us to suspicion in regards to the use of 
stories in relation to the political. And while I would not dare to propose any part of this project 
as prescriptive, for it is not viable to think of what the future stories will look like, I will invite 
the reader to follow me in the analysis of the slippery political slopes our myths throw us into.  
So let’s remember that kid watching the savages in the volcano; let’s remember that kid 
witnessing the genocide of his forebears; let’s remember the one ganging up with Mowgli on the 
orangutans. Remember, and think hard on it, for the power of our stories and our myths is great. 
And they often act through us, setting the limits for what we believe is real; for what we believe 
is just; for what we believe is good; and even more importantly, for what we believe can be.  
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COWBOYS: JUSTICIAR EXCEPTION 
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KNIGHTS ERRANT OF THE AMERICAN PRAIRIE 
 
“What the Mediterranean Sea was to the 
Greeks, breaking the bonds of custom, offering 
new experiences, calling out new institutions and 
activities, that, and more, the ever retreating 
frontier has been to the United States." 
Frederick Jackson Turner 
 
It is nothing but four pages, four pages that could have been forever lost in the 
history Livy wrote of the Roman peoples. In those four pages, we find Lucius Quinctus 
Cincinnatus, in peace, working his land, maybe behind the plow, maybe working on an 
irrigation ditch. He is wearing a simple tunic, not one of those Romans in fancy togas we 
are used to seeing in the movies, and neither is he one of those armored consuls, chasing 
after Liz Taylor perhaps. Quietly far away from Rome and the political, he is interrupted 
by an envoy from the Senate, who asks, offering prayers to the Olympians, interceding 
for him, and for the Republic, that he may heed the call of Rome and follow them to the 
city in the guise of a Magister Populi.  
Cincinnatus, “after mutual salutations had passed, being requested by the 
ambassadors to put on his gown, and listen to the commands of the senate, (with wishes) 
that it might be happy both to him and to the commonwealth, being astonished, and 
asking frequently "whether all was safe," he bids his wife Racilia immediately to bring 
his toga from his hut” (Livius) Fifteen days later, having saved the Republic, Cincinnatus 
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resigned his position as Magister Populi and he quits the political space altogether, away 
from public life. And then he disappears. Quietly as he came. 
Change the scene: The image we see now, in the mirages of the desert is very 
familiar. A man is riding with a poncho for a toga and a hat for an olive branch. The 
scorched land, baked into ceramic, is cracked like a broken vase. In the distance, red 
mountains merge with the horizon. Everything we see is a little bit out of focus due to the 
little humidity in the air, the lack of which makes the air shimmer. We can listen to a 
minimalistic, but quite absorbent music, which follows the figure of a stranger riding into 
town. 
It is not a single movie we think of as we remember this setting, it ain’t even 
isolated in the imaginary, it is a construct that we can simply recognize from cowboy 
movies. We don’t even need to see the picture to know that the character wears a hat, we 
don’t need to listen to any dialog in order to know he is a cowboy. We don’t need to 
know the plot to know he is on his way to reestablish justice. We know the story to take 
place in the Old West, we know what it is about. The cowboy, the stranger, is a blank 
slate whose role is for us to be able to stand in his shoes. The West he rides is more an 
ideological space, rather than a geographic one, like Athearn says: “Not just the West of 
geography. It was also the West of the mind, of the Spirit, a concept that for generations 
had reassured Americans of a future, a place to go, even though most of them would not 
choose to move” (10). The territory that extended in the general direction of the Pacific 
Ocean was always free space, an escape valve for all evils, that defined, through its own 
indeterminacy, the nation that contained it, and was, at the same time, contained within it. 
In the very influential study The Significance of the Frontier in American History, we 
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find the following thesis: “Up to our own day American history has been in a large 
degree the history of the colonization of the Great West. The existence of an area of free 
land, its continuous recession, and the advance of American settlement westward, explain 
American development.” (Turner, The Significance of the Frontier… 1893) In this 
discourse, that was read in 1893, in the conference that the American Historical 
Association held during Chicago’s World Fair, Turner proposed the Frontier Thesis, and 
changed the path of American Studies. In this discourse: 
Turner maintained that the West, not the proslavery South or the 
antislavery North, was the most important among American sections, and 
that the novel attitudes and institutions produced by the frontier, 
especially through its encouragement of democracy, had been more 
significant than the imported European heritage in shaping American 
society. (Smith 250) 
It is not hard to propose that the factors that invested importance upon the West 
were its neutrality and indefinition. This changed the political organization of the 
country, as the conflict that followed what is known in the history of the South of the 
U.S.A. as “Redemption” were liable to become invisible. The release this territory 
offered, allowed the malcontents of the East to emigrate, instead of antagonizing the 
elites, providing the principle of possibility for the sustenance of the State.  
Nothing particularly important seemed to happen in this territory, in comparison 
to the events of the Civil War, for example. After all, Little Big Horn had less than 500 
casualties, which pale in comparison to the 51,000 casualties of the battle of Gettysburg, 
to name but one of the battles that took place in the East. The impact of economic activity 
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in the West would not be big enough that it could precipitate a national crisis until the 
1930’s, in the middle of the Great Depression, with the Dust Bowl. And yet, it is 
precisely because of this seeming lack of protagonism that stories of the West can 
become as significant as they are in the political mythology of the United States: 
And yet this negligible history was seized upon by writers, who 
transmuted facts, figures, and movements beyond recognition, projecting 
mythic possibilities out of prosaic events (Pat Garret's capture of Billy the 
Kid, Custer's last stand, the Earp-Clanton shoot-out at Tombstone's O.K. 
Corral). In fact, a reason western history could be transmuted into art so 
readily was because it was viewed by Americans as pleasantly varied but 
inconsequential. (Mitchell 5) 
The ideological importance of the West derives from the possibility of having a 
terrain outside of the body politic, free, a terrain from which the previous occupants have 
either been removed or are just about to be removed (in any case, as Indians, they are not 
thought of by those in power as equals, and are considered unsuitable for the dream of the 
yeoman farmer). For the purposes of political mythology, "The West matters less as 
verifiable topography than as space removed from cultural coercion, lying beyond 
ideology (and therefore, of course, the most ideological of terrains)." (Mitchell 4) Much 
like the territory, the Cowboy, on his steed, roaming this territory barren of History and 
fertile in stories, he himself is an ideological space, he sees in himself the territory that 
conforms him. Like the “man with no name” Eastwood lent his body to, he is merely a 
 39 
receptacle for the movie goer. This knight errant5, who rides through empty space, 
becomes empty himself, a man with no name. The cowboy is an infinite tract of 
philosophical space, to be occupied by whatever the spectator brings. A great part of 
Clint Eastwood’s success comes from his propensity for this role: 
 The film needs spectators to complete the scene; they supply the 
desire and passion missing from Eastwoood. This is because Eastwood in 
his persona and his presence is oddly incomplete; the cause of his 
phenomenal success might lie partly in the fact that he is only a schematic 
figure whose desires and motivations the spectator willingly fills in. 
(Bingham 168) 
Eastwood’s figure, in his abstraction, his lack of emotion and context opens a 
space for a profoundly ideological narration that is presented believably. As we find him, 
not quite a blank slate, but still quite empty, alone on the red dust of the West, we already 
know something about him. We know there is something in his past he is trying to escape 
from, and he is really out of place in the town he is riding into. His place, in truth, is 
outside the city limits, in the uncivilized, misty, sun-baked plains. We know he belongs 
outside civilization, in the wilderness. There’s always a well-managed balance between 
                                                
5 And there is much to be said about the figure of Knight Errants in political 
mythology of the United States. Roosevelt, for example, in his Winning of the West, uses 
this figure profusely. Another famous instance was Jackie Kennedy’s famous interview, 
where she said of her husband Jack’s presidency: "Don't let it be forgot, that once there 
was a spot, for one brief shining moment that was known as Camelot--and it will never 
be that way again." (White 159). 
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the lack of content and context, and enough information to support the basic mythic 
structure. The story presented here is composed of familiar materials, that have been 
made into myth, the loom where the peplum of the representation of a community is 
woven: 
These familiar materials, however, are only so many unwoven raw 
strands. What actually brings them together into the narrative we 
recognize as a Western are a set of problems recurring in endless 
combination: the problem of progress, envisioned as a passing of 
frontiers; the problem of honor, defined in a context of social expediency; 
the problem of law or justice, enacted in a conflict of vengeance and 
social control; the problem of violence, in acknowledging its value yet 
honoring occasions when it can be controlled; and subsuming all, the 
problem of what it means to be a man, as aging victim of progress, 
embodiment of honor, champion of justice in an unjust world. (Mitchell 3) 
This environment, both empty and full of meaning at the same time, is the perfect 
laboratory to explore the emotivity of political problems in narrative. Law, violence and 
justice are experimented, represented and codified into values. It is not casual that this 
environment would penetrate so deeply in the collective subconscious. The cowboy 
narrative is constitutive of America’s image, since it negotiates unresolved issues, shared 
traumas that linger below the national historical narrative. 
From this imaginary arises the stranger that concerns us right now. At the 
beginning of Eastwood’s directorial debut with High Plains Drifter, we can see the 
character, nameless, crossing a cemetery with a markless cross, the stranger rides into 
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town, walks into a bar, where he asks for a bottle and three gunmen provoke a fight. The 
cowboy walks out of the saloon and seeks that civilizatory mark: the shave6. He is, 
however, interrupted again, and the stranger kills the men with otherworldly precision 
and speed. As he walks out, a woman pushes him and insults him. The stranger grabs her 
by the arm, tosses her into a barn and rapes her.  
This scene belies the normal progression for the film. The stranger does not 
conform to the law, and does not seem to conform to any notion of ethics. An invading 
enemy forcibly takes the town. Up til now, the easiest interpretation is to place this 
narrative within the framework of American naturalism, civilization facing the continual 
threat of a strange wilderness. But that is not Eastwood’s narrative. His is a revisionist 
approach to cowboy mythology. In this film, it is not the alien and wild that generates 
fear, but much rather, it is the town itself that produces the problems, as we can see in the 
following dialogue between the Stranger and the townfolk:  “-You're a man who makes 
people afraid and that's dangerous. STRANGER:-It's what people know about themselves 
inside that makes them afraid.” 73 Through a series of flashbacks, the story shows a 
different side to the events that unfurl. The Sheriff that represented the law in that town 
appears in front of us, whipped to death, in the middle of the night, with the observant 
town complicit to the murder. The innocent victims we thought we observed earlier, 
merit the questions: innocent of what? The town hires the stranger to protect them from 
                                                
6 The meaning of the shave for the cowboy gunslinger is very important, it 
signifies reentrance to civilization. A stubble or beard tends to mark cowboys with the 
thick of wilderness, a separation from the polis. By shaving, they portray their desire to 
reenter society. 
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three men who will come to take revenge on the people. We slowly learn of the plot that 
underlies the actions in the present of the film. The town is economically dependent on a 
mine which was fraudulently operated, as it was located on federal land. The owners had 
the Sheriff murdered, so that he would not divulge the fraud.  
This story places us in the crossing of two of the key political myths in the 
American imaginary. On the one hand, we face the mythology of regeneration through 
violence, well described by Richard Slotkin in his book trilogy, and on the other hand, we 
can see the myth of civilization and barbarism, in its frontier edition, the confrontation 
between the anglo colonists and the wild, aggressive and idyllic nature of the New World. 
These two myths intertwine often. The Western image of the New World as a 
space both antagonistic and idyllic comes from the very first reports Columbus sent to 
Castille, coursing through the many civilizatory experiments conceived for America, such 
as the perfect cities Da Vinci drew up, More’s  Utopia, or Bacon’s New Atlantis, where 
the continent was a laboratory to explore ideal images of human societies, freed from the 
yoke of Old World oppression. As Slotkin states, that impetus to find a newer, purer life, 
found its own self in violence: 
The first colonists saw in America an opportunity to regenerate 
their fortunes, their spirits, and the power of their church and nation; but 
the means to that regeneration ultimately became the means of violence, 
and the myth of regeneration through violence became the structuring 
metaphor of the American experience. (Slotkin, Regeneration through 
violence 5) 
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The frontier experience and the conquest of the West was a process of purification 
through violence that erased its trace as it grew, covering its myth with a romantic 
veneer. By exterminating the Indian land was freed; by privatizing the commons fortunes 
were built; by means of imagination, reality was overcome. What the town carries out, as 
it opts to murder the Sheriff to prevent the unveiling of the fraudulent origin of its 
prosperity, is to replay the American Dream in Lago, appropriating land in a process of 
continued thievery. The territory, which used to be property of the Indians, was snatched 
away by Spain, then Mexico, then America and then by robber barons. The history of this 
land is always absent and present at the same time. The traces are present even if they are 
written over in the palimpsest of Western history. The town name is the Hispanic Lago. 
In the town’s general store, the Stranger takes candy and blankets from the store in order 
to make a gift of them to an Indian family that was in the store, addressing, if only 
marginally, the need to make amends with historical injustice. Further on, the Stranger 
prepares, ironically, a welcome party for the bandits, requisioning food and drink from 
the town. A pair of Mexicans, who appropriate the necessary wood from a town barn, 
build the furniture needed. These carpenters ask if they may participate in the party, but 
the Stranger refuses, as the party is a celebration of the town’s guilt.  
The Stranger’s activity in town, and the way he overthrows social structures, for 
example, naming the town’s midget as the Mayor, brings forward the violence hidden 
behind the prosperous dream the mining company peddles. Having regenerated their 
fortune and power, they gloss over the violence that fuels this process. This is the way in 
which, in the Wild West, the two visions Europeans impose on the New World are 
reconciliated, the way in which the ever receeding frontier was greeted by the new 
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Americans, the settlers who created first the British colonies and then the young 
Republic.  
In this new, unknown territory, the European “adventurer” plunges into the 
Frontier, the mythic West, trying to reconcile the civilization he projects upon himself 
and the barbarism he exercises and projects upon the territory, trying to reconcile the land 
of opportunity, free for the taking, and the wilderness full of danger, populated by 
savages and trouble. When the new Sheriff that the Stranger finds, a man who claims to 
have been elected by chance, describes the murder of his predecessor, he states: 
Bullwhipped. Damnedest thing I ever saw.                       
Why would anybody want to do a thing like that?                       
I don't know. It wasn't anybody from this town anyhow.                       
How do you know?                       
This is a good town and these are good people (Eastwood, High 
Plains Drifter) 
A good town, good people, birds with feathers that break through swamps with no 
smear, taint or stain. The man who sets himself up for the grand landgrab of the west 
requires a mythology that naturalizes, justifies and requires the violence implicit in the 
colonization and conquest of the country. When the Stranger returns to town, and forces 
the settlers to wield weapons themselves, what comes forth is the huge abyss between the 
imaginary and reality, between guilt and profit. The town and mining company outsource 
guilt, putting separation between themselves and their actions, by hiring first the bandits 
and then the Stranger. They build a mythology of a pacific orderly body politic, placing 
their original violence outside the city limits.  
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The Stranger throws a wrench in the gears of this ideological machine. The town 
finds itself uncapable of withholding the status quo it generated, and a hole must be 
opened within for its own preservation. This is ordinarily the conflict played out in 
cowboy films, how a man, a stranger to the body politic, finds himself, much like 
Cincinnatus, walking into town in order to protect the polis from menace. He becomes an 
element that both belongs and remains alien. Eastwood however, turns this myth on its 
head, and points out the ideology that belies its ideals.  
When the foreign element inaugurates a state of exception, what we find is not the 
peaceful settlers who populate the genre of cowboy films (Settlers which the films never 
bother explaining just what they are doing in Apache or Sioux territory), but a town that 
has bought its prosperity with a hideous crime. Here we do not find a Stranger rid of 
history (flashbacks reveal that the Stranger is the Sheriff the townfolk murdered in order 
to preserve their privilege), but a force of vengeance. Outside the town, outside life, 
outside the body politic, the Stranger, Marshall Duncan, the former Sheriff, becomes the 
master of the people, Magister populi, and establishes order, though it is an order foreign 
to Lago.  
High Plains Drifter’s mythology problematizes the regeneration of the West, 
starting an ethical discussion regularly absent from cowboy films. John Wayne’s Hondo, 
a very good example, fails to explain just what exactly are the Lowes (the Lowe widow 
represents the romantic interest in the film) doing in Indian territory, it fails to explain as 
well why Hondo, in spite of supposed strong ethics, and a mixed heritage, chooses to 
align with the whites in a war that arises from whites breaking yet another treaty. These 
films presupposed morality to be on the side of the settlers, a supposition that required 
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considerable effort to preserve. This preservation effort was such that when Eastwood 
offered John Wayne the starring role for High Plains Drifter, after repeated conversations 
about their desire to work together, Wayne reffused, claiming those settlers were not 
adequate images of what the West represented for America. (Schikel 291).  
The relationship between body politic and sovereign7 is very close in this 
laboratory, as they constantly define each other. As Agamben says of the sovereign in 
times of exception: “Being-outside, and yet belonging: this is the topological structure of 
the state of exception, and only because the sovereign, who decides on the exception, is, 
in truth, logically defined in his being by the exception” (Agamben, State of exception 
35) We should think of this relationship of mutual semiological and ontological 
dependence, as we turn back to Turner’s Frontier Thesis, which tells us it is the frontier 
which defines American culture. It is this capacity to absorb countless violence, to 
receive any excess of population, to produce uncatalogued riches, to digest barbarism, to 
offer free space in between barbarism and civilization, where the latter need not 
immediately apply, that we find the two main poles of American political mythology. 
This mythology is constantly defined in its pendulum between civilization and barbarism, 
where barbarism is not so much an integral part of civilization, but rather its main 
product. In High Plains Drifter we can clearly appreciate the efforts the town makes to 
preserve its appeareance of civilization. As they discuss their defensive options in regard 
to the bandits, the priest states: “my conscience will not allow me to be a party to the 
hiring of a professional gunfighter” (Eastwood, High Plains Drifter) However, when 
                                                
7 I delve deeper on the possibility of non-identity between the sovereign and the 
people in “Outlaw Utopias” the third section of this study. 
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asked for an alternative, he mentions he has duties elsewhere, and, by omission, allows 
the gunslinger to be hired. The revisionist project is very clearly stated by the actions of 
Marshall Duncan. After the hotel owner’s wife tells him: “You're a man who makes 
people afraid and that's dangerous.” (Eastwood, High Plains Drifter) he quickly 
responds: “It's what people know about themselves inside that makes them afraid” 
(Eastwood, High Plains Drifter) What he proposes is the moral destabilization of the 
regeneration by violence process. The film’s answer however, gets stuck in a loop within 
this myth itself. The Stranger leaves Lago, after his revenge is done and justice has been 
served. The town is to prosper in peace for ever more. 
Eastwood returns to his unfinished business in Unforgiven, his most acclaimed 
film, where he goes back to the same laboratory with a very different experiment in mind. 
In this film, the Stranger, is found in a pigsty, raising hogs, far from violence, and in 
retirement. A muck-covered-Cincinnatus. William Munny, our new stranger, and a 
former assassin and thief, starts the film in front of his wife’s grave, silent and only 
silhouetted on screen. We read that Claudia Feathers Munny has managed to retire 
William from his former life, full of alcohol and violence, and that it was not her choice 
in groom that led her to an early grave, but an epidemic. And from this scene we are 
thrust into the original violent sin in the film: A prostitute in Big Whiskey, WY laughs at 
a cowpoke’s short penis. The cowboy disfigures her face with a knife in return. When 
Little Bill, the Sheriff, arrives at the scene in order to reestablish order, he refuses to 
punish the offender as a criminal. This reduces the crime to a commercial dispute.  
Skinny, the brothel’s owner, has a contract with Delilah, the prostitute, for he paid 
for her moving expenses in her trip to Big Whiskey. Now that Delilah is disfigured, she is 
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left tradeless, and thus unable to liquidate Skinny’s investment. This conflict reflects on 
the underlaying problems that the move out West glosses over: A highly patriarchal 
society, still possessed by the echoes of slavery, and enticed by the possibility of 
biopolitics, experimenting with ever new alchemic ways to transform flesh into gold. 
What follows is not a casual transaction, but one of the conflict’s central issues, 
both in the film and in its reading of America’s mythic life. Little Bill assesses the 
damages incurred in the amount of seven colts, refusing to address the woman’s 
mutilation as a crime, transforming Delilah’s living flesh into a merchandise freely 
interchangeable for money or goods. Strawberry Alice describes the conflict thus: “Just 
‘cause we let’em ride us like horses, don’t mean we have to let’em brand us like horses” 
(Eastwood, Unforgiven) In this film we go back to the sort of conflict experienced in 
High Plains Drifter, regarding the search for an excepcionality outside the law in order to 
reestablish a body politic’s status quo. However, the view is opened, as if it were seen 
through a wide-angle lens. If we reflect again on Turner’s position, where the Frontier is 
posited as preponderant over slavery as the central subject of American history, we can 
clearly listen to the echoes of slavery in this narrative8. America’s conflicts follow, no 
matter how fast they ride to the Pacific. 
                                                
8 There are many echoes of slavery in appearance throughout the film. Morgan 
Freeman plays Munny’s partner, Ned Logan. He takes part in a scene where Little Bill is 
whips him on the back. During this scene, he is hit numerous times, while the whole town 
listens, and Logan refuses to give the correct name for Munny, and all these names are 
refused by Little Bill. This scene seems very much like an inverted quote of the iconic 
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The life that is built in Big Whiskey appears under idillic tones, as Little Bill 
builds his little house on the prairie by himself, and Skinny, the brothel impresario, is just 
about to become (according to Little Bill) the country’s first “Billiard Tycoon”. 
Nevertheless, just as in Lago, that prosperity is built on violence and exploitation.  
What jumps in our face is the structural violence of the West, the persistence of 
the exploitation of the civilization and barbarism with which the theft of the occupied 
land is “cleansed”, an original story that mythology built to obscure the violence. The 
cowboy stories around which the idea of the “taming of the West” was built are only a 
patina of civilization over the iniquity and violence of the west-ward expansion. This 
narrative is evidenced in the film in the figure of W.W. Beauchamp, an Eastern writer 
who arrives to Big Whiskey as the biographer of a gunslinger, English Bob, who aims to 
collect the bounty the prostitutes offered to whoever would bring justice to them9.  
Upon his arrival, Little Bill disarms English Bob and jails him. The mask that 
drops from English Bob’s face is a reflection on the cover applied to barbarism in the 
name of civilization. The Sheriff narrates how he witnessed English Bob’s most famous 
                                                                                                                                            
scene in Roots, where Kuntai Kinte refuses to acknowledge his slave name. While the 
whip cracks, W.W. Beauchamp, the civilizing gaze, looks the other way. 
9 The definition of justice offered here is relative. Currently, the position of the 
Judiciary in the United States is that the Eigth Amendment prohibits the use of death as a 
penalty in cases of rape or physical harm that does not end in death, considering it  to be 
cruel and unusual punishment. In any case, Little Bill’s exercise of judiciary powers is 
illegitimate, as would have been so in the case of any gunslinger who would heed the 
prostitute’s call and execute the cowboys. 
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showdown, and tells the “true story” to Beauchamp, not surprisingly, a much less heroic 
tale than that which the Englishman narrated. In the end, Beauchamp prefers to continue 
writing a biography, though now it is Little Bill’s that he takes a fancy to. Then, when 
Bob, disarmed, beaten, in chains and unmasked, is taken out of town in a stagecoach, he 
screams at the top of his lungs: 
A plague on you! A plague on the whole stinking lot of you, without 
morals or laws! You got no laws! You got no honor!  It's no wonder you 
all emigrated to America, because they wouldn't have you in England! 
You're all a lot of savages, that's what you are.  A bunch of bloody 
savages! A plague on you. I'll be back! (Eastwood, Unforgiven) 
It is curious that as the symbol of fallen civilization, English Bob’s last words are 
at the same time a quotation of Shakespeare’s work10, a beacon of civilization, and a 
threat to return to what he deems a lawless, savage place Even though it is clear that 
English Bob isn’t in any way less savage than Little Bill, the Englishman’s threat echoes 
of history. It places him at the same time in and out of place, a representative of a  
European tradition in the Wild West. William H. Munny, riding his steed into Big 
Whiskey is not the first iteration of his archetype: The cowboy is a reiteration of an entity 
of European political mythology, with a difference.  
                                                
10 English Bob’s speech echoes Mercutio’s dying words, where he curses 
Montagues and Capulets both: “I am hurt. A plague o' both your houses! I am sped. Is he 
gone, and hath nothing?” (Shakespeare Act 3 Sc I.) 
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Myths are not created or destroyed, only transformed. Much like, at least, three 
presidents who rode the cowboy myth into the White House11, prior political clases have 
built mythologies of liminality to essay notions of civilization and barbarism. The 
mythology of the errant knight is very important in the constitution of that of the cowboy, 
different as their time and spaces are. In the old roads of Europe, following the downfall 
of the Roman Empire, and preceding the rise of the Nation State, the myth of the 
honorable knight grew, a rider dedicated to righting wrongs and dispensing justice. 
Camelot was shaped, the perfect image of a civilized center from which, on the haunches 
of the knights’ steeds, law and order would disseminate. 
In this frontier, the order of things in mythology is inverted. Law does not come 
from the East, the cities, but from the empty, unpopulated spaces. The cowboy, like a 
grand jury from beyond, appears as judge, jury and executioner, dedicated to honor, and 
to protect those who cannot protect themselves.12. However, much like the knight who 
fights the monster only to see his face beneath the helm of his enemy, and much like 
                                                
11 It is all too obvious that Theodore Roosevelt, Ronald Reagan and George W. 
Bush, at least, made use of the aesthetics and ethics of the West and the frontier in order 
tu articulate their public image. 
12 Theodore Roosevelt, as Holmes concedes, subscribed to honor’s preponderance 
above the law: “TR believed in a government less of laws than of men. ‘To a practical 
student of government like yourself’, he told one colleague, ‘I do not have to say that the 
question of who is to administer the laws is always more important than the question of 
exactly what the law shall be.’ The letter of the law must not impede the honorable 
course of action.” (Holmes 23) 
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Arthur finds in Mordred, his own blood, death and treason, the cowboy finds in himself 
the reverse of his code of honor, finds himself civilizing through the exercise of savagery. 
The stories Beauchamp records in Unforgiven are continually edging away from 
heroism. Departing from English Bob, the Duke of Death,13 a heroic and civilized 
justiciar of the West, he comes into Little Bill, a gruff, pragmatic Sheriff, who faces 
violence as the price for civilization. Little Bill, exemplary of states of exception, lives 
outside Big Whiskey, in an archetypal house on the prairie that he builds with his own 
hands, a place to smoke a cigar and watch the sun set. He has created a locus amoenus in 
Big Whiskey, where only the agents of the law are allowed weapons, and he seems to be 
able to uphold the peace by any means necessary. 
English Bob and Little Bill are two chronologically distinct forms of the myth of 
regeneration through violence. In Beauchamp’s work as the film shows, the actions 
carried out by both gunslingers are molded into something else: 
 LITTLE BILL ‘You have insulted the honor of this beautiful 
woman, Corchran.’  Said The Duck. ‘You must apologize.’ But Two-Gun 
Corchran  would have none of it, and, cursing, he reached for his pistols 
and  would have killed him, but The Duck was faster, and hot lead blazed  
from his smoking six-guns. 
                                                
13 The film approaches this situation with a simple but sharp pun, as the 
uncultured policemen of Big Whiskey reads “The Duke of Death” as though it sounded 
like “The Duck of Death”. 
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BEAUCHAMP See, I consider that to be an accurate description of 
the events ---Albeit--- All right,  there is a certain poetry to the language 
which  I couldn't resist. (Eastwood, Unforgiven) 
The “The Duke of Death” represents the style of a gallant cowboy, popularized in 
the figure of John Wayne, as a guarantor of honor, law and order in a place that has no 
abundance of any one of them. This figure, nonetheless, is easily dismissed by Little 
Bill’s testimony: 
LITTLE BILL Uh, Mr. Beauchamp I was in the Blue Bottle Saloon 
in Wichita on the night that English Bob killed Corky Corchran, and I 
didn't see you there, nor no woman. No two-gun shooters. None of this. 
(…) Yeah, well, a lot of folks did call him Two Gun, but that wasn't 
because he was sporting two pistols, it was because he had a dick that was 
so big it was longer than the barrel on that Walker-Colt that he carried. 
And the only insulting he ever did was stick that thing of his into this 
French lady that English Bob here was kind of sweet on. (Eastwood, 
Unforgiven) 
Little Bill replaces the myth of the galant cowboy with the revisionist version, a 
myth of a rough, pragmatic, less idealistic character, that attempts, in an imperfect world, 
to dispense justice and impose some kind of order. The ample powers he wields (in 
effect, in Big Whiskey he is the judiciary, legislative and executive power, with a capital 
power to decide on any subject he wills) he conceives as a mandate to uphold peace. He 
fulfills the role of Magister populi in Big Whiskey. This role arises from need, from the 
absence of an executive or judiciary power that might apply the laws of the territory of 
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Wyoming or of the United States. In his self perception, he is the only one who protects 
the town from the scum that frequents taverns: “I can't abide them kind. You see them in 
the taverns, you know, tramps and drunk teamsters and crazed miners, (…) sporting their 
pistols and acting like they was bad men but without any sand or character. Not even any 
bad character. I do not like assassins (…) or men of low character.” (Eastwood, 
Unforgiven) When he comes across Munny, feverish and delirious, suspect of being a 
bounty hunter, and guilty of sporting weapons inside the city limits, he disarms and beats 
him, much like he did the “Duck of Death”, and tosses him out of town. As he does so, he 
says: “You see, Mister Beauchamp. This is the kind of trash I was speaking of. You find 
this kind in all your saloons and all your prosperous communities. Over in, uh, Cheyenne, 
Abilene, But you won't find them in the town of Big Whiskey.” (Eastwood, Unforgiven) 
While the details of Little Bill’s role might be relatively irrelevant, the figure he gives 
shape to is directly inserted into a recurring reflection on a political resource. There is 
recourse to the immediateness of need, to the inadequacy of the institutions on which the 
State depends for its legitimacy, that a bubble in the legality that legitimizes it might 
burst. 
Agamben, in State of exception, quotes Gracian in order to discuss the use of need 
as a precursor to law, even as the guarantor principle of law, as common good is derived 
from necessity: “If something is done out of necessity, it is done licitly, since what is not 
licit in law necessity makes licit. Likewise necessity has no law” (24) Nevertheless, when 
we afirm this relationship between necessity and law, we open an exceedingly important 
question in relation to the function of the state of exception. If the law should be 
suspended in favor of the common good, an obvious doubt comes forth: Whose common 
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good? After all, some reason must exist for common good to require the law instead of a 
case by case analysis of necessity. As Agamben states: “Necessity is not a source of law 
nor does it properly suspend the law; it merely releases a particular case from the literal 
application of the norm” (25) No matter, by the nature itself of the exception, it is 
somewhere between incredibly hard and imposible to codify how and when the literal 
application of the norm can be avoided in favor of the exception. Furthermore, once the 
lacuna of exception comes into being, it is hard to establish a principle of justice in the 
exception of the law, for, “If the state of exception’s characteristic property is a (total or 
partial) suspension of the juridical order, how can such a suspension still be contained 
within it? How can an anomie be inscribed within the juridical order? And if the state of 
exception is instead only a de facto situation, and is as such unrelated or contrary to law, 
how is it posible for the order to contain a lacuna precisely where the decisive situation is 
concerned?” (Agamben 23) but who might decide the inauguration of this state of 
exception, and then, how to regulate the return to law, or how to establish a principle of 
responsability or justice for those who are entrusted to the Magister Populi.  
In the film it is easy to appreciate that in Big Whiskey, the common good is not 
all that common. All the conflict is triggered by Little Bill’s decision to inaugurate one 
more exception within his already arbitrary justice system: 
 ALICE For what they done? Skinny get's some ponies, and that's 
it?  That ain't fair, Little Bill. That ain't fair!   
LITTLE BILL Haven't you seen enough blood for one night, Huh?  
Hell, Alice, it ain't like they were tramps, or loafers or bad men, you know 
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there were just hard working boys who were foolish. If they was given 
over to wickedness in a regular way then I could see... 
ALICE Like whores? (Eastwood, Unforgiven) 
The pragmatism shown in this reign of political necessity does not contribute to 
the welfare of the community if by such we understand to mean all the inhabitants of a 
territory. The mechanisms by which the presumption of innocence in the eyes of the law 
is established and protected are always amongst the first things to go. After Little Bill 
beats William Munny to his heart’s content, Alice the prostitute complains: “ALICE: 
You just kicked the shit out of an innocent man.  LITTLE BILL: Innocent? Innocent of 
what?” (Eastwood, Unforgiven) 
And it is on this question that hinges the violent pragmatism where the 
construction of the argument of necessity is unraveled, the node upon which the 
justification of the legal lacuna is established. A Magister populi erects himself as an 
element outside the law in order to sustain the law, as he preserves the common welfare 
of a body politic. But by establishing a presumption of guilt, we can see how the initial 
justification, the protection of those foolish hard working boys loses its meaning. What is 
the difference between those hard working boys and the scum or prostitutes and why 
would we need such a distinction? In the face of an ever-growing legal lacuna, what is to 
justify the Magister’s actions? Convenience? Pragmatism? Ideology? His relationship 
with the more prosperous citizens, such as Skinny? Within this community of men living 
the American Dream, living in their housea on the prairie, living with their prosperous 
businesses, it is power over somebody else’s flesh that establishes the objectives of the 
common good.  
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William Munny’s life, in his failed farm, where he has found a retreat from his 
former violent life, only to see his wife die, his pigs catch a sickness, and ruin creep up 
on him, slowly but with certainty, stands in stark contrast to Little Bill and Skinny’s 
prosperity. It is not surprising for the prostitutes who are not really admitted within the 
political community to look amongst their peers for a Magister Populi, an element of 
exception that might administer their justice. We now have before us two cowboys, both 
of them coming to the body politic from a beyond in order to impose order: Little Bill 
and William Munny.  
Two paths for analysis open up: A) the body politic now has two Magister 
Populii; B) There are two body politics in competition in Big Whiskey, both of them in a 
state of emergency, recurring to a dictator to look for a return to a stable state.  
If in the beginning, what characterized the people expanding westward, and what 
justified their appropriation of the territory, was their role as representatives and 
introducers of civilization, how can they further justify themselves? If civilization, even 
in their terms, was considered as a means to produce and protect innocence, what 
happens when those who are charged with its protection ignore it or forget about it? 
Unforgiven is Clint Eastwood’s swan song as a Western hero. It is a role that 
seems to bury every serious prospect of continuing the discourse of regeneration through 
violence. The title itself is probably the best key to understanding the film, as it has often 
been acclaimed as a fitting eulogy for the western genre. It is a reflection on the 
characters and on the genre. In it, we find two intertwined body politics and their stories: 
In Little Bill’s, we can observe the economic history of the explotaition of human flesh; 
in William Munny’s, the raw violence that underlies the Conquest of the West.  
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The procedures through which one and the other strive to create innocence and 
find absolution for their actions are miserable failures. Little Bill is unable to generate a 
community to protect, as he continually reduces it, every step forced to walk further 
ahead into the land of exception. On the other hand, Munny, goes back to drink, the 
cowboy who rode into the horizon, seeking forgiveness in Claudia Feathers, a woman 
who “straightened me [Munny] up, cleared me of drinking whiskey and all” (Eastwood, 
Unforgiven). All his murders, his fame as a killer of women, children, and  “just about 
anything that walked or crawled at one time or another” (Eastwood, Unforgiven), were 
acts of drunkenness. After Claudia, sober, with two children, having joined the republic 
of yeomen farmers, he feels different: “NED You was one crazy son of a bitch, Will. (…) 
Well, like I said, you ain't like that no more.  MUNNY That's right. I'm just a fella now. I 
ain't no different than anyone else no more” (Eastwood, Unforgiven)His previous life, 
however, lurks just behind the façade. When Ned is killed by Little Bill, Munny returns 
to Big Whiskey and murders five men in an instant. Munny resists narration in such a 
state14, as Beauchamp attempts to reconstruct the facts: “BEAUCHAMP And so... who 
was next? It was Clyde, right? It must have been Clyde.  Well, it could have been deputy 
Andy.   (…)  MUNNY All I can tell you is who's going to be last” (Eastwood, 
Unforgiven). And suddenly the reformed hero finds himself staring at the abyss of his 
                                                
14 Previously, when discussing his youth, and the murders he committed, it is 
spoken of how Munny cannot remember any of them, of how alcohol made him forget 
them just as he committed all his murder and pillage. It allows the film to claim some 
goodness in Munny, arguing an outside force as motivator for his wild and cruel streak. 
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descent into monstrosity. As Little Bill, wounded to death, attempts to drag Munny with 
him, Munny stops Bill and resists argumentation: 
LITTLE BILL I don't deserve this. To die like this. I was building a 
house.   
MUNNY Deserve's got nothing to do with it.   
LITTLE BILL I'll see you in hell, William Munny.   
MUNNY Yeah.  (MUNNY shoots Bill. Sees Clyde still living, and 
shoots him without missing a step. He kneels at the bar entrance and 
screams)   
MUNNY All right, I'm coming out. Any man I see out there I'm 
gonna kill him. Any son of a bitch takes a shot at me, I'm not only going to 
kill him, I'm going to kill his wife and all his friends and burn his damn 
house down. (Eastwood, Unforgiven) 
 
In this context, innocence or civilization are meaningless. The unleashed violence 
brings no regeneration, no protection, no production. Neither the classic myth, nor the 
revised version, nor the horizon brings forgiveness. In order to prevent the last violent 
scene from granting any kind of positivity or closure to the film, it ends by showcasing 
the failure of Claudia Feathers Munny’s regeneration project: 
Some years later, Mrs. Antonia Feathers made the arduous 
journey to Hodgeman County to visit the last resting place of her only 
daughter.  William Munny has long since disappeared with the children.... 
some said to San Francisco where it was rumored he prospered in dry 
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goods.  And there was nothing on the marker to explain to Mrs. Feathers 
why her only daughter had married a known thief and murderer, a man of 
notoriously viscious and intemperate disposition.  (Eastwood, Unforgiven) 
While we listen to the minimalist “Claudia’s theme” and we see William Munny’s 
silhouette disappear, to become, perhaps, a grocer, we might reflect on the actuality of the 
knights errant who gave themselves to the westward trails in order to produce the 
“civilization” the Frontier Thesis supposed. Having swept the territory of its population, 
through waves and waves of men of notoriously viscious and intemperate disposition, 
what justice can they claim? What civilization? What Eastwood shows as the balance of 
the Conquest of the West, of the cowboy myth is a history of violence where no promised 
regeneration is ever found, the never ending failure of the Claudia Feathers Munnies of 
this world. 
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THE GAVEL AND THE GUN: NOMAD DYSTOPIAS OF JUSTICE 
 
“Did you know that the first Matrix was 
designed to be a perfect human world? Where 
none suffered, where everyone would be happy. 
It was a disaster. No one would accept the 
program, entire crops were lost. Some believed 
that we lacked the programming language to 
describe your perfect world. But I believe that, as 
a species, human beings define their reality 
though misery and suffering.” 
Agent Smith, The Matrix 
 
Most interpretations of Blood Meridian have focused on the novel as an 
antinomian construction, where our acts are dislodged from moral judgment, and where 
salvation is an unnecessary exercise. In my analysis, I will provide a different reading of 
it, focusing on morality and amorality, whilst theorizing about empty spaces within the 
system of judiciary powers. 
It is very difficult to establish an authoritative interpretation of such a book, for as 
Owens states: "If we are fishing for critical approaches, we know there may be all sorts of 
interesting trout in the text, down in there somewhere, but efforts to tease them out, to tie 
just the right fly, mostly fail." (Owens xiii). Thus, I look not to interpret the novel, but to 
navigate through its output, framing its amoral discourse within configurations of the law, 
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that the Judge, its villain, sutures as he decides upon them. In order to go deeper into this 
analysis, I must depart from the need to establish a distinction between the representation 
of amorality and amoral discourse. It is not necessary for a story’s narrator to take up an 
explicit position in relation to the morality of the action he describes. Whether the facts 
told concern the welfare of people or the conservation of a society, discourse represented 
within a novel is not necessarily the discourse of the novel, and the wide territory of 
optical democracy might bear more meaning and participation on his part than is 
commonly agreed to.  
I would argue that the position of moral ambiguity McCarthy shows throughout 
the novel is related not so much to his beliefs but to the history of moral arguments in 
cowboy mythology. If we look at the history of cowboy epics, we can see a definite 
tendency in the outcomes of the political experimentation of these narratives, as, most 
often, they propose moral principles to be applied, a posteriori to the Native American 
genocide that became the condition of possibility for the modern United States. These 
narratives tend to produce a perverse sense of innocence. In one of the first, The 
Virginian, what we find is a narrative of paid assassins who are dedicated to help make 
the people destitute, and yet, since the novel makes a gown out of blue skies and wide 
open spaces to drape around itself, these problems fade from the general image 
constructed out of it.  
This brand of innocence is much more closely related to bad faith than to an 
absence of guilt. It led to a myth of regeneration through violence that shaped the cowboy 
figure. Hondo, the main character of John Farrow’s homonymous film can allow himself 
to watch the genocide of a people that is in part his (he is part Indian, part Anglo), with a 
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steady pulse, lamenting the passing of a way of life even as he contributes to it. And yet, 
as his contribution saved a family (though contributing to the malaise of thousands), he is 
able to feel regenerated, at ease with his role in history.  
As the Civil Rights Movement became part of the political imaginary of America 
and the idea that minorities (African-Americans, Hispanic-Americans and Native 
Americans) might be people too, and have a certain right to self-determination, a new 
version of the cowboy myth sprung up. A revisionist history of the myth arose around 
figures like Clint Eastwood (of High Plains Drifter or Unforgiven) or Richard Slotkin. 
This history changed the discourse around Western violence, showing the deep, 
unforgivable guilt of the violence in the range. As a discourse that permeates a whole 
culture, and informs many other genres (such as Sci-Fi, as Star Wars or Star Trek might 
be evidence of), that which happens in cowboy films can be seen as invested with an 
importance that far surpasses its role as history. McCarthy, on the other hand, favors the 
role of the West as history. The Western is described by Slotkin as: "The hero's inner life 
--his or her code of values, moral or psychic ambivalence, mixtures of motive-- reduces 
to personal motive the complex and contradictory mixture of ideological imperatives that 
shape a society's response to a crucial event." (Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation 14) What we 
find in these stories is a laboratory for social experimentation. In it, experimentation takes 
place on how to exemplify and convince the members of a culture on the outcomes of 
their conflicts, and possible past or future solutions to them. If we think of Hondo, we 
find a perfect example of how the indigenous genocide is hidden within national 
discourse. In the film, John Wayne decides not to help the Indians, who hold to similar 
ethics, and to help Anglos, whose honor codes are often at odds with his. Yet this is not 
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problematized, as the conflict is seen as predestined, a true antinomian epic, romanticized 
as the flow of the river of History. Hondo is thus not able to fight it, he argues that he is 
merely able to watch it happen and lament it, even as he contributes to it.  
The projections of History into the individual sphere are preserved and 
communicated through diverse channels that the people maintain, for "A culture has its 
heritage of 'lore', which is preserved for use by designated lore-masters, story-tellers, or 
historians and is transmitted by them to the 'public' in one or more of the genres" 
(Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation 7) In Gunfighter nation, we find a profound analysis of the 
evolution of cowboy films in the United States, all the way back to the political use that 
Theodore Roosevelt makes of Western Mythology and forward to the point immediately 
preceding revisionism.  
This current, as we have seen, represents a fracture in the heroic narrative of the 
West, putting into question the history of oppression that regularly underlies stories such 
as Magnificent Seven. In this John Sturges film, we find a group of gunslingers who 
arrive at a town in Northern Mexico to defend the peaceful town from a group of bandits. 
It stands in contrast against Blood Meridian, and it closely imitates Kurosawa’s Seven 
Samurais, translating that story into the language of Westerns, covering over a historical 
narrative. All three of them resemble a problem contained in Samuel Chamberlain’s 
memory, where the city of Chihuahua invites a gang of cowboys from Texas to protect it 
from a band of Comanches. Both in the historical account as in Blood Meridian, and in 
stark contrast to Magnificent Seven and Seven Samurais, the protectors of the people 
become predators to the people as soon as they carry out their work, taking the place of 
the threat and expanding upon it.  
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Historical revisionism of such a key figure as the cowboy in U.S. culture, has to 
be followed by reflection upon everything this archetype represents. As Slotkin states: 
"major breaks in the development of important genres may signal the presence of a 
significant crisis of cultural values and organization" (Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation 8). The 
value crisis associated with postmodernity along with the recognition of some degree of 
equality for minorities generated an erosion of the ideological elements that provided 
justification of the cowboy’s actions. The ever more evident similarity between blood 
spilled in the West and the Vietnam massacres, (where American soldiers lost the 
civilizing veneer they put a claim to before) contributed to the loss of prestige. The 
effectiveness of the myth of regeneration through violence in which cowboys played such 
a big part was surpassed by reality. 
It is this environment that surrounds McCarthy’s work, which we analyze here as 
departing from revisionism, in that it probably takes cowboy revisionism to its utmost 
extreme in spite of not adopting a discourse (in depth) contrary to the myth of 
regeneration through violence. 
Western epics are, almost always allegories. They are a history woven in such a 
way that the characters or events that happen in them are often the representation of a set 
of political ideas. They are part of a procedure that seeks to naturalize an organization of 
other collectivities (Natives, Mexicans, African-Americans) through a history disguised 
as innocent and naïf. Cowboys represent the catalyzer for this experimentation, for a 
mythical construction that seeks to hide a colonial wound, assuming it as the condition of 
possibility of a superior social organization, fairer, more powerful, better.  
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The main character is often merely a receptacle for the spectator or the reader to 
occupy. In Sergio Leone’s films, we can see these archetypes: The cowboy, blonde, solid 
(The good), representing that which the narrative construct considers to be the best of the 
majority of men. He lacks personality, so that it would be all the easier to walk in his 
boots. Usually, there is an elder figure to the cowboy, wiser, whether it is an Indian 
antagonist or an old partner in arms. This character usually, much like the protagonist, 
has superhuman capabilities, but lacks the moral character of the hero, or is inadequate in 
other ways, perhaps racially (The bad). Likewise, there usually is a representative of a 
world that has no place within the social system proposed, a savage, an example of the 
aggressivity unleashed amongst cowboys (The ugly). These last two characters represent 
the danger that primal violence might offer those who dive into it seeking (or not) 
regeneration. This structure is completely absent from Blood Meridian. In contrast to The 
Good, The Bad and The Ugly, no one is either the Good or the Bad, every single one is 
the Ugly. Every character represents violence unleashed in a story in which every man 
abandons his belonging to a community and delivers himself to self-defense in a 
Hobbesian all out war with no quarter given.  
The way individual stories work as representations of a collective experience 
places us in a territory that is consciously allegorical. In this territory, the kingdom of 
Allegory, the capital is Synecdoque. The capacity a part has to hold the whole within 
itself, to widen its reach and to embrace the world in its entirety is one of the primal 
ambitions of literature, to hold the world whole inside a book. From Homer’s time, and 
his description of Achilles’ shield, the narrator looks to his artwork as a way to produce a 
map of reality that becomes as real as reality itself. This cartographic impulse is live and 
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well in McCarthy, who, through Blood Meridian’s true protagonist, Judge Holden, a 
seven foot tall giant weighing over four hundred pounds, with no skin pigment 
whatsoever and not a single hair on his body. The Judge is a giant more than capable of 
performing any trade, and one who displays an insatiable hunger for violence, an entity 
that is constantly seeking to appropriate reality.  
At a point in the novel, we find the Judge sketching something in his notebook, to 
which activity, one of his crew says: "no man can put all the world in a book. No more 
than everthing drawed (sic) in a book is so." (McCarthy, Blood Meridian 141) In this 
radical inequivalence we can see one of the Judge’s main engines, a will to power and 
possession that recognizes no countenance. His will to power is focused on the viability 
of cartographic synechdoque as the possibility itself of power, as he seeks to establish a 
translation system between words and reality: 
Books lie, he said. 
God dont lie. 
No, said the judge. He does not. And these are his words. 
He held up a chunk of rock. 
He speaks in stones and trees, the bones of things. (McCarthy, 
Blood Meridian 116) 
If a stone could be a word, possession of a word could lead to possession of the 
stone, trees, bones. Knowledge of the world is, for the Judge, a necessary condition for 
possession of it. That which has no word for it, exists only once, without existing for 
anybody, according to the way the Judge relates words and things. Even more so, it exist 
against someone, against him."Whatever exists, he said. Whatever in creation exists 
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without my knowledge exists without my consent." (McCarthy, Blood Meridian 198) 
Holden’s thirst for knowledge is associated with his experience of power, with the way 
synecdoche thought is embedded in his weltanschauung. This thirst and the Judge’s 
fabled capacity to be on top of everything and to be able to hold his own in just about any 
discipline against anyone he might come across, lead us to question his position in the 
civilization-barbarism dichotomy that has been traditional in the Frontier, or even 
whether he has a position in it. The giant is not a representative of either civilization or 
barbarism, much rather, the opposite, he represents the irrelevance of both. In his figure 
both concepts join until they are semantically destroyed. This hunger for knowledge and 
dominion corresponds to relationships toward nation in the modern project. “Man masters 
nature not by force but by understanding. This is why science has succeeded where magic 
failed: because it has looked for no spell to cast on nature” (Bronowski 18). Many 
philosophers have described the project of mastery as central to human beings’ essential 
nature, like Hegel, who in Lordship and Bondage talks about life and death judgments, 
which configures men as lords or servants in the following way: “it is solely by risking 
life that freedom is obtained; only thus is it tried and proved that the essential nature of 
self-consciousness is not bare existence” (Hegel §187) and then proceeds to establish that  
“In the same way each must aim at the death of the other, as it risks its own life thereby; 
for that other is to it of no more worth than itself; the other’s reality is presented to the 
former as an external other, as outside itself; it must cancel that externality.” (Hegel 
§187) This culture is framed from a need to cancel externalities, building a universality 
that encompasses everything. Within a culture that embraces these principles, how can 
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we be surprised by Holden’s attitude?, when he tells his men, as they gather around the 
fire at night: 
Only nature can enslave man and only when the existence of each 
last entity is routed out and made to stand naked before him will he be 
properly suzerain of the earth.  
What's a suzerain? 
A keeper. A keeper or overlord. 
Why not say keeper then? 
Because he is a special kind of keeper. A suzerain rules even where 
there are other rulers. His authority countermands local judgment. (…) 
This is my claim, he said. And yet everywhere upon it are pockets of 
autonomous life. Autonomous. In order for it to be mine nothing must be 
permitted to occur upon it save by my dispensation. (McCarthy, Blood 
Meridian 199) 
The Judge’s need for suzerainty is not so much a product of his deviance from our 
ethical and philosophical traditions, but rather the product of his hyperbolic attachment to 
them. Much as it has been argued that the Nazi holocaust was modernity in one of its 
possible hyperboles, the Indian genocide was not much different, as it was a byproduct of 
the capitalist need for domination, expansion and accumulation of capital. This need 
derives from the will to become a lord amongst lords, to continue risking lives, and to 
preserve himself in the moment of affirmation that confirms him as a Lord. “The Judge 
kills out of will and conviction and a deep commitment to the cause and the canons of 
Western rationality” (Shaviro 147). What the Judge displays as he becomes the standard 
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bearer, rather than a degenerate of western modernity is a breaking point within the ways 
we organize ourselves politically. If these values are so central to our idea of western 
culture, as we anoint judges within and outside the law at the same time, what reason 
might the judge have not to opt for lordship instead of bondage? If the possibility of 
dominion is available through exceptionality, the Judge has a strong incentive to elect to 
rule rather than to serve.  
Throughout the Glanton’s crew raids, there is but one element that resists the 
Judge’s dominion. Even though the main character does not refuse to participate in 
barbarism, there is a part of him that refuses to be known by the Judge, that refuses to be 
possessed. In this circumstances where representation is identified with that which is 
represented, and even further, we come into contact with the book’s focal character: The 
Kid. There is barely any dialog, there’s only a blank slate for the reader, apparently 
nothing, and because of that, everything: "See the child. He is pale and thin, he wears a 
thin and ragged linen shirt (…) He can neither read nor write and in him broods already a 
taste for mindless violence. All history present in that visage, the child the father of the 
man" (McCarthy, Blood Meridian 3). Being his own father, the Kid, by emptying 
himself, makes our occupation of himself possible. As nearly absolute virtuality, any path 
he takes will actualize some History. He represents the natural man, the unexplored 
possibilities of mankind.  
Through an underdeveloped character, the narrator offers us a possibility to insert 
our own characteristics within the character. The Kid spends most of the novel without 
constructing a discourse. His dialogs are austere, and generally, are merely restrained to 
formulating questions that the reader must, almost irrepressibly be making himself as he 
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reads the book. What is different in this respect in  Blood Meridian is its direct 
relationship with history. “All history present in that visage, the child the father of the 
man”, is the space from which the history of any nation is invited to enter the mythology 
of the Frontier, for what nation’s history in this world has not been generated out of the 
need to debase a war machine like the Glanton crew? What nation is not originated in a 
group of lawless, bloodthirsty men like them? And also, what nation, deep inside, is not 
absolutely ashamed of this? 
The Kid, much like the novel, is inspired in Samuel Chamberlain’s war memoirs. 
Chamberlain participated in a mercenary expedition to Chihuahua, in order to collect a 
bounty on Comanche scalps, an expedition where, in order to bolster their profit, they 
sacrificed women, children and the elderly, Comanches and Mexicans, civilians and 
soldiers, in order to sell their scalps to Chihuahua’s government. Upon their return, they 
ransacked the city, and had to flee to Sonora and then Arizona, with the Mexican army 
hot on their trail and a bounty on their heads. As McCarthy sums the Chihuahuan 
experience: "Mejor los indios"15 (McCarthy, Blood Meridian 171). If elsewhere we point 
to the problems of universalizing law to the abstraction of all particularity, and its 
subversion of legislative powers, and the problems of constructing the legitimacy of a 
state based on self-defense and exploitation, and its undermining of the executive powers, 
here we see the reduction to absurd of judiciary powers, and the problems of the 
resolution of states of exception that lies in the center of its self, and the possibility 
within, to unleash a war machine inscribed in absolute immanence. If we hearken 
Deleuze and Guattari, the philosophers of the celebration of the line and of immanence, 
                                                
15 “Better to face the indians” (In Spanish in the original) 
 72 
of the body without organs and schizophrenia, we can observe here the horrors of the 
tirany of the line and nomadology, the terror of radical deterritorialization.  
Deleuze and Guattari, in their treatise on the War Machine, using Go as a 
metaphor, they claim that: 
"Go pieces, in contrast, are pellets, disks, simple arithmetic units, 
and have only an anonymous, collective, or third-person function: "It" 
makes a move. "It" could be a man, a woman, a louse, an elephant. 
Go pieces are elements of a non subjectified machine assemblage with non 
intrinsic properties, only situational ones." 353 
The freedom a Go piece offers, in comparison to a chess piece, as pure 
indetermination, as the possibility of anything, sounds like paradise when it is thought 
within the system of a philosopher who announces that the XXth century will be known 
as the Foucauldian century, a universe built around the escape from the logic of discipline 
and punishment. When Deleuze and Guattari tell us that “A schizophrenic out for a walk 
is a better model than a neurotic lying on the analyst’s couch” (Deleuze and Guattari, 
Anti-oedipus 2), they assume, clearly, that the schizophrenic goes out, takes a walk and 
the walk is a contemplative stroll. Nonetheless, thinking of the apology of nomadism and 
the line that Deleuze and Guattari propose in Capitalism & Schizophrenia, what happens 
when we come across nomads that are a horde of murderers, forever on the attack and 
forever withdrawing? What happens when the lines and rhizomes that cross the territory 
are the lines of blood that irrigate that rhizomatic node? 
The terror McCarthy presents is inorganic, a schizophrenic stroll: the Kid 
listening to the voice of the Devil, and such Devil is the Judge, a man who "like a great 
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ponderous djinn stepped through the fire and the flames delivered him up as if he were in 
some way native to their element" (McCarthy, Blood Meridian 96); a man who belongs 
to different elements and who recognizes no moral nor sovereign. If the neurotic is a man 
destroyed by morality, what is the man who rides through Blood Meridian’s deserts? This 
man, Holden, typical and atypical of the genre, as our cowboy stories teach us, is fertile 
ground to reflect on how these stories influence what a state is and should be, along with 
the judiciary elements. How many and which voices does Judge Holden listen to? 
When the knights errant of these stories in the prairies decide to give themselves 
over to the road, they configure themselves as nodes of justice. In Plutarch’s  Life of 
Theseus, we hear how "Herakles had the misfortune to kill Iphitus, and thereupon sailed 
to Lydia and was for a long time a slave in that country (…) During this period the 
country of Lydia enjoyed peace and repose; but in Greece the old plague of brigandage 
broke out afresh, as there was now no one to put it down" (Plutarch). And it was in a 
similar situation that, due to the inability of the people to establish peace on the roads, a 
Wild Greece is generated and Theseus gives himself to the road in order to bring the 
bandits who held Greece hostage to justice. As every ideal roving justice maker, Theseus 
eliminates bandits according to a strict code of justice. Likewise, classical gunslingers 
adhered to a code, killing the evil men and defending the weak. But here is where Blood 
Meridian comes in and dislodges the discourse: What if Theseus had no interest at all in 
justice? 
What happens within a system that creates a legalist institution, and rids it of 
morality and objective, delegating the question of what the law is to an individual? The 
state of exception open in front of the justice wielder does not contemplate the possibility 
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that whichever supernaturally empowered giant such a system is entrusted to, like the 
Judge, will choose not to exercise justice. The Glanton crew rides through the Chihuahua 
desert, transforming it into a series of images that remind us of Goya’s The disasters of 
war, and the Black Paintings, where we see demons walking on Earth, and a history, that 
much like Saturn devouring his son, chews and digests humanity. The dreams of progress 
and Manifest Destiny, that political form of Antinomianism, when allowed to roam free 
in the open skies of the Aridoamerican deserts, produce monsters as well. 
Even though Blood Meridian is, in every way, the fictive extreme of this 
principle16, the principle exposed is intrinsical to the application of law. As Glanton 
strolls around the streets he has dyed red in Chihuahua, we find the deconstruction of the 
original motivation for his and his band’s presence. The situation in which Northern 
Mexico was in relation to Comanches who were fleeing from the American army is 
interpreted by Captain White in the following way:"a bunch of barbarians that even the 
most biased in their favor will admit have no least notion in God's earth of honor or 
justice or the meaning of republican government. A people so cowardly they've paid 
tribute a hundred years to tribes of naked savages." (McCarthy, Blood Meridian 33) The 
notion itself that a conflict might have been settled in a peaceful way, or the possibility 
that Comanches might have valid claims within this conflict is so foreign to this man, that 
he considers such notions and possibilities the brand of a nation that does not know what 
republican government means. And even more interesting is what White considers to be a 
republic, and how he defines the capability of self-governance:  
                                                
16 Though it might do us well to remember that most of the episodes narrated are 
based on real events, even some of those that would strike us the most as fictitious. 
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What we are dealing with, he said, is a race of degenerates. A 
mongrel race, little better than niggers. And maybe no better. There is no 
government in Mexico. Hell, there's no God in Mexico. Never will be. We 
are dealing with a people manifestly incapable of governing themselves. 
And do you know what happens with people who cannot govern 
themselves? That's right. Others come in to govern for them (McCarthy, 
Blood Meridian 34). 
The background of this conflict, according to the captain, is race-related. 
Mexicans are at fault, and degenerates, because they have intermarried with Indians. 
White’s arguments do not move towards the organization of the State, but towards the 
impossibility of government organization on the part of an “inferior” race. Or perhaps it 
is his belief that by intermarriage, some (though certainly not a whole lot) empathy might 
prevent Mexicans from engaging Indians in an equally genocidal approach as 
Americans.17 His will to power becomes even emptier as we see what happens to White 
in this novel. After being ambushed by a Comanche army, White’s troop is decimated to 
only a couple survivors. The captain’s head is reduced to conservation in a jar of mescal, 
putting into question White’s capacity to govern either himself or others. 
In McCarthy’s territories there is no possibility for republican government, or 
law, for what rules is an empire of violence. Once unleashed, laws are incapable of 
                                                
17 The only way I could see the claim work, however is by a series of questionable 
disclaimers, such as asserting that, for example, the violence wielded by Díaz against 
indigenous peoples was not racial, as Díaz himself was indigenous, or other cheap 
accounting tricks. 
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reining in violence.18 Even though the Comanches in Northern Mexico are the proximate 
cause of the escalation of violence, it cannot be asserted that violence arises from there19.  
In the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, by which the U.S.A. annexed the territories north of 
the Rio Grande, Americans had acquired responsibility for containing Indians and 
preventing them from raiding Mexico. In reality, the extermination policy in the U.S.A. 
only motivated Comanches more in their southward migration, and only pushed them to 
adopt more and more violent forms of self defense. Incapable of defending themselves 
through more widely accepted violence, the governments in Northern States in Mexico 
inaugurated a state of war that initiated yet another genocidal movement in the desert.20. 
In addition to poisoning wells, in order to pacify the territory a bounty system was 
installed for Comanches, using scalps as “receipts”. And thus was the Glanton crew 
arrived in Mexico, and start by killing Comanches, then turn genocide on its instigators, 
as they then continue killing any dark haired person, whose receipt could be cashed in, 
without any consideration for national affiliation. This War Machine transforms every 
individual into a Go piece, uniform and interchangeable. After opening the state of 
                                                
18 Unleashed is the just word here, since by opening the territory of 
exceptionality, the bounds on those who apply the law are undone. This hands the 
territory to the right of might, as there is very little that can be done to bind the War 
machine until it is defeated, exhausted or it bows down of its own accord. 
19  Nor was it the last iteration, for the violence continues, a tradition extending to 
the Columbus’s encounter or further back.  
20 Atrocities such as poisoning the water wells, a project which Santiago Vidaurri 
undertoook during the conflicts with Comanches in the XIXth century.  
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exception, Chihuahuan governor Riddle finds himself unable to close it: "The citizenry 
made address to the governor but he was much like the sorcerer's apprentice who could 
indeed provoke the imp to do his will but could in no way make him cease again".  
(McCarthy, Blood Meridian 171) Quite disposed to initiate genocide against the 
Comanche nation, Riddle unleashes a war he cannot control. Not very much hidden 
behind this breaking point in the composition of a body politic  that we can observe in 
McCarthy’s Chihuahua, we can see the imminent danger in the figure of judges. Judge 
Holden, is a figure that wields the negotiation of exception that might be necessary in a 
republic becomes a non-place within the body politic. The Judge buttresses the law by 
being outside of it. 
One of the most interesting questions in the novel is asked by The Kid to Tobin, 
the fallen priest: "What's he a judge of? he said" (McCarthy, Blood Meridian 135). The 
direct object of Holden’s justice is one of Blood Meridian’s greatest questions. By 
following the tradition of the Western genre, all territory beyond 100 West Meridian, the 
Wild West, is beyond the law. And in this territory of exception from the power of the 
state, the justice it espouses, without its checks and balances takes other shapes that show 
us elements normally hidden in the ritual that surround judges, in that metonymical 
relationship by which we mistake the ritual of justice for justice itself. 
In the prairies, far from the risk of prevaricating, the control of juries or any other 
ritual conjured up to exorcize the man from the judiciary system, the cowboy, as judge, 
jury and executioner, attracts to himself the liminal functions of law and its opposite. 
Much as cowboys are not formally anointed with judiciary powers, the archetype 
accepted by silence in popular mythology configures him as being endowed with such. 
 78 
From beyond the horizon, the gunslinger and his gun arrive to right the injustice that 
plagues the Earth. 
If before, we saw High Plains Drifter’s justice wielder as a spirit that crosses the 
line between this world and the next in order to establish justice, here, in Blood Meridian, 
we find his opposite in the Judge. Holden is surrounded by satanistic paraphernalia, 
which, in the midst of the rampant violence he unleashes, produce reflections much like 
the next one: 
aught man knows lies the locality of hell. (…) I'd not go behind 
scripture but it may be that there has been sinners so notorious evil that 
the fires coughed em up again and I could well see in the long ago how it 
was little devils with their pitchforks had traversed that fiery vomit for to 
salvage back those souls that had by misadventure been spewed up from 
their damnation onto the outer shelves of the world. Aye. It's a notion, no 
more. But someplace in the scheme of things this world must touch the 
other. (McCarthy, Blood Meridian 130) 
In the Glanton crew we find many characters who are dislodged from their 
station, like Tobin, the scalp-hunting priest, or Judge Holden, all powerful, all knowing, 
dedicated to the violence of bounty hunting in the desert. If we ordinarily might operate 
under the assumption that a judge acts as an agent of the law, the reflection McCarthy 
forces upon us is that, precisely, the Judge is the person that is most outside of the law 
within a legal system. The judge is a figure that gives suture to justice, offering himself as 
a mediator between the polis and its outside. Between the civilization that the law 
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allegedly represents, and the barbarism that allegedly surrounds it, the judge becomes an 
intermediary, but an intermediary with shared allegiance: a double agent of the law. 
The encyclopedic knowledge of the law that is expected of a judge is not a sign of 
his loyalty to the state, but of the necessary precaution to mitigate the danger of giving a 
person power to go outside the law in order to interpret it, to actualize its virtualities. It is 
expected in the hope that even while venturing outside the law, a judge might continue to 
be clothed in it. But having opened the door to indecision, everything in a judge’s station 
is an enticement to exception. Whether their sentences are absurd, draconian or fair, the 
judges are endowed with the power to mark the limits of the polis. 
The outside of the law, in the Judge’s dominion is constructed around the loss of 
the monopoly of violence, and the opening of exceptions where every law but need is 
suspended, the need for survival. As Tobin, the ex-priest, tells The Kid of how they met 
the Judge, alone in the desert, after having depleted their supply of gunpowder chasing 
Indians, the Judge offers a way out for the crew, which chooses to follow him: 
he pointed to that stark and solitary mountain and delivered 
himself of an oration to what end I know not, then or now, and he 
concluded with the telling us that our mother the earth as he said was 
round like an egg and contained all good things within her. Then he 
turned and led the horse he had been ridin across that terrain of black and 
glassy slag, treacherous to man and beast alike, and us behind him like 
the disciples of a new faith (McCarthy, Blood Meridian 132). 
Up in that mountain, the Judge mixes guano, sulfur and coal in a diabolical mass, 
where later “he was cryin out to us to piss, man, piss for your very souls for cant you see 
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the redskins yonder” (McCarthy, Blood Meridian 132) With their genitals out, urinating 
in the mountain, the crew signs a pact with the Judge, becoming his disciples in exchange 
for a way to preserve life from the Indians who chased them. 
McCarthy constructs a history of the morality of freedom, of American (or any 
other) exceptionalism, and Manifest Destiny through a reduction (or inflation) to absurd 
of its principles. With the two pronged method of exposing philosophical questions 
through the narration of facts and the endowal of realism grounded in pain and violence 
of his discourse, McCarthy builds a collection of images that accesses suspension of 
disbelief through wonder, through a violence so exhuberant that it forces the reader to 
accept it, as we might see in a typical scene of the novel: 
seizing them up by the hair and passing their blades about the 
skulls of the living and the dead alike and snatching aloft the bloody wigs 
and hacking and chopping at the naked bodies, ripping off limbs, heads, 
gutting the strange white torsos and holding up great handfuls of viscera, 
genitals, some of the savages so slathered up with gore they might have 
rolled in it like dogs and some who fell upon the dying and sodomized 
them with loud cries to their fellows (McCarthy, Blood Meridian 54). 
It is through this sadistic reproduction of violence that McCarthy builds his breed 
of realism. Whilst a Balzac novel might appeal to realism through the neurotic 
representation of the details of objects, or a writer like Joyce might appeal to realism 
through the repreoduction of psychological processes of relation to reality, such as 
streams of consciousness, McCarthy does so through placing his narration in a breaking 
point between the possibility and the impossibility of reproducing violence. Whilst realist 
 81 
novels ask of us: Could you imagine such detail? And totalizing novels ask of us: Is it not 
true that you conceive of the world in such a way?, in representing blood, death, 
evisceration and the desacralization of bodies, McCarthy asks of us: Could this violence 
be imagined? Can my imagination lead you here, or is this a place only real violence 
could take us? By appealing to realism through overcoming reality, we find a plethora of 
things reduced to utter absurd. From the moment when Aristotle claimed to have been 
Plato’s friend, but even more so of the truth, we find mimesis as a process by which 
morality is postponed, by plaicing moral judgments in a state of suspension, privileging 
the representation of how things are over the imagination of how they should or could be. 
In the wide open spaces rode by McCarthy’s mercenaries, we can see a territory 
that is either empty or in the processs of becoming so. Far from any element capable of 
imposing a law or rule beyond the reach of might, this territory allows for the emptying 
of the discourses that describe it. By appealing to violence’s descriptive realism, we find 
ourselves in a process of suspension of morality. This route, as we observe, allows 
McCathy the possibility of eviscerating key propositions in western thought, like 
Spinoza’s idea of living in the best of worlds: 
God made this world, but he didn't make it to suit everybody, did 
he? 
I don't believe he much had me in mind. 
Aye, said the old man. But where does a man come by his notions. 
What world's he seen that he liked better? 
I can think of better places and better ways. 
Can ye make it be? 
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No. (McCarthy, Blood Meridian 19) 
This simple conversation puts forward the conception characters in the novel 
offer, officially of realism. The novel’s official discourse establishes that the world can’t 
be better than it is, for that world is the only one that can be. Nevertheless, the Glanton 
crew’s actions establish that the world can always be worse, that the world can always 
take a drastic turn towards the worse, for if neither the main character, nor Glanton, nor 
the Judge at any moment ask themselves if they have seen a world they like less,  they 
won’t ever doubt they can make a worse place, with worse ways. And it is this world they 
bring forth, a cult of War that flows throughout the territory, deorganizing any power.  
The cult of War proposed by the Judge is based on the nobility of gaming, 
conceived as a sublimation of Chance, as a manifestation of pure will, without any moral 
or theoretical limitations. Presented as a Nietzschean variation of Lutheran antinomism, 
the cult of the Judge is the exaltation of violence, of War as the most noble manifestation 
of play, a way to decide the existence of the one or the other. As previously stated, Blood 
Meridian may well be the most profound actualization of a revisionism of the cowboy 
myth. This is in spite of the similarities with the myth of regeneration through violence. 
McCarthy’s narrator adopts a profoundly amoral discourse, but constructs it in such a 
way that it undermines itself. By taking such amorality to its utmost extreme, McCarthy 
appeals to a sense of morality and resistance in the face of war. 
The antinomian construct in Blood Meridian’s discourse departs from the position 
of chance, and the radicalized equality of elements in its narrative. The way in which the 
novel turns the organic into inorganic and equalizes everything in the sight of the narrator 
is often quoted as the novel’s take on “optical democracy”: 
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In the neuter austerity of that terrain all phenomena were 
bequeathed a strange equality and no one thing nor spider nor stone nor 
blade of grass could put forth claim to precedence. The very clarity of 
these articles belied their familiarity, for the eye predicates the whole on 
some feature or part and here was nothing more luminous than another 
and nothing more enshadowed and in the optical democracy of such 
landscapes all preference is made whimsical and a man and a rock 
become endowed with unguessed kinships (247). 
As we see the panorama McCarthy builds, a wide open desert,  goat excrement, 
stones, shadows and gods find in their blinding appeareance under the sun an optical 
democracy, an equality in which every character is described with the same abandon, 
with the exception of the judge, every character an enshrinement of chance. Life is but a 
form of chance if the notion of good or evil, strong or weak is removed from the game. 
Nobility, as the Judge describes is in submitting to the game. Every element becomes 
flatly demoralized in chance as suture, when we remove morality from the equation. 
Everything honorable in this system is then the acceptance of the game, of chance, and 
the affirmation of whatever result comes out, as the Judge proposes:  
Men are born for games. Nothing else. Every child knows that play 
is nobler than work. He knows too that the worth or merit of a game is not 
inherent in the game itself but rather in the value of that which is put at 
hazard. Games of chance require a wager to have meaning at all. Games 
of sport involve the skill and strength of the opponents and the humiliation 
of defeat and the pride of victory are in themselves sufficient stake because 
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they inhere in the worth of the principals and define them. But trial of 
chance or trial of worth all games aspire to the condition of war for here 
that which is wagered swallows up game, player, all. (McCarthy, Blood 
Meridian 249) 
The affirmation of chance in games is profoundly related to the notion of optical 
democracy we discussed earlier. It is this mechanism through which McCarthy allegedly 
represents in the novel all objects on a par with men. The use of prosopopeya through this 
optic is a two-prongued strategy, by which at the same time that objects are personalized, 
some persons are objectified. In the novel, deaths are experienced as physical 
phenomena, without an ethical dimension, actions extracted from chains of meaning and 
significance. This can obviously not be taken to its extreme, for no story could be 
produced, given that most of a writer’s task is to adscribe significance, but this 
construction of objectivity that is construed in the stylistics of McCarthy should make us 
reflect on what objectivity he might weave in his ethics.  
Holden proposes a world where games have no value as themselves, as games, 
but rather, acquire it through the stakes that are placed on them. The emphasis the Judge 
places on how the game’s value is dependent on the elevation of risk, demonstrates the 
purpose, from an aesthetic point of view, as well as ethic, how inadmissible it is to 
equalize all elements exposed to our sight or analysis. This emphasis is a logical outcome 
of the effort to make sense out of the world, and to build a hierarchy for the elements men 
come across in their path. The cult of war Holden proposes is based mainly on the 
possibility of granting meaning to any kind of game practiced, no matter how barbaric:  
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Suppose two men at cards with nothing to wager save their lives. 
Who has not heard such a tale? A turn of the card. The whole universe for 
such a player has labored clanking to this moment which will tell if he is 
to die at that man's hand or that man at his. (…) This enhancement of the 
game to its ultimate state admits no argument concerning the notion of 
fate (McCarthy, Blood Meridian 249). 
It is through the experience of betting, where the possibility of an end, an absolute 
end, to one of the participants that lordship is sought for. It is submission to chance, to 
contest that produces significance. In the eternal return of the same, what changes is not 
the game, nor the players, who, according to the Judge, will play one way or the other. 
What changes is the circumstance of play, the stakes at play, for in its depth, judgment, 
play, War is the indeterminate space that is built on the outside of law, civilization and 
experience. As we can see in No country for old men, the nature of a game is irrelevant, 
so long as the stakes are high and the rules are kept. In a scene where Chigurh stops to 
buy some cashews, he decides upon the life or death of the owner of the store he is at. His 
life is decided by a coin toss: 
What's the most you ever saw lost on a coin toss? 
Sir? 
I said what's the most you ever saw lost on a coin toss.  
Coin toss? 
Coin toss. 
I don't know. Folks don't generally bet on a coin toss. It's usually 
more like just to settle something. 
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What's the biggest thing you ever saw settled? (McCarthy, No 
country for old men 55) 
In this scene, it is Chigurh’s intention for the owner of the store to acquire 
consciousness of what is actually happening. While the quarter is flying, the continuation 
of his life is being decided without his knowledge or consent. No doubt, for the man 
behind the counter, there will never be a more significant coin toss, for his whole 
universe is at play. Just like in Hegel’s phenomenology, only death is capable of altering 
consciousness in such a way that the decision that generates lordship can take place. In 
Blood Meridian, the definitive trait of lordship, of having successfully crossed the 
encounter with war and death, is not the game, but a dance, a ritual of power, associated 
with a warrior’s privilege. "Only that man who has offered up himself entire to the blood 
of war, who has been to the floor of the pit and seen horror in the round and learned at 
last that it speaks to his inmost heart, only that man can dance." (McCarthy, Blood 
Meridian 331) This privilege implies belonging to a different order of existence, to a 
nobility of violence, pertaining to a strata where events, ordinarily imposible to rank, 
acquire significance and a place amongst things. The desire to be granted passage to this 
environment is one of the most resistant and traditional fantasies of European thought, the 
diabolical will of lordship and the fantasy attached that Holden displays in front of us: 
This logic of power elaborates notions of honor fully construed around the need and will 
to war: 
As war becomes dishonored and its nobility called into question 
those honorable men who recognize the sanctity of blood will become 
excluded from the dance, which is the warrior's right, and thereby will the 
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dance become a false dance and the dancers false dancers. And yet there 
will be one there always who is a true dancer and can you guess who that 
might be?" (McCarthy, Blood Meridian 331) 
The Judge argues that there is only one True Dancer, himself, who is such, only 
because he recognizes the sanctity of war, because he raises it as the object of a cult. This 
cult uses chance in the immanence of a continued state of indeterminacy, generated, not 
quite solved, by the continuous game of war. When we spoke earlier of a reduction (or 
inflation) to absurdity of the cult of war and absolute immanence, it was a key passage 
that I had in mind, in order to aid our interpretation. After the Judge pronounces his 
speech about how God’s words are the things in the world, the narrator offers us a quite 
unusual window into the Judge’s interior life: "The squatters in their rags nodded among 
themselves and were soon reckoning him correct, this man of learning, in all his 
speculations, and this the judge encouraged until they were right proselytes of the new 
order whereupon he laughed at them for fools." (McCarthy, Blood Meridian 116) Where 
we to take the cult of war at its word, without further reflection, these characters would 
be our own image, reaffirming each other, accepting the order the Judge draws in blood 
upon the canvas of chaos.  
The characters in the book construct their nomad dystopia from their radical 
refusal to ever locate themselves within an order, or to stay in one place. A great deal of 
the Judge’s laughter comes from his knowledge that their nomadism is untenable. Every 
inch where the Glanton’s crew has rode through is one more inch they will never ride 
again: "They were of another nation, those riders, and all that land to the south out of 
which they'd originated and whatever lands to the east toward which they were bound 
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were dead to him and both the ground and any sojourners upon it remote and arguable of 
substance." (McCarthy, Blood Meridian 244) It is because of the indecision nomad 
dystopias such as Glanton’s produce, that every political system develops containment 
strategies for War Machines. No matter how necessary it may be to decide by life and 
death eventually, the image of these Riders traversing the desert like a Grand Jury from 
beyond (or below), like the great War cultists they are, in abandonment to the practice of 
their trade, this image remains a warning of the danger of opening states of exception 
within the law. According to the Judge, the activity of Glanton’s crew needs not bother 
with justification: 
This is the nature of war, whose stake is at once the game and the 
authority and the justification. Seen so, war is the truest form of 
divination. It is the testing of one's will and the will of another within that 
larger will which because it binds them is therefore forced to select. War 
is the ultimate game because war is at last a forcing of the unity of 
existence. War is god (McCarthy, Blood Meridian 249). 
This unity of existence refers to the moment of execution, where to kill or be 
killed cancels difference as it allows, for only the briefest of instants, recognition. The 
deity Holden waves in front of us is a fleeting one, that appears as a way to close down 
arguments, conflicts or any limit to a will that submits to it (or a will that is submitted to 
it, in its absence). In this all out contest, war is the zenith (or meridian) of existence: 
War is your trade. Is it not? 
And it aint yours? 
Mine too. Very much so.  
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What about all them notebooks and bones and stuff? 
All other trades are contained in that of war (McCarthy, Blood 
Meridian 249). 
All trades, as the Judge claims, are necessary for war, and something of war 
makes its way to all trades. Nevertheless, there is always loss in translation, the Judge’s 
game always comes to a point where men must stop playing. Towards the end of the 
novel, the crew settles down in a ferry, in the Yuma river, where slowly they allow their 
weak spot to be seen. From a beginning where they appropriated the crossing in order to 
extort passers-by for passage, slowly they arrive at a point where 
People who had been waiting three days to cross at a dollar a 
head were now told that the fare was four dollars. And even this tariff was 
in effect for no more than a few days. Soon they were operating a sort of 
procrustean ferry where the fares were tailored to accommodate the 
purses of the travelers. Ultimately all pretense was dropped and the 
immigrants were robbed outright. Travelers were beaten and their arms 
and goods appropriated and they were sent destitute and beggared into 
the desert. (McCarthy, Blood Meridian 262) 
This procrustean organization that adjusted its theft to the victim remained 
standing only as long as it took the army, playing the Theseus for this Procrustes, arrives 
and expels them, the few survivors, braving hunger and heat in the desert in order to 
preserve their breath. A war machine cannot become established and perpetuated. He 
who judges over life or death must relinquish the power in order to keep it. 
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If the dispensation of justice is an extension of the cult of war, it is a continuation 
of the desire to master. But the ending of the book is a departure from the alleged 
Antinomianism of the novel. The exercise on the part of the Kid of his will to life in spite 
of all the pressure to take part in the death contest the Judge calls for. The will to life 
without the will to kill is a possible way out of the Master-Slave dialectics, where the Kid 
chooses not to partake of the infernal dance. 
It is however a dangerous turn to take. The Kid finds in his resistance a strategy 
that others amongst McCarthy’s characters have followed. They choose to go on living in 
the face of unsurmountable cruelty, to remain masters of themselves without bowing to 
the cult of war. The Road is the story of a non-suicide, where a father and his son roam a 
post-apocalyptic wasteland determined to go on living, with no goal or comfort to be had. 
But this road, much like the evening redness in the West, is just a plunge into the territory 
of continuous exception. In order to find security, a fantasy of peace must be imposed 
upon it.  
This relationship between the schizophrenic going out for a stroll and the desire 
for some sort of peace brings us to the figure of the Judge, of a person that can stand 
between the law and its outside. In Justified, the television series, Judge Reardon 
discusses the subject with Raylan Givens, a U.S. Marshall under investigation for his 
frequent participation in shootings. The discussion is centered on what they have in 
common, and the judge proposes that his gavel is the equivalent of Raylan’s gun, two 
tools capable of extracting a man from the polis, and within a certain limit, theirs, theirs 
to be used at their leisure. Two tools to dispense justice, with two men in charge of the 
 91 
polis even as they are incapable of belonging; two tools to dispense justice and give 
suture to breaks in the community; two tools for justice, even if in nothing but name. 
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DRUGLORDS: EXECUTIVE LEGITIMACY 
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OUTLAW UTOPIAS OF THE INTERIOR 
 
 “Criminals are like weeds, Marston. 
Quick as you stomp one out, another one sprouts 
up in its place.” 
 
Red Dead Redemption 
 
 
The encounter between civilization and barbarism has been one of the great 
metanarratives within which American stories have been framed. In general, debates have 
followed a rather Eurocentric tone. This is not surprising, as when the states of the 
American continent took control of their political destinies, their ideological affiliations 
where aligned with those of European modernity. After all, the individuals who wrote, 
signed and applied the law where overwhelmingly of European ancestry, and even more 
importantly of European education. 
The last chapter focused on Frontier dystopias, the narratives of how the arrival of 
“civilization” unleashed “barbarism” in the Wild West. Now, I would like fo focus on the 
narratives of how “barbarism” developed “civilization” in provincial México through a 
political figure categorized as a bandit.  
Juan Pablo Dabove states: “The bandit is perhaps the most important in a series of 
dramatis personae that in postcolonial Latin American culture function as frontiers 
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between "domains of sovereignity" (Dabove 7). It is this fiction in reality that allows for 
the political narrative of sovereignity. This concept is manifold in the frontier, as it lies 
always in the interstice between legality and the state, and it is in this junction that the 
bandit carries out its power struggle, the negotiation of violence inside and outside the 
law. Outside the law, though not necessarily against it, even if he often is, the bandit 
shows another side of crime, one where crime and the law come into close contact. 
The word bandit itself derives from bando, a proclamation performed with the 
purpose of proscribing a member of the body politic, expelling him from the community. 
Most of the time, this has to do with behavior determined to be outside of the law, but 
often times it also has to do with behavior more of a political rather than criminal nature. 
Several of Aridoamerica’s relevant political figures have once worn the bandit tag, such 
as Stephen Austin, Pancho Villa or Joaquín Murieta. As we will see further ahead, the 
bandit’s main offense has to do with his participation as a political agent in a violent 
register. 
The bandit’s participation in the American continent’s political sphere can be 
traced back to the roving bands that violently appropriated Latin America under the 
shadow of Charles V of the Habsburg, emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, and his 
successors, or the colonizing companies that appropriated North America under the 
auspices of Queen Elizabeth and her successors. One of the subjects that is common both 
to Mexico and the United States is the colonial wound, the after effect of that tyrannical 
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enterprise21 by which social order was established and then naturalized and reformed 
through the Independence Revolutions.  
The establishment of nation states throughout America installed a political logic 
that was not shared by the general population and was often not compatible with the 
social codes, which this population followed (or follows). The bandit appears in these 
territories, where behavioral codes face each other and end up resorting to violence in 
order to impose themselves.  
So, by speaking of the bandit as someone who is set outside of the body politic, it 
behooves us to ask ourselves what such a body is. If we follow, say, Lincoln’s principle 
as stated 22 in the Gettysburg address, of a government of the people, for the people, and 
by the people, it follows to inquire just what the people is. If the territory we explore falls 
in its entirety within two republics, of masonic inspiration, federal, with liberal European 
influence, it would probably be a good idea to refer to the sovereignty principles that 
Rousseau proposed in The Social Contract.  
                                                
21 And when we say tyrannical here, we appeal to the Greek definition of the 
word. In Greece, tyrant refered to the path to power followed by the ruler. It designated 
someone who would come to power by illegitimate means, such as a popular revolt, a 
path not prescribed by law or custom. It did not refer so much to the abuse of power, as 
there was such a thing as a just tyrant. 
22 Lincoln was ideologically close to Juárez and was also a personal friend. He 
was also very influential in the outcome of the French intervention in Mexico, a 
continuation of the Guerra de Reforma. 
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Rousseau starts his argument with the search for a cohesive principle for a body 
polític that has a moral, and not simply a military base, for, as he states, "Force is a 
physical power; I fail to see what morality can result from its effects. To give in to force 
is an act of necessity, not of will. At most, it is an act of prudence" (Rousseau, El contrato 
social 19). The notion of might making right is discarded as it does not offer moral 
justification for the actions of the mighty unto those who suffer them, beyond the 
necessity of staying alive. 
Thus, we find a blind spot of political theory, an aporía that deals with the origin 
itself of the polis, allowing for the notion of politics to have any validity whatsoever. In 
his search to resolve such an aporía, Rousseau resorts to Hugo Grotius, in order to extract 
a theory of transferral of sovereignty from the people to the Government: 
A people, says Grotius, can give itself to a king. According to 
Grotius, therefore, a people is a people before it gives itself to a king. This 
gift itself is a civil act; it presupposes a public deliberation. Thus, before 
examining the act whereby a people chooses a king, it would be well to 
examine the act whereby a people is a people. For since this act is 
necessarily prior to the other, it is the true foundation of society. (23) 
From this position the notion of social contract is extracted. It is conceived as a 
union that precedes the whole state, turning the state into a homogeneous entity. The 
problem is that rarely is a population homogenous in such a way, but rather they tend to 
be profoundly heterogeneous, whether it is from an ethnic, political or just about any 
other perspective. We derive the proliferation of instersticial spaces that generate the 
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figure of the bandit from the metonymy that american body politics are based upon by 
assuming heterogeneity to be homogeneity. 
Bandits occur in the breaks where a social contract crumbles, where the will of 
the Sovereign 23 ceases, or if it has not yet solidified, where the Prince24 has separated 
from the Sovereign, in a case that Rousseau describes in the following way:  
If it should finally happen that the prince had a private will more 
active than that of the sovereign, and that he had made use of some of the 
public force that is available to him in order to obey his private will, so 
that there would be, so to speak, two sovereigns--one de jure and the other 
de facto, at that moment the social union would vanish and the body 
politic would be dissolved (Rousseau, On the social contract 62) 
Whether a community dissolves because its people are sufficiently heterogeneous 
to feel misrepresented within its legal system, or because the government takes a turn to 
the tyrannical through the Prince’s actions, the fiction of homogeneity is at the heart of 
the problem. Often times the State becomes separate from the sovereign, becoming 
“every malefactor who attacks the social right becomes through his transgressions a rebel 
and a traitor to the homeland; in violating its laws, he ceases to be a member, and he even 
wages war with it." (Rousseau, On the social contract 35) If the contract from which the 
                                                
23 I am following here Rousseau’s concept. For him, the Sovereign is the exercise 
of the will of the body politic. In as much as this is thought of as capable of common 
political will, a relatively homogenous community is assumed.  
24 Again, I follow Rousseau’s terminology, where the Prince is not necessarily a 
monarch, but he who exercises Executive Power in the State.  
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state derives allows that any citizen who acts against the interest of the sovereign to be 
warred against, would it not be justified for the sovereign to war against the state if it 
behaves in the same way?  
It is because of this situation that we find the drop in legitimization to allow or 
motivate the origins of a bandit, for, as Dabove states: "a bandit is he who maintains 
through his actions (which may not form part of a conscious 'political program') his 'right' 
(unusually uncodified) to engage in certain practices that collide with a legality-in the 
making that portrays such actions as out-and-out crimes." (Dabove 5) As we will see, the 
bandit often has a political program that challenges a structured discourse that inserts 
itself between the state and the people. Legality is always in the making, even if it 
depends so strongly on the fiction of its permanence. So often forgotten, when arguing 
for democratic tradition are Jefferson’s thoughts on intergenerational governance: “We 
may consider each generation as a distinct nation, with a right, by the will of its majority, 
to bind themselves, but none to bind the succeeding generation, more than the inhabitants 
of another country” (Jefferson) If we legitimize a government by the will of the people, 
what happens to all the people who are misrepresented within? If the majority is very 
rarely allowed participation in the creation of the law because of how legal discourse and 
legal production are made inaccessible to them, can it be stated that they are not justified 
in exercising their political right when it arises out of strict necessity? As we reflected 
previously on Agamben’s statement that “If something is done out of necessity, it is done 
licitly, since what is not licit in law necessity makes licit. Likewise necessity has no law” 
(24) might then not necessity be a term that crushes the solidity of the social contract? If 
legal justification of a tyrannical Prince fails to reduce the instances in which necessity 
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comes into conflict with the law, then it might be stated that the Prince is  a failed Prince. 
It is in this failure that we can understand how it is that so commonly bandits claim both 
an appeal to law and an opposition to it. In the face of these oppositions, a need arises to 
incorporate different discourses into the political sphere. 
In order to study this side of the bandit, the Mexican State history and its literary 
representations is ideal. Given the political, ethnic and religious sincretism that has 
characterized the multiple iterations of the state, the bandit has played a key role in 
configuring the nation.  We seek to reflect on the bandit’s involvement in the legitimizing 
processes of the state, by establishing a genealogy between the prerrevolutionary bandits 
we find in Luis G. Inclán’s Astucia and the contemporary ones in Yuri Herrera’s 
Trabajos del reino. These bandits elaborate on theories of how a body politic that rises 
from the people might look like, from the perspectives of Colonel Astucia, a XIXth 
century tobacco smuggler, Martín Sánchez, a police officer in El Zarco, and El Rey, a 
XXIst century drug runner.  
Throughout the long history of bandits in Mexico, the state has intereacted in 
many different ways with them. They have been configured as radical others, as savage 
natures, as an alien form that must be purged from a body politic in order to construct its 
narrative, organic as it is to social tissues. Obviously, there has been great variation in the 
approach to bandits, as there has been great variation in the states: the conservative 
government of the first half of the XIXth century, Juárez’s liberal republic, Díaz’s 
dictatorship and the institutionalized revolution, to name but the longest lived, could not 
have had common approaches. These have varied from forclusion, to extermination, to 
idealization, but every single one has had the bandit pegged as a problem to deal with and 
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neutralize. It might be such, but reactions towards the bandit always represent 
problematic emanations of the narratives of the nation.  
As far as Santa Anna’s government was concerned, its reaction was akin to 
forclusion, but the liberal movement that followed, built around characters such as 
Juárez, Lerdo or Altamirano, was actively involved with several of the roving bands that 
constituted a large part of their armies. The attitudes towards them can be well studied in 
two novels: Altamirano’s El Zarco and Inclán’s Astucia. 
Both of these novels are focused on the all-time favorite Mexican bandit: the 
Charro. It was construed as the symbol of Mexico in an analogous way to how the 
Cowboy became USA’s symbol. Duded up in their fancy black cloth suits and large hats 
filigreed with silver, the shiny costume gave rise to their better known name in their time: 
Plateados, or silvered. As Dabove states: "The charro-smuggler could very well be, as 
Inclán himself proposes at the beginning of the novel, a 'national type par excellence. 
However, the word 'national has a different meaning here than 'nation-state'." (Dabove 
133) The hyphen in nation-state is a key part of our argument here. We can trace back the 
European nation-state to medieval France and how the Capet kings initiated a move to 
homogenizing a population in order to create one nation under one power, ignoring the 
differences between, or erasing them if necessary. This process of homogeneization 
aroused suspicion on the part of the population, but also created a need for discipline.  
The national came up against the state in all of the political entities that attempted 
such homogeneization, in some more succesfully than in others. One way to sum up the 
history of the civilization and barbarism trope in the Americas is to describe it as the 
narrative of an inmune response to state discipline.  
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The problem of state discipline is one that Gramsci comes across in his early 
writings. In La città futura he analyzes a piece by Kipling, where he describes the unity 
and discipline with which the British empire moves as one in the conquest of India. This 
prompts Gramsci to try and justify how discipline under socialism might differ from the 
discipline of the imperial burgeoisie.  
His approach points out the need for a sort of functional anarchism in order for 
socialist discipline to be fair. He states: “The discipline of the Socialist Party makes the 
subject into a citizen: a citizen who is now rebellious, precisely because he has become 
conscious of his personality and feels it is shackled and cannot freely express itself in the 
world” (Gramsci 20). In this exercise of citizenship we find one of the aporetic spots of 
any theory of the state, how can the people justify their own oppression by the very same 
institutions they build? The socialist discipline Gramsci proposes is both disciplined and 
rebellious, free and ordered. The socialist citizen is free to accept the conclusions of 
historical materialism, gain his class conscience and act accordingly, much like in 
Catholic dogma, where man is free to accept God’s will in his own best interest.  
Bandits always arouse distrust from every part of the political spectrum because 
oftentimes they set themselves politically in the breaking point of political constructs. 
The social bandit presents the state with an alternative to itself that often must be 
erradicated through violence, belying principles of freedom or emancipation that states 
often publicly espouse. Because to a state the lone possibility of its alternative may mean 
a challenge to its existence, the bandit is prosecuted, in image and in flesh, in military and 
ideological might. 
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It is such a violent reaction that they elicit because of the ethereal nature of 
politics. Power is seldom solid enough to be grasped except when exercised, and even so, 
when exercised, one can never know the exact moment when it will run out. Dussel states 
that “politics—the politics of the exploited—is the first philosophy, because politics is 
the center of ethics as metaphysics” (Dussel 170) If politics is the first philosophy, then 
we might see the problematic that bandits pose in a different light. Most often the social 
bandit brings echoes of decay in political discourse, for there is a natural distrust from 
politicians. Most of the time, it is believed that social bandits are there for the taming, so 
they can be incorporated in other political projects.  
Much like the free-roaming Mustangs who originated from Iberian stock run wild, 
bandits seem to represent in Mexico both the image of the wild and free original man and 
a resource to be acquired and used. Every bandit roaming in the Commons is political 
capital to be had or anhihilated if it cannot be had. Liberal democracy, religious 
conservatives, socialist revolutionaries, political projects of all denominations have 
believed the social bandit will find their own vision of order to be the right one. 
Some decades after Astucia and even Zarco, we would observe the first 
Revolution of the XXth century happening in Mexico, started by the bourgeoisie and 
hijacked by the bandits that fell through the cracks of Porfirio Díaz’s regime. Rivers of 
ink have flown through paper speaking of the link between Charros and Revolutionary 
armies, but we might do well to revisit the idea of the Charro from another Revolution, 
one that, contrary to its name, also started in November. 
Gramsci wrote of the Bolcheviks, who were more ideologically aligned than most 
social bandits, that they were a progressive group that was turning power to the people. 
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At the moment he was writing, it was still not apparent what would become of the 
October Revolution, whether it would succeed, and even if it did, what its success would 
look like. What Gramsci thought was that there was great revolutionary potential in the 
chaos taking place in Russia, stating that: 
In this drive, many fall by the wayside, so making the needs of 
those who are left more urgent; the masses are forever in a state of 
turmoil, and out of this chaos they develop some order in their thoughts, 
and become ever more conscious of their own potential, of their own 
capacity to shoulder social responsibility and become the arbiters of their 
own destiny (Gramsci 34). 
It seems of note the mistrust placed in the popular manifestation of the 
Bolsheviks. For all the supposed popular sympathies of most political theorists, the 
notion of the people is always a problematic one. It is always close to the notion of chaos, 
always close to the loss of the political, to the approximation of a barbarous state. And 
they might very well be right, exactly right.  
For if we turn to the original meaning of barbarous in Greece, it basically meant 
foreign. And the bandit charros we find in our novels are foreign, in their own way. In the 
XIXth century, in Mexico, charro meant bandit, and as Dabove stated, it was identified 
with the idea of national. But in this territory, in the Mexican frontier, we find the idea of 
national to be a very complicated one, as well as the idea of foreign. And that the charro, 
as a bandit should be identified with both should, at the very least, raise one of our 
eyebrows.  
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Civilization and Barbarism are just two terms to reframe the notions of European 
and Native, shifting, as they may be, and ones that allow for a disconnection between the 
ideas and the racial origin of the individual, but it still does not preclude oppression. The 
people are only to be allowed to arbitrate, so long as they decide the way the “civilized” 
desire. Whether it is Juárez, the mighty Indian at the top of the structure, or any other, it 
is always history of oppression, of locals bowing to a foreign inspired authority. 
From the pampas of the Southern Cone, the Mapuche bands and their malones; 
gauchos, good and bad, pressed in war; cholos of the Highest Andes thrown into the 
mines, cangaceiros of the Sertões, looking for a way out of starvation; quilombos in 
revolt, full of men that once were slaves; revolutionaries of all colors, conservative, 
liberals and Marxists; smugglers of tobacco or moonshine all along the coasts; Indians 
throughout mountains North and South, waiting out the slaughter; Indians sweet and sour 
in all places; Blacks, Mulatoes, Mestizos, Indians and Ladinos; slaves of the Isles and 
Caribbean; Comanches poisoned in the desert; Yaquis marching out to Yucatán; 
Seminole, Muscogee, Cherokee, Chickasaw and Choctaw on the trail of tears; freedmen 
fed with no remorse unto Jim Crow; migrant workers on the Prairie fields; Chinese 
immigrants laying down the rails, and on and on until you find the Innuit protected by the 
snow; all throughout the continent what we find is colonized and colonizing states, where 
an elite regards a wide section of the population as an internal colony, or a population 
that has or should adopt the perspective of their oppressors.  
As it is in politics, so it is in thought, or perhaps it is the other way around, but it 
is difficult to speak of true politics in a state of oppression. Where the people cannot 
philosophize, and cannot theorize the way they themselves organize politically we can’t 
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speak of political legitimacy. While developing the notion of a philosophy of liberation, 
Dussel raised the question of whether “a Latin American, African, or Asian philosophy of 
the peripheral world [is] possible? Peruvian Augusto Salzar Bondy, now deceased, 
answered courageously: No! No, because a dominated culture is one in which the 
ideology of the dominator has been adopted by the dominated—by the colonized” 
(Dussel 172). Bandits in Mexico were very much the forces of chaos, but they were also 
amongst the most organized of institutions. Often they were one of the very few ways the 
people had to defend themselves from the forceful drafts, or the raids of any of the 
multiple armies that roamed the country in the continuous warfare that characterized the 
nineteenth century, where Juárez and Altamirano would say: we shall be a modern mason 
nation, liberté, egalité, fraternité, or whatever else, Inclán’s Coronel Astucia sees no need 
for a colonizing political theory. He organizes a group of bandits and installs order in his 
town, setting up a little utopia in Michoacán. This is only utopic in the sense that Astucia 
is a good ruler in his lands, but bandits were very efficiently organized throughout the 
territories. In a less fictitious approach than Guzmán, a French ambassador, 
The rather prissy and decidedly pompous French Minister to Mexico 
surveyed national conditions at mid-nineteenth century and concluded that 
banditry had become institutionalized. In fact, asserted Dubois de Saliguey, “It is 
the only institution that can be taken seriously and functions with perfect 
regularity.” The minister was not exaggerating. Brigands had indeed earned 
social status as one of the best-organized special interest groups in the country. 
(Vanderwood 3) 
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Bandits had come to organize themselves to form quasi-institutions, to protect 
their thievery, but also to help it become a sustainable activity. The whole XIXth century 
was a struggle to come to a negotiated status quo between bandits and the state, where 
finally, the triumph of liberals over conservatives left a unified government that 
proceeded to ally with hacendados and capitalists in order to stop brigandage. And thus 
bandits became Rurales, a special police force that secured the countryside for capitalistic 
exploitation with exemplary use of force. “When Mexico’s bandits became Rurales, they 
remained in large part brigands. Bandits and policemen: they are not the antagonists they 
are assumed to be. They are fluid and interchangeable (…) They are double agents of 
order and disorder” (Vanderwood 63). Between most bandits who ruled in the 
countryside and the bandits who ruled in Mexico City, the problem was not that of 
alienation, but that of kinship. The violence elicited by the conflicts of civilization and 
barbarism runs so deep because of the similarities between one and the other, because the 
“civilized” act the same, yet pledge a different faith.  The story is framed as if the 
barbarous was a twin of the civilized, normally the evil one, but how could we ever 
decide which is which? Who is the evil twin and who is the good one if they both behave 
the same? 
The disorder of the masses was so pointedly derided only so a supposed order 
from a civilized elite would seem all the more orderly even though it failed to materialize 
once and again. But bandits, like governments, came in many forms and embraced many 
shapes, some orderly, some chaotic. Much like government approved tariffs, levies, taxes 
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and police corps such as the Rurales, bandits took to racketeering, kidnapping, excising 
tolls at the roads and the formation of self-defense organizations25. 
Stricu senso, Altamirano and Inclán speak of very similar characters facing 
similar situations, that nonetheless respond in very different ways to the role of the State 
and the way a body politic becomes established. Whether their popular caudillos are 
framed as leaders of weaponized mobs, or as founding fathers, it must be clear that they 
were a force at odds with the state, resisting its monopoly of violence. 
The criollo elites that inherited the role of government from their Spanish 
forebears had a very problematic relationship with bandits because they raised the issues 
that surrounded the questionable legitimacy of the criollo position. The symptomatic 
relationship of a state that imposes its rule by force, much the same as the bandits do, 
leads us to reflect on one of Charles Tilly’s lines of research, where he states that "If 
protection rackets represent organized crime at its smoothest, then war making and state 
making—quintessential protection rackets with the advantage of legitimacy—qualify as 
our largest examples of organized crime." (169) Most discourses constructed around 
bandits in the XIXth century were focused on domesticating their barbarous ways, in 
order to deviate the attention from the similarity between that which remained inside and 
outside of the state. These discourses reflected the liberal state’s project to coopt bandits, 
                                                
25 Of interest here is a comparison between Astucia and Alonso Sánchez Baute’s 
chronicle Líbranos del bien. Coronel Astucia and Sánchez Baute’s depiction of the real 
life paramilitary leader Jorge 40 have many similarities. These almost Plutarchian figures 
show common manifestations of rural violence in Latin America, the main difference 
being that Inclán idealizes Astucia, while Jorge 40 is represented in a much cruder way. 
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using the church, elites, and foreign invaders as mortar, in order to hold together the 
blocks of the theoretical nation. 
The liberal party started several state building and reconciliation narratives, even 
if they weren’t comprehensive. By incorporating the indigenous population to power 
structures, the ethnic constitution of the state changed, a process represented by Indians 
such as Altamirano or even Juárez, the man who became the main symbol of the state: 
the first indigenous president in America. This happened as Juárez, Altamirano, Díaz and 
other symbolic characters within the liberal party became acculturated to a secular, 
liberal, masonic state. In a way, this process opened a path to power for the under 
privileged, allowing the indigenous population access to the elite centers through an 
educational system. In principle, this would constitute the basis for an enlightened state. 
In practice, this system developed in a way much more similar to that narrated by Ángel 
Rama in The Lettered City- Separation between those who possessed letters and those 
who didn’t, between those who thus possessed power and those who didn’t, became by 
itself a process of exclusion that was marketed as its opposite, an inclusion process.  
Even though this process displaced racial dynamics beyond its traditional 
spaces26, oppression was not finished, it merely redistributed agents. Where the nation 
building novels that Altamirano wrote, in order to use an influential example, use racial 
marriage to create a metanarrative of inclusivity, this model betrays itself from the origin. 
                                                
26 One very good example might be the beginning of the Mexican Revolution, 
where the very white Madero rose from the shackles of oppression against Huichol 
dictator Porfirio Díaz, or the story of how the Yaqui Indians were oppressed by the 
“white” state, made up of mestizo soldiers and led by the Huichol Díaz. 
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It doesn’t look at the otherness within. What the discourse aims to do is to deracialize the 
discourse of civilization and barbarism, by configuring Zarco, the villain, as a character 
of European ancestry, blond and blue-eyed, while the lettered and civilized hero is an 
indigenous man. Regardless of these efforts, as Dabove states, "the Plateados continued 
to occupy letrado consciousness because they challenged the state on its own terms. El 
Zarco, then, must be read as a fable in which all colusion between the Plateados and the 
state is erased and the Plateados as a group must be crushed for the nation-state to 
emerge." (Dabove 101)  The problem banditry presented for the new mestizo state that 
was being proposed was essential, as it showed the blind spots in the inclusivity the 
liberal party’s nation building promised27. 
Zarco’s death, within Altamirano’s proposed system is a precondition for the 
development of the state, as he has the man in charge of prosecuting bandits in the novel 
                                                
27 In all due fairness, the mestizaje Project is complicated, but not without merit, 
as Enrique Krauze puts it: “We have left behind racial (and racist) theories about the 
ethnic dominance of “mestizos” in the Mexican mosaic. Formulated by Vicente Riva 
Palacio, Justo Sierra and Andrés Molina Enríquez, these theories could, in their time, 
serve as ideological vehicles of national unity or political legitimation, but no one 
defends them any longer. It seems clear, all in all, that mexican mestizaje, seen as a 
process of cultural convergence and social cohabitation, differentiated Mexico from most 
American countries where the rule was widespread discrimination, segregation and even 
systematic extermination of indigenous peoples” (Krauze 8). While many criticisms 
might be addressed to this project, it did manage to suppress a great deal of the racial 
violence that has been the norm in most of America. 
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say: "Martín Sánchez then reflected that while the fight against the bandits was not 
undertaken in force, while the people did not see a fight with no quarter given between 
the authorities and malfeasants, they would never decide in favor of the first" 
(Altamirano 242). Thus, the state can’t find its legitimacy if, its first role being to protect 
its people from aggression, it finds itself unable to offer such protection from external 
attackers (The French army) or internal ones (El Zarco). This narrative ends with the 
suppression, not only of the villain, but of Manuela as well, a perverse criolla who 
chooses the fair-skinned bandit over the lettered and indigenous Nicolás. Martín Sánchez, 
who obtains a wide array of powers in order to fight bandits, ends up configuring himself 
outside the State, as well as within, in order to protect the State itself, conveniently 
stepping outside the rule of law, which theoretically would be the main difference 
between himself and the bandits. 
That this process is violent, as well as racialized (even if the poles are inverted) is 
undeniable when Altamirano describes Sánchez’s investiture: “One dark skinned [Juárez] 
the fully indigenous type, the other one yellowish, [Martín Sánchez] the mestizo, peasant 
type; both of them standing in all seriousness and gravity, anyone who could read the 
future would shiver. It was the law of public health arming honesty with the ray of death” 
(Altamirano 246). The nation offers as its narrative that of a State represented by a fair 
and strong Indian, as well as an informal police made up of yeomen farmers, represented 
by a fair mestizo, willing to back his judgment with his life, all of them ruling over a 
nation built on the foundation of racial marriage under one law. 
In stark contrast to Zarco, Luis G. Inclán’s Astucia, our other example of bandit 
narratives of the XIXth century, builds a very different kind of national history. His 
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perspective is focalized through Lorenzo Cabello, a.k.a. Colonel Astucia, the leader of a 
group of charros, The Fellowship of the Leaf, dedicated to tobacco smuggling, a trade that 
was reserved for a state monopoly, at the beginning of the country’s history, due to laws 
and structures that had been inherited from colonial times. 
In this narrative it can easily be seen that there is no wide abyss between the 
smuggler and the people, for the Fellowship of the Leaf sees their actions as not 
contradicting a social contract, but rather, as resisting a tyrannical will that, de jure, has 
been expelled from Mexican Territory. This is so, for the laws that prohibited the tobacco 
trade were written by the Spanish colonial government, written by the Spanish Sovereign 
against the Mexican Sovereign, even if the State has not decided to abolish them. This 
can be observed in Astucia’s apology of the Fellowship of the Leaf, as he is being tried 
for the crime of smuggling tobacco: 
I deny my guilt in the crime of smuggling of which I am accused; 
that I was caught red handed is libel, for it is an expression used for 
thieves when they are caught with the product of their trade; we drove our 
loads bought with our own money; the leaf we traded with was sold to us 
by their owners, at the expense of their effort, leaf they had sown by the 
sweat of their brow, and profit they extracted from land they owned; and 
in respect of the laws that forbid the free trade of a monopolized 
commodity, I believe the only ones we have will not be in effect, for they 
were imposed by the Spanish government when we were under its yoke, 
and then were to be extended even to farmers, for, after so many years of 
war and so much blood spilt by good Mexicans, who managed to free 
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themselves from their chains and to reach our Independence, it is  a bad 
end to keep the damned laws despotism imposed on us. (Inclán413) 
The separation between the people and the law is one of the central elements in 
most bandits’s discourses. Two hypothesis might be established in relation: one, that 
bandits become such because they find such separation intolerable and look for some 
reconciliation between the law and the people, and/or two, that without said 
reconciliation having an important role in their actions, the bandit uses it to justify his 
position, to unrecognized the State as a representative of the Sovereign, and then to erect 
himself as a military entrepreneur, where 
by “military entrepreneur” I refer to a category of men who take 
up arms and who wield violence or the threat of violence as their stock in 
trade. I use “military” here not in its contemporary common connotation 
of a national army, but in an older, more ambiguous form referring only 
to the use of arms and weapons. They are entrepeneurs in the sense that 
they are purveyors of a commodity-violence. They may act in the employ 
of others or as agents in their own right (Gallant 26). 
In this way there is a break in the body politic, where it moves from the status of a 
community to a partitioned union of particulars. What is theorized as the exercise of a 
monopoly of violence with the purpose of withholding the common good shows itself in 
practice as the participation in a market of violence, where the presence or absence of 
commodities generates economic movement, whether in the private or public sector.  
Lorenzo “Astucia” Cabello’s banditry arises precisely within this environment. A 
state official rips him off while he is dedicated to the moonshine trade, by asking him, on 
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the one hand, a bribe to guarantee his merchandise’s circulation outside law and taxes, 
but on the other, using public force to dispossess him of his goods and livelihood. 
Astucia’s reaction prepares his conversion to tobacco smuggling, as he reflects on the 
disparity that exists between those who participate of the violence market: 
that there may be some so infamous that after auctioning 
themselves, sucking at two tits, intend to rob even more, exercising the 
position they occupy, unworthy, and to hold themselves to the law only to 
finish flaying alive the unhappy ones who fall within their clutches! Those 
aren’t men, they are entities cursed by the human genre; I, in order to get 
a peso, risk my fortune, wandering treacherous roads, through the thick of 
the forest, at the mercy of beasts, falling and then getting up again, while 
these brigands, in their chairs at a toll booth, or exercising their expertise 
in taverns, prosper at the expense of the whole world (Inclán 67). 
The use authorities make of public force, as indicated in the picture Inclán makes 
throughout his novel, is no different from the use Zarco makes of private force in 
Altamirano’s book. While the Plateado is judged because he participates in extorsion and 
highway robbery, the authorities are accused of exactly the same crimes here. If the 
bandit is configured as a participant in an illegal cartel, as a part of a body politic that 
generates a contract of community with the sole purpose of carrying out his activities in 
safety and predictability in the benefit of common goals, the kinship we find between this 
kind of association and the nation state is considerable and suggestive.  
 Here, however, we may do well to distinguish between what a bandit is and what 
a criminal is, especially around the notion of affiliation, a very important difference that 
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Dabove makes, as he argues: "Unlike the social bandit, the criminal does not know any 
affiliation beyond his gang. The criminal may be employed by someone, but this 
relationship belongs to the market of violence-and it implies violence as a commodity-
and therefore cannot be properly termed an affiliation" (Dabove 13). A bandit, in as much 
as he can be considered as belonging to a public order organization, recognizes a 
dichotomy that can be defined as civilian/military, central to the workings of the notion 
of affiliation. Without the existence of the notion of a civilian, a bandit’s community 
could never be more than a criminal association, where it would be a body politic devoid 
of a constituency. 
In the case of Martín Sánchez, Altamirano’s super police officer, there is a clear 
distinction between the civilian and the military, as he is hired by the government to use 
public force with the backing of the Sovereign. In the case of Lorenzo Cabello, this exists 
too, even if it is not as obvious. One of the main tasks of the Fellowship of the Leaf, is 
precisely, to rid the roads of robbers: "I warn you that if you ever set foot three leagues 
from here, we will hang you in the first tree available, for we don’t hold commerce or 
relent ever with robbers; get away from here, before I dispatch you, in an instant, to hell” 
(Inclán 141). Likewise, they see themselves as righters of wrongs, for the presentation of 
the Fellows of the Leaf, where they transmit their lives is a succession of stories of justice 
restoration, where the smuggler who tells the story always presents himself as suture for 
the community, guarantor of an order where everybody gets his just deserts. 
 A very interesting example is Pepe el Diablo’s story, which tells of how he met 
his wife and freed her. His wife was the daughter of an Hacendado who was dispossessed 
by the laundry lady and her lover, through a marriage and some legal stratagems. When 
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Pepe finds this situation, the daughter feigns insanity in order to preserve her life, the 
laundry woman is pretending to be a conservative Catrina, and the lover pretends to be a 
landowner of old, a standard of the law. When Pepe uncovers this couple’s crime, he 
assumes an analogous position to that of the King in plays of the Renaissance, where he 
reestablishes the natural order, or naturalizes the established one: “What do you say now 
of he who could not speak with smugglers, and wished to see them hanged? What say 
you of she who had such a sensitive heart, and was so delicate and impressionable? 
You’ve seen it, they’ve been well lodged in a car, and who knows how they’ll do when 
they meet their fate?” (Inclán 122) In more than one way, this reestablishment of a status 
quo is a carnavalesque inversion of social order, where the bandit brags about his honesty 
in contrast to a police chief’s dishonesty, as one of the characters states: “Have some 
shame, man—Chepe added—, if you have a family, work honestly to support it” (Inclán 
265). The authorities are configured here as a sort of parabandit, which is a much more 
accurate way to describe the status quo than saying the bandit is a sort of paraauthority. 
The distaste Inclán shows at the way the authorities seek to impose the law is never more 
clear than at a point where he describes a murder investigation. The town’s mayor, who is 
in charge, approaches the dead man and carries out the following formula: “Indalecio, in 
the name of God and Law, respond to the question the authorities ask of you: Who killed 
you?” (Inclán 379) This extreme in ritualization of the law is commonly construed as a 
useless process that makes no sense, countered by the bandit’s practicality, expediency 
and good judgment.28  
                                                
28 As we can see in Carl Schmitt’s Legality and Legitimacy, the formulaicity of 
the parlamentary notion of legality can lead to an empty form of legality. In this situation, 
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Through this reorientation towards a casual29 political construct, we may 
recognize a problem that has been repeatedly framed since the times of Greece, in 
relation to the construction of legal systems: 
Discovering the rules of society best suited to nations would 
require a superior intelligence that beheld all the passions of men without 
feeling any of them; who had no affinity with our nature, yet knew it 
through and through; whose happiness was independent of us, yet who 
nevertheless was willing to concern itself with ours; finally, who, in the 
passage of time, procures for himself a distant glory, being able to labor 
in one age and find enjoyment in another. Gods would be needed to give 
men laws (Rousseau, On the social contract 39). 
In Ancient Greece, laws were always entrusted to foreigners (or gods, depending 
of the city and author) or mythical heroes, such as Minos or Lycurgus (themselves 
claiming inspiration from Zeus and Apolo). This was the case because there was a 
recognition of a contradiction between two necessities within a legal environment: the 
participation of the Sovereign in law, in order to establish legitimacy for such a system, 
and the inviolability of the law, in order to guarantee their application. 
                                                                                                                                            
substantive law would disappear in favor of procedural law, which severs the law’s 
profound relationship with content in favor of procedure. The example of the Weimar 
Republic and the rise of the Third Reich show the dangers of embracing procedural law 
on its own. 
29 Refering to the casual approach to the application of the law, differing from the 
more general approach to its production. 
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The path Inclán follows is similar, for he establishes the fallibility of men, and 
resolves conflict through ultramondane pathways at the same time. Astucia, a foreigner 
and bandit, becomes a factor outside and inside the law, one that allows for the people to 
overcome themselves in the law. As Plato states: “all men everywhere are the enemies of 
all, and each individual of every other and of himself; and, further, that there is a victory 
and defeat—the best and the worst—which each man sustains, not at the hands of 
another, but of himself.' And does this extend to states and villages as well as to 
individuals?” (Plato Book I) Thus, there is a need to establish a distinction between the 
outside and the inside of the people, so that someone who has been part of the people can 
be separated and exercise the law, allowing for the Sovereign to come out victorious in a 
fight against himself. 
Nevertheless, the bandit utopia Inclán produces around the paramilitary turn of 
Colonel Astucia is no more real than the state utopia that Altamirano builds around 
Juárez and Sánchez. When Colonel Astucia is configured as head of Public Safety in 
Túxpam, Inclán builds a utopia of good government for rural Mexico in the XIXth 
century: 
As soon as funds were available, after establishing schools for 
boys and girls, he rebuilt Túxpam’s bridge, where he spent nearly five 
thousand pesos. He even carried out the role of priest, for women and men 
who had domestic trouble would reach out to him. The justice of peace 
was in paradise, for he received his good salary for no work at all; 
criminals were scarce, and most civil suits were arbitrated by the Colonel, 
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who would mediate between contending parties in such a way that they 
would end up conforming to his judgment (463). 
In the same way that Altamirano’s utopia is dependent on the extraordinary figure 
of Martín Sánchez, a man untouchable by the temptation of power, Lorenzo Cabello is 
untouched, and uses power for the common welfare. What both stories do have in 
common is their low esteem of a system of legality, in favor of a system of legal 
execution. In the end, Dabove’s point that “Inclán breaks away from the closure imposed 
by nationalists à la Altamirano, which defined the national from the vantage point of high 
culture, incorporating, in a highly restrictive fashion, selected elements of popular 
culture" (Dabove 134), is relevant. Both writers depart from the same diagnosis of 
Mexico, even if their proposed treatments are the opposite prescription. While 
Altamirano proposes to strengthen a State, providing a strong ideology as a way to 
guarantee safety, freedom and equality, Inclán proposes an ideological weakening of the 
State, to the same end. We can draw this from Astucia’s political program: "I pronounce 
myself this very same moment against all bandits, wearing no political colors, 
whatsoever, here are my accomplices present, and you in the first place; my plan only has 
two articles: to exile revolucionaries, and to hang bandits" (Inclán 442). Both postures 
had their moment in Mexican History. Altamirano’s found its zenith during Porfirio 
Díaz’s liberal regime, which incorporated bandits into its structure through the infamous 
Rurales, while Inclán’s found its when and where with the one party system of the 20th 
century, as the men who arrived to power with the Mexican Revolution institutionalized 
Revolution in the PRI. 
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THE CAUDILLO, THE BARD AND THE LEGITIMACY OF REPUBLICS 
 
Derrière chaque grand fortune se cache 
un grand crime. 
—Honoré de Balzac 
 
After Mexico’s institutionalized revolution put a host of bandit warlords or 
caudillos into power, these mixed with the old bourgeoisie and created a new ruling class 
that, starting in the 1960s, began to alienate the underprivileged classes of the country via 
domineering centralization and a closure of the paths to power. Nowadays we have a new 
iteration of the bandit caudillo: the narco, or drug dealer. This section focuses on a drug 
dealer in Yuri Herrera’s novel Trabajos del reino and his Kingdom, a nation-within-a-
nation in northern Mexico. I will show that this creates the possibility of a political 
identity for the dispossessed30 in a city that, despite having no name and being populated 
by characters with abstract names, is very similar to Ciudad Juárez. I will suggest that the 
                                                
30 By this I mean those who, because of their socioeconomic status, are excluded from 
the body politic, poorly represented in political bodies, and subject to structural 
poverty and abuse by the authorities. The main factors in this exclusion are endemic 
poverty and the status of recent immigrants, which leads to a lack of the community 
support networks that have traditionally played an essential part among the 
desperately poor in Mexico.  
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drug cartels and the state share an organizational structure, the differences between them 
being mostly stylistic and only secondarily political, and that, in any case, these 
differences have little significance in comparison with the large number of casualties 
produced by the war between them—an estimated 150,000 people.31 
Yuri Herrera’s novel is about a singer and composer of corridos, Lobo, called “the 
Artist,” who becomes part of the court of “the King” and finds a place there that society 
has previously denied him. From his position in the “Palace” he is able to observe how 
the cartel functions and realizes that the members of this para-state are part of a machine 
that keeps the political entity operating. After a legitimacy crisis involving the King, he 
realizes that his feeling of belonging was illusory and decides to leave the cartel as the 
Heir replaces the King. My analysis of the novel focuses on the theory of a social 
contract from the perspective of those who are not represented in formal government 
structures or in the society to which they allegedly belong. Using E. K. Hobsbawm’s 
notion of the “social bandit,” I will seriously question the concept of the law and its 
justification with regard to the groups that are part of the social fabric but not part of the 
institutions that produce the laws that rule them. 
Best known from the Robin Hood archetype, the social bandit is a category 
developed by Hobsbawm in an exploration of the way bandits interact with the 
                                                
31 These estimates vary considerably. In an article in Proceso, Enrique Mendoza 
estimated more than 60,000 up to December 2011; La Jornada (March 21, 2010) 
cited Leon Panetta and set the number at 150,000. 
 
 121 
population to create a proto-state within the state. (Hobsbawm, Primitive rebels) In his 
analysis of Italian robbers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Hobsbawm shows 
how these characters place themselves between the people and the state, replacing the 
latter while carrying out some governmental functions on behalf of the excluded. In his 
analysis of Carlo Levi’s book Christ Stopped at Eboli, which deals with the bandits of 
southern Italy, he discusses “how profound the memory of the bandit-heroes is among the 
Southern peasants, for whom the ‘years of the brigands’ are among the few parts of 
history which are alive and real, because, unlike the kings and wars, they belong to them” 
(Levi 21) The affinity of these characters to a population that the state views as surplus 
while nevertheless benefiting from its production and consumption generates the illusion 
of a community with something akin to genuine political representation.  
In Hobsbawm’s reading of Levi’s text, the environment is significantly, if 
deceptively, similar to our subject area. The peasants surrounding Levi are regarded as 
people who cannot escape their place of origin; they are residues, surplus. As Levi  puts 
it, “Those who are left in the villages are the discarded, who have no talents, the 
physically deformed, the inept and the lazy; greed and boredom combine to dispose them 
to evil. . . . It is therefore, a matter of life and death to have the rule in their own hands, to 
hoist themselves or their relatives and friends into top jobs.” (Levi 28) The narrative 
generated by this explanation of the state of things creates a vicious circle whereby those 
who are already alienated become increasingly excluded for the same reason that they are 
being barred from privilege. The use of words like “inept” and “lazy” contributes to the 
naturalization of this imbalance. At the same time that he is trying to revalue the 
inhabitants of Gagliano and other villages in Southern Italy, Levi reproduces the 
 122 
paradigm that reinforces the status quo. His assertion that Gagliano was “a tiny village far 
from the traffic of men; the passions that reigned there were simpler and more primitive, 
but no less intense than those of the world without” (Levi 22) is a significant logical leap, 
one that takes off from the fact that the subjects are poor. As does Hobsbawm, Levi finds 
a deep affinity between the society of the have-nots and his own but is unable to 
acknowledge it in these terms and has to describe the former as “primitive.”  
When Hobsbawm tries to explain how the bandit conceives law and lawlessness, 
he is forced to fall back on the notion of a stateless society. Thus he points to the origin of 
the legal alienation of these bandits: “In stateless societies, where ‘law’ takes the form of 
blood-feud or negotiated settlement between the kin of offenders and the kin of victims), 
those who kill are not outlaws but, as it were, belligerents. They only become outlaws, 
and punishable as such, where they are judged by a criterion of public law and order 
which is not theirs” (Hobsbawm, Social bandits 7). The criterion of public law and order 
that categorizes them as fugitives or beings outside the law does not belong to them; a 
different approach is required, but the same external criterion is still applied. “Stateless” 
is a term that indicates precisely what this society is not and manages to avoid the need to 
consider what it is. 
Herrera’s King comes from a sector that is often euphemistically described, in 
political discourse, as “poorly represented”—poorly represented in legislative bodies and 
separated from the making of the laws that govern it or, as the Artist, reflecting on his 
relationship with “respectable” people (those with money),  puts it:  
So they do not want him… so he is small fry for the moneyed, so he 
makes their ears itch. It was far from the hundredth time they had scorned 
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him, but this time he didn’t feel humiliated, he felt provoked, he felt 
aggrandized. He clenched his teeth and realized, all of a sudden, that he 
could think with great clarity. Being rejected by others defined him. 
(Herrera 58) 
Considering oneself as rejected by the moneyed, the ones who have access to the 
nation, means that the law is identified with the enemy. As in the days of the Charro, the 
law is seen as a vehicle of violence against one’s group. Most of the criticism of drug 
trafficking focuses (not unreasonably) on the violence generated by the traffickers; few 
analyses pay attention to the horrific violence inflicted on the groups from which the 
cartels conscript their soldiers. At the same time that the cartels violate the social contract 
implicitly assumed by the state, the state breaks down as far as the “poorly represented” 
communities are concerned. 
In many cases, this situation leads those who are forced into this role to seek their 
own cultural representation in opposition to the society that excludes them, leading to 
what the press has called a “narco culture.” This term may be inadequate for referring to 
the complex sociocultural environment of organized crime in Mexico. Decidedly 
polymorphous, this manifestation of popular culture cannot be reduced to a single 
definition. In the complex system that surrounds the drug trade, as Astorga points out, 
“the terms [‘traffic’ and ‘narco’] only partially signify what they purport to cover, but 
their symbolic power makes us believe that what they actually do is summed up in what 
they say.” (Astorga 24) The narco is not only a drug dealer but a guarantor of social 
order, sometimes murderer and sometimes benefactor—an outlaw in almost all his 
manifestations but occasionally also a source of law, as was Pablo Escobar during his 
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stint in the Colombian Congress. Built in opposition to the culture of the state and 
strongly regional in nature, the narco culture combines elements of a popular culture that 
precedes the dominance of organized crime in Mexico with the definition of a region, the 
Mexican North (including the U.S. Southwest), the political propaganda of organized 
crime groups, a ballad tradition (the corrido) that can be traced back to medieval 
romances or the Claros varones de Castilla, and many others, although the privileged 
representations of the narco emphasize his relationship with hired assassins. 
Trabajos del reino is a milestone in the literature surrounding the narco culture, 
for Herrera refuses to place it within the presumed criminal framework imposed by the 
nation-state. His work becomes part of a political discourse based on the point of view of 
inadequately represented political subjects. Rather than finding stories of hired assassins, 
we are taken to a different arena that, although perhaps erroneously, is ascribed to social 
bandits. This way of conceiving the segments of society that the system fails to 
incorporate  not only separates this stateless society from the one possessing a state but 
renders it dependent, in need of guidance. That this population does not feel that it 
belongs in the social contract should not come as a surprise. 
When from the center of the country the inhabitants of the Northern slums are 
viewed as stateless barbarians or social bandits, we fall into an error similar to that noted 
by Juan Pablo Dabove regarding Darwin’s description of the Rosistas in Argentina: “The 
analogy between Rosas's army and a gang of bandits is for Darwin little more than a 
commonplace literary hyperbole well suited to the exotic surroundings. Moreover, by 
quoting Salvatore Rosa, the seventeenth-century painter whose images of bandits and 
forbidding landscapes were well known, Darwin was linking the Argentine rural scene to 
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European classical art.” (54) Here, of course, we are not dealing with a Rosista army or 
Rosa’s painting, Colombian drug lords, or fugitives from Hollywood. In spite of all the 
similarities, it is inappropriate to resort to the Robin Hood archetype when speaking of 
Herrera’s King. If we attempt to describe the novel via familiar archetypes of social 
banditry we may fail to understand what is happening in the text and, more importantly, 
the project that the protagonist, the Artist, pursues throughout the narrative: self-
representation. Simply put, he seeks to represent himself and his environment freely. 
Representation is central to the ideological constructions of the King and his 
court. The actual situation faced by poor people in drug territories is not very different 
from that portrayed in the novel; in the midst of the prevailing violence caused by lack of 
membership in the surrounding society, mass migration, and the absence of positive 
prospects, all poor young men have been criminalized a priori. Those under thirty years 
old are barred from any participation in the social contract. In political discourse, “Every 
young man executed is considered, a priori, a member of a criminal gang. This presumed 
lack of innocence turns these male corpses into mere bodies lacking subjectivity, a 
biography, and, often, funeral honors. Their citizenship denied, they are reduced to thugs. 
In this drama of violence, the voice most ignored is that of young people” (Domínguez 
Ruvalcaba) 
This environment leads to the flowering of parallel societies, and some people in 
this situation are forced, willingly or not, to play a role similar to that of the King. 
Hobsbawm’s analysis addresses and separates the functions of this archetype32 and is 
                                                
32 Many features of his analysis are not relevant here, in particular the structuralist 
tendency to favor deep structure over causal particularity and the Marxist tendency to 
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useful in that many of its theoretical foci can be applied to the figure of the drug lord. 
One of Hobsbawm’s proposed archetypal requirements for the social bandit can be seen 
in Herrera’s novel: “The noble robber begins his career of outlawry not by crime, but as 
the victim of injustice, or through being persecuted by the authorities for some act which 
they, but not the custom of his people, consider as criminal” (Hobsbawm, Social bandits 
47). Drug traffickers find themselves profoundly dislocated between the system of values 
through which their society operates and the laws imposed on them. While other crimes 
committed are recognized as such, the crime that identifies the drug trafficker (since he is 
not being prosecuted for murder, kidnapping, or illegal weapon possession) produces 
justified resentment: 
As they see it, cocaine is just one more crop in the history of 
tropical countries producing such crops, from sugar to tobacco through 
coffee. Exporting it is a business like any other, and in this instance one 
that exists simply because the U.S. insists on snorting or smoking the stuff 
in ever more astronomic quantities. Left to themselves and the principles 
of Adam Smith, the consortia of Medellín investors would no more see 
themselves as criminals than did the Dutch or English venturers into the 
                                                                                                                                            
establish a positive temporal progression. The notion of progress encapsulated in his 
generous use of the terms “primitive” is probably the most problematic in its sense of 
superiority. Finally, his tendency to create lists of archetypal requirements, though at 
times useful, is also problematic. 
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Indies trade (including opium), who organized their speculative cargoes in 
much the same way. The trade rightly resents being called a mafia. 
(Hobsbawm, Murderous Colombia) 
The King sees himself as a legitimate businessman and feels that others, the 
“respectable” people, are hypocrites—people who seek to apply to him a value system 
different from the one that they may or may not, depending on the circumstances, apply 
to themselves. This drives him to work with culture producers to create a system of 
meaning that is consistent with the world in which he lives.  
This separation between law and reality creates a mythology that provides a 
bipolar view of the world: “The distance between the actual traffickers and their world 
and the symbolic production that speaks of them is so great that there seems to be no 
other actual and feasible way of referring to the subject than a mythological discourse the 
poles of which could be represented by legal codification and drug-trafficker corridos” 
(Astorga 12). Inasmuch as the social construct seeks to create a legitimate view of reality 
as conceived from and about drug trafficking, as is the case with the Artist in the King’s 
court, we can approach the novel as addressing these conflicts of representation in a way 
that is analogous to that of the  narcocorridos. This genre of epic poetry often serves as a 
political form of resistance and a source of unity for the less privileged sectors in a state 
that barely takes them into consideration. 
It is not surprising that communities that are massively criminalized—such as 
undocumented immigrants or the young men of northern Mexico—who are readily 
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assumed to be criminals if they die in violent circumstances, do not feel part of society.33 
The a priori construction of these subjects as outlaws further erodes the possibility of 
incorporating them into a legal framework, creating illegal identities inspired by 
persecution and deliberately erroneous representations.  
These stories of persecution and extralegality have contributed to the environment 
in which drug traffickers can take advantage of imaginaries of illegality to develop their 
approaches to sovereignty.34 As Cabañas puts it, “The issue of ‘illegal identity’ has 
marked the metaphorical connections between drug trafficking and illegal immigration. 
Both were crucial aspects for a Northern, border audience because by eluding the 
‘rinches’ or ‘rangers’ the drug lord hero offered a model that stressed the Mexican’s 
resilience in the face of persecution” (Cabañas 525). The tendency to establish fixed sides 
supplies a large part of the discursive basis for the environment created by drug lords. 
When one of his followers, El Pocho (named for his use of Spanish heavily interspersed 
                                                
33 While examples are plentiful, some of the most representative are the massacres 
in Juárez, in Villas de Saválcar (El Universal, February 3, 2010), and in Las Juanas (El 
Universal, July 18, 2010) and the murders of students in Monterrey (La Jornada, March 
21, 2010), where several of the young male victims were regarded as drug traffickers 
until it was proved otherwise. 
34 Thomas Hobbes (1886: 48), for example, derives sovereignty from honor: “To 
obey is to honour, because no man obeys them whom they think have no power to help or 
hurt them. And consequently to disobey is to dishonour.” As a result, “Honour consisteth 
only in the opinion of power” (50). 
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with English), who has worked for law enforcement agencies on the other side of the 
border, finds himself in a position to capture the King, the narrator explains that he 
suddenly realizes that the status of “good guy” is arbitrary—that he operates in more than 
one system and can choose or negotiate between them.  
Even so, it would be difficult to argue that the King is an example of a primitive 
tendency toward state construction. Rather, he evidences the decline of the nation-state 
under which he operates and the erosion of the social contract that that state uses to 
justify its existence, giving rise to other systems that stand as representatives and 
organizers of the communities in question. 
Thus, the caudillo begins constructing a parallel state, one that enables the 
community to live its own history and replaces the nation-state with a popular political 
organization that can operate in its place or at least appear to do so. At this point the 
cultural products known as narcocorridos (drug-trafficker corridos) come into conflict 
with cultural products of the nation-state such as journalism. Cabañas says: “competition 
between narcocorridos and journalism is commonplace, since the former offer a very 
tough critique of the co-opting of the media” (Cabañas 527). As access to the mass media 
becomes increasingly difficult, the corrido singer campaigns against the media’s apparent 
legitimacy. As Herrera’s narrator says, “to keep fools busy with clean lies, the Journalist 
had to make them resemble truth. True news were his, the subject of corridos” (Herrera 
35). Here the presumed objectivity of journalism and the subjectivity of narrative have 
changed places as their styles are employed to address the field of action originally 
assigned to their opposites. 
 130 
In this environment, corridos become a way of telling true stories, even if they are 
fictitious. Corridos such as Mario Quintero Lara’s 2008 “Propiedad privada” (Private 
Property), performed by Los Tucanes de Tijuana, represent a political manifesto, a 
proposal for a social and commercial organization that explicitly states its operating 
values: “He who won’t pay won’t cross the line/ and he who crosses the line will 
pay/You’d better be careful, friends/so that nothing will befall you/You know this is your 
house/ but it’s private property” (Los Tucanes de Tijuana). This is a product that closely 
follows the key economic doctrine of the continent, neoliberalism, which favors private 
ownership as its main right and laissez-faire as the organizational system of the body 
politic. Other corridos chronicle the deeds of important characters in the drug wars, 
sometimes in much more powerful ways than those of the official discourse. In Gerardo 
Ortiz’s 2009 “En preparación” (In preparation) performed by Banda MS, for example, the 
degree to which the war is based on violence is clear: “If you’re no good at killing/then 
you’re good for killing” (Banda MS). This corrido also remarks on the esprit de corps 
among these groups: “I’m preparing/to join the team/my code name is respected /and I 
carry a badass badge / which is why I’m effective/known in the mafia/number one among 
my people/active collaborator” (Banda MS). The word “collaborator” is characteristic of 
this environment and indicates loyalty to a community. 
Another very interesting and contrasting case is Teodoro Bello’s 2009 “La 
granja” (The Farm), performed by Los Tigres del Norte, in which the collective 
viewpoint portrayed is distanced from any focal power point, belonging neither to the 
state nor to any of the established surrounding powers but to the people themselves, 
equally alienated from the state and the cartels. The song portrays the people as farmers 
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alienated from political actors, which are presented as animals: “Nowadays we have//lots 
of insecurity/because the bitch got loose/made a total mess/among all the farmers/We 
need to tie her up.” (Los Tigres del Norte) In this corrido we find the cartels represented 
by a raging bitch, politicians as pigs, the media as chickens, and the president as a fox. 
This allegorical rendition of the Mexican political situation at the end of the 2000s is a 
parody and a call to action comparable to Orwell’s Animal Farm. 
 As we can see from these few examples, corridos do not all have the same kind 
of message, nor are they all located on only one side of the border. The farm, for 
example, is about the Mexican body politic, with Los Angeles as the place of 
enunciation. Not all corridos come from the same community, although generally 
speaking they tend to appeal to any of the political collectives in the territory. The people 
spoken of are a group that sees itself as a deeply regional as well as deeply transnational. 
In a way, the role of the corrido has to do with the creation of an identity, a citizenry that 
does not belong to any of the states that exclude it. “This step of becoming ‘a citizen’ is 
presented as the corrido’s project: restoring the pride and dignity of the individual in the 
transnational space” (Cabañas 533). It is this drive to find pride and dignity in the local 
environment that provides the drug dealer with a certain legitimacy in his progress 
toward the image of the caudillo while his sights are set on pulling together the 
significant system around him like a monarch: “The King is undoubtedly the point of 
'suture' of social totality, the point whose intervention transforms a contingent collection 
of individuals into a rational totality -yet precisely as such, as the point which 'sutures' 
Nature and Culture, as the point at which a cultural-symbolic function (that of being a 
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king) immediately coincides with a natural determination” (Žižek, For they know not 
what they do 20) 
The naturalizing function of the state creates value for its members in that it 
organizes the relationship between the social body and reality; at the same time, it 
diminishes that value and makes this relationship happen through the King or his symbol. 
Žižek tells us how this function forces the members of the state to justify their 
membership in the body politic:  
The King radically 'de-sutures' all other subjects; makes them lose 
their roots in some preordained organic social body that would fix their 
place in society in advance and forces them to acquire their social status 
by means of hard labour. It is therefore not sufficient to define the King as 
the only immediate junction of Nature and Culture--the point is rather that 
this very gesture by means of which the King is posited as their 'suture' de-
sutures all other subjects, makes them lose their footing; throws them into 
a voide where they must, so to speak, create themselves (20). 
 Herrera’s characters feel themselves clearly subordinated to the King. 
They all have a role to play in the court and understand that they owe this position to his 
power. The Jeweler, for example, recognizes his role, which is to be available on the days 
when court is held: “This is what we’re good for… to give him power. On his own, what 
good is any one of us? Nothing. But in him we are strong, in him, in his blood.” (Herrera 
60). In more than one way, the drug lord takes the place of an absent nation-state, 
developing a kind of corporate state that carries out its functions, administers justice, and 
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restructures the social order in a way that favors some of the dispossessed.35 Hobsbawm 
reports something similar with regarding to one of the Italian social bandits: “When he 
arrived in any village, it is reported ‘he had a tribunal set up, heard the litigants, 
pronounced sentence and fulfilled all the offices of a magistrate.’ He is even supposed to 
have prosecuted common-law offenders. He ordered grain-prices to be lowered, 
confiscated the grain-stores held by the rich and distributed them to the poor” (Primitive 
rebels, 21). Herrera describes the King and his activities in a similar fashion: “Deep in 
the room, surrounded by the Court, the King looked everyone in the eye, listened to their 
pleas, gestured the Manager, and the Manager took note” (59) The King here serves as an 
arbiter of society, the personification of an immediate and decisive state that provides 
efficient and necessary services for its client population.36 
Thus, the cultural products of caudillo states such as the one portrayed by Herrera 
point us toward notions of sovereignty and politics rather than banditry. After all, if it 
looks like a state, sounds like a state, and smells like a state, why is it not a state? And if 
                                                
35 They, however, remain dispossessed; they are dependent on their leader, even 
though they obtain tangible and irreplaceable benefits from their interactions with him. 
36 Domínguez Ruvalcaba (2010) tells some of the stories of cartel recruits in 
Juárez. For example, “The welfare state is absent from Erick’s story. The young man’s 
daughter required medical attention and selling drugs—what was available in the labor 
market—guaranteed her life. Since this job is dangerous and carries the risk not only of 
being arrested but killed, the desire of leaving this activity is as predictable as are the 
high costs of doing so.” Coupled with intimidation, the economy of personal favors is 
essential for cartel recruitment. 
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the state acts like a kind of social bandit, sounds like one, and smells like one, can we not 
then describe both of the states involved as bandits (social or otherwise)? This kind of 
“banditry,” perhaps best described as caudillismo, is not a primitive version of the state; 
rather, it represents a tradition and a path toward political thought much more pertinent to 
actual state building than the fictions proffered by social contracts or Hobbes’s 
Leviathan. When Charles Tilly talks about the state as a crystallization of the relation 
between organized crime and its constituents (174),  he emphasizes the tendency to 
consider external problems much more important than internal ones, giving greater 
weight to external agents that could replace it than to the individuals that, in theory, 
should pose a bigger threat.  The nation-state is much more like a cartel than like a social 
contract.  
The characters in the novel choose the functions of a state for themselves and 
their political organizations in order to set themselves up as the main referents for the 
body politic to which they belong. The lack of ability or willingness on the part of any of 
these nation-states to recognize the conflicts of most of its constituents represents the 
breaking point of its political legitimacy and the fact that the caudillo, “bandit,” or 
founder occupies a position of legitimized power. The situation is similar to the one 
described by Dabove in his discussion of Astucia: “The law of the bandits is the 'original' 
law, a law in connection with justice, emanating from the constituent power of the 
insurgent multitude, before the constituted power lost contact with its origin and became 
a husk or a skeleton, one mobilized for perverse purposes.” (139) In a way, according to 
this argument, we could say that what is sometimes described as a proto-state is even 
closer to the original law, since this aspect is what appears in the use of the legitimacy 
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machinery (corridos) employed by Herrera’s cartel, building legal systems and laws 
opposed to the laws and systems of the nation-state within which their own states exist. 
The “bandits” in question present a solution to a problem that the nation-state is not 
solving or perhaps even acknowledging.37 Constituted not as a force of chaos but as a 
necessary tool of environmental order, they do not quite conform to Hobsbawm’s 
definition of the social bandit.  
Similarly, speaking of the bandits of nineteenth-century Mexico, reflects that they 
may have constituted the power behind the system organizing the modernization process 
pushed and then rejected by the Díaz regime: “Order and progress are what bandits bring 
to Mexico, because in [Manuel Payno’s novel] Los bandidos de Río Frío [in contrast to 
Hobsbawm’s version] banditry does not resist modernity.” (204) The nation-state, with 
its projects of improvement and economic expansion is, for the King, incidental at best. 
In the absence of prospects within a nation-state that appears strange and foreign, the 
emergence of an independent parallel organization presents itself as a fair and useful 
alternative. As the King tells the Artist, “Why would you sweeten these fuckers’ ears? 
It’s enough that what we are fits us. Let them be scared, let the decent folk be astonished, 
put them under. Why else would you be an artist? (Herrera 62). This exemplifies the 
rebellion against the representation of reality exercised by the instruments of the nation-
state. And that is exactly the nightmare of the state, of the “lettered city”: being replaced 
as barbarism presents itself as more civilized than civilization and the informal state 
becomes a sign of order. Herrera shows us how the Artist conceives this fear of the other:  
                                                
37 Here it would also be fair to consider that they create many problems that did 
not precede them, but this rarely goes unnoticed. 
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They are scared One might bring unto himself everybody’s flesh, 
that He shall be keeper of everybody’s strength. They are scared of who he 
is, and how he is, and how he says it…. They’d rather hear just the pretty 
parts, right?, but ours are not songs to get permission, corridos are not a 
picture looking pretty in the wall. It’s a name and a weapon.  
Funny they’re all scared.  
Perhaps, who knows?, in the end they’ll found out they’re maggot 
meat. (64) 
The fear described here is at the center of the power that law and letters give the 
state, the representation of “All” in “One.” Reflecting on this, we can refer to how it is 
precisely those who have inherited the lettered city and the mechanisms that deny power 
to the dispossessed who are frightened by the corridos. The use of letters and their 
institutions to create the spectacle of a city, a state, and a nation that are then 
superimposed on the experience of the majority of the population loses most of its 
ideological power as it loses its referents in reality and as other discourses expose this 
loss. The legitimacy crisis faced by the depopulated lettered city leads to the emergence 
of alternative powers with their own claims to legitimacy. 
In this representational conflict, the figure of the Artist is trapped between the two 
bandits, the “respectable” state and the King. On one hand, the respectable state is food 
for maggots, disassociated from the reality of most of its population—a seller of 
protection unable to deliver the goods it advertises. On the other hand, the King is the 
central node of an organized crime group. The legitimizing propaganda that the Artist 
produces for the King may indicate the decline and the criminality of the respectable 
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state, but this does not make the King any less a criminal, even though he is ideologically 
closer to the Artist than the nation-state leaders are. The woman with whom he is 
sleeping reminds him of this when she says, “What else will it be?, you dumbfuck…. 
That they’re sons of bitches and you are a clown”. (Herrera 68). Her calling him a clown 
refers to his inability to control the state machinery in any meaningful way, regardless of 
his beliefs. He keeps the machinery going but does not influence its direction. 
There is a parallel story in corridos operating outside of Herrera’s novel. Songs 
such as Teodoro Bello’s 1993 “Pacas de a kilo” (One-Kilo Bales), for example, create an 
identity discourse around the figure of the caudillo/bandit/drug trafficker. When Los 
Tigres del Norte sing, “I like riding through the mountains,/I grew up among the 
bushes,/I learned my math out there/just by counting sacks,” they are placing the drug 
dealer within a tradition of heroism related to the foundational narratives of the Mexicans 
who inhabited the lands north of the plateau, including the nineteenth-century nomadic 
bandits. Interestingly, this figure is linked to a landscape that binds it to the territory and 
separates it from the respectable state, which is seen as belonging to faraway Mexico 
City. The traditional northern agricultural occupations are also linked to drug trafficking: 
“Very close to the mountain range,/I have a cattle ranch/cattle that will get no ticks/that I 
take abroad/ How pretty look my cows/with little lamb tails.38” Like the cowboy, the drug 
dealer is a merchant, transporting desired goods from their place of origin to a place of 
consumption. All this creates an imaginary that invests him with positive regional values. 
This signifying device suggests a revolutionary potential that it unfortunately does 
not have. As the Artist discovers, the finery worn by the drug lord does not change him 
                                                
38 Lamb tail or Cola de Borrego is a marijuana varietal grown in Mexico. 
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any more than the spectacular apparatus with which the United States and Mexico invest 
their presidents changes those presidents.  Watching the King deposed and replaced by 
the Heir, the Artist “had a minutely detailed image of the King’s face, as if through a 
magnifying lens he saw the loose tissue of his skin, of such a precatious constitution as 
that of any one person in this place” (Herrera 95). He thus realizes that the epic narrative 
his corridos have contributed to the Kingdom is to be found only in songs. Recognizing 
that, like any politician, the King pursued the interests of others only in terms of his own, 
the Artist understands that “the only peculiar thing was him, who saw it all from the 
outside. The only one that was special was him.” (Herrera 94). The cartel is too much 
like a nation-state. 
Failure to recognize the similarities between the state and its bandit counterpart 
becomes a blind spot that prevents the creation of a stable environment that can offer 
peace to its citizens; it impedes the establishment of a social contract. The construction of 
others as ignorant and politically disabled leads to a political corporation built on an 
empty historical dialectic, one that lacks memory and does not recognize the lives of all 
the subjects that make up the body politic. If we cannot understand what is going on in 
the head of a man who is willing to leave his position in the state and enter a political 
organization so brutal that it uses heads to communicate its intentions, how can we 
understand the conflicts posed by banditry in this country? There is a tendency to use 
ignorance and poverty as explanations for the state of desperation in which a large sector 
of the population lives, alienated from a state that cannot provide a solution to a political 
conflict between at least two socioeconomic and cultural forces that, at least in principle, 
should be made up of equals. There is a tendency to criminalize a priori all those who are 
 139 
pushed to the periphery of the social contract, generating a political reaction that answers 
violence with violence. Organized crime and social banditry, the nightmares of the 
modern state, are generated by the same process and for the same purpose. It is not that 
the sleep of reason produces monsters but that the dream is seen from the outside. The 
cartel is founded upon the gaps of the nation-state. 
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BANDITS: ILLEGAL REPRESENTATIVITY 
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SONGWRITER MASONS OF THE DESERT  
 
 “I like corridos because they tell our 
people’s real facts” 
Los Tigres del Norte 
 
Not quite belonging to one law or the other, riding between two conceptions of 
order, legality and illegality, Chicanos find themselves living between systems of fluid 
conceptions, where Weltanschauungs must be negotiated between the different elements 
that, whether from Mexico or the U.S., are imposed upon him. In this section, we will 
observe negotiation and construction of legality from a Chicano perspective. 
We will have to understand some peculiarity of material cultural production in the 
Mexican-American border in order to understand the way legality and illegality play out 
in borderer political imaginaries. By studying literature in other zones, if we followed the 
European modern model, we would look to libraries for the first texts produced by 
individuals who belonged to a political clasification. We would look to the first Chicano 
writers who appeared in print, perhaps the first ones who found commercial success, or 
those that first received critical acclaim. Perhaps we would move to Chicano authors such 
as Tomás Rivera, or Américo Paredes, as it is been common to speak of the Border 
Renaissance, due to the novelty and sophistication they employed. While aluding to this 
literary environment as foundational for Chicanos is not quite inaccurate, and it would be 
very unfair to speak of authors such as Rolando Hinojosa or Dagoberto Gilb without 
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recognizing its due value, it would be at the same time deceitful to think of Paredes and 
Rivera as the foundational figures of Chicano literature. While works such as With his 
pistol in his hand, George Washington Gómez, or Y no se lo tragó la tierra, represent a 
considerable shift in Mexican American cultural production, and it is easy to think of 
these works as the beginning of a cultural tradition, that is something they are not. The 
narrative inheritance a borderer receives from his ancestors extends further back, rising 
mostly from corridos. 
This genre, between literature and history, emerged from the Hispanic tradition of 
Mexicans in the Aridoamerican desert, and represents a very influential narrative in the 
Border Renaissance and beyond. Writers such as Hinojosa would be very hard to 
understand appropriately unless we understood the rhetorical traditions he inherited from 
border ballads. These ballads have commonly been traced to their relationship with 
Spanish Romances, an epic genre of medieval origins. This trace can be tracked throught 
Samuel G. Armistead’s work on Spanish epic and Hispanic ballads, where he states that 
"If we are going to look at the corrido's medieval origins, we will, I believe, need to go 
all the way back to medieval epic poetry and its own distant--and ultimately unknowable-
- origins." (Armistead 95). Other origins have been proposed, an interesting example 
being Mario Colín, who, departing from research upon precolumbine cultures ventures 
that "Father Ángel María Garibay, who knew the indigenous past so well, said that when 
speaking of ancient or precortesian poetry, we should turn back to Corridos, for before 
the Conquest, festivities, facts and confrontations where celebrated with music and with 
letters akin to those of Romances” (Colín xii). Nevertheless, whether their origins lie in 
Anahuac, Iberia or the miscegenation of both cultures, the importance of ballads as a 
 143 
vehicle for history and cultural cohesion has been widely researched.  The path they take 
to arrive at our location, the corrido, goes through the incorporation of many different 
elements that Armistead sums up by saying that:  
these epic narratives share three crucial features in common: Each 
poem involves ethnic or religious conflict; each also involves armed 
confrontation along a disputed frontier (today we would say a border); 
and each narrative, too, has, at its beginnings, a more or less distant 
historical nucleus, a core of historical fact, that, over the years, usually 
over centuries, may have acquired a dense overlay of legendary 
elaborations, but which, all the same, can still yield its basic historical 
outline to informed philological analysis (Armistead 97). 
The corrido’s main function is to represent a comunitary conception of a conflict 
that represents its circumstances through resistance. In the Rio Grande Valley, the 
epicenter for our purposes of Mexican-American culture, corridos have carried out the 
function of coagulating an identity. This task has been carried out in the midst of a fluid 
cultural intromission both from the Eastern United States and Central Mexico. Corridos 
provide a sorely needed discourse to this population, in as much as “the corrido emerged 
as a “dominant form of Lower Border balladry” because it satisfied the rhetorical needs 
of those living along that border, a means of discursively opposing encroachment from 
both sides, particularly as embodied in Mexican federales and American rinches, the 
derogatory term for Texas Rangers” (Noe 598). 
The structure of Mexican and Chicano corridos is not very different, both 
northerners and Chicanos resent the imposition of an order foreign to their society. 
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Corridos restructure their economic processes in order to harmonize them with what, in 
the best of cases, might be considered an illegitimate government, and in the worst, a 
crime syndicate. Both northerners and Chicanos find access to mass media limited, and, 
in Gregorio Cortez’s period (beginning of the XXth century), foreclosed. It is because of 
this that they opt for corridos as a means to challenge the ideological cartography of the 
border that leaves them off the map. The hero in corridos becomes a representative of 
society, a cultural hero, competing for representation of reality with official constructions 
of it: 
In taunting the Rangers, Cortez revises their discourse and its 
ability to order their subjectivity. The Ranger is no longer an individual, 
but a member of a mob; he no longer represents order, but the violence 
that inevitably underscores demands for order. In particular, “El Corrido 
de Gregorio Cortez” challenges the Texas Ranger as the personification 
of this dominant version of reality (Noe 598). 
This genre, in its effort to deterritorialize the cartographies of reality that are 
imposed upon Mexican-Americans, is the main literary heritage for the Chicano 
Renaissance writers, as its oral traditions are employed by them, turning it into their 
tradition. “Américo Paredes demonstrated, in the most elegant and eloquent terms, how a 
narrative poem in the oral tradition is continually recreated, reshaped and reinterpreted by 
traditional singers as it is passed on from one generation to another, in a dynamic process 
of poetic creativity."  (Armistead 93) In this chapter I will reflect on how oral literature 
transfers an attitude in relation to legality and illegality. This attitude is shown throughout 
Paredes’s work, which focuses on the conservation of knowledge through stories, as well 
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as the need to adapt to temporal circumstances. In his work, we find in Gregorio Cortez’s 
popular story the substance of his project, in the different ways the story is told, and how 
its mythology is reinterpreted.  
The node of resistance that corridos provide for Paredes is shaped around a 
rhethorical system that emphasizes the parody of an official discourse, and its 
rearticulation for later appropriating it. “It may be that border rhetorics, as exemplified by 
the corrido, can be used to resist being appropriated by academic discourse through 
mimicry of the conventions of that discourse” (Noe 604). By reappropriating discourses, 
corridos permit a deterritorialization of the discoursive weapons of opposing narratives. 
One very good example might be Los Tucanes de Tijuana’s Propiedad Privada, which 
reinscribes the smuggling of psychoactive substances into neoliberal discourses, equating 
the values of the prosecuted with the core values of the prosecutors. (Los Tucanes de 
Tijuana) another very good example is Gregorio Cortez’s corrido, where the Castle 
Doctrine39 is used to justify his actions, as he states: “Said Gregorio Cortez / with his 
pistol in his hand: / —I’m not sorry I killed him / self-defense is permitted” (Paredes, A 
Texas-Mexican cancionero 65) 
The result of this deterritorialization is the construction of an identity in a 
cartography that is “neither Mexican nor American,” important because oppositional 
                                                
39 The present form of this doctrine in Texas law has not changed much, and the 
relevant section would be  “(e)  A person who has a right to be present at the location 
where the force is used, who has not provoked the person against whom the force is used, 
and who is not engaged in criminal activity at the time the force is used is not required to 
retreat before using force as described by this section” (Texas Capitol)  
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binaries operate at the friction points between the inside and the outside. The corrido, as a 
border rhetoric, questions that metaphor by insisting on a border space in which 
oppositional binaries no longer order discourse.” (Noe 599) By escaping the colonial 
logic of oppositional binaries of civilization and barbarism, of law and banditry, corridos 
avoid the discourses that seek to make Chicanos accept their place as outlaws, outsiders 
of the state. Through corridos, the people generate a tradition that resists the construction 
of order that gives rise to the stories of “desperadoes”. 
In film and song, we have heard this story many a time. The characters in the 
story have an easily recognizable code. Within a broad desertic expanse, bandits roam, 
murdering and pillaging. When those whereabouts are not teeming with bandits, fierce, 
murderous Indians constantly patrol them. In spite of how much it is described as an 
empty territory, the prairies and deserts east of St. Louis seem like a very populated 
space. That is, unless their inhabitants are not considered human. 
Stories of “desperadoes”, an adaptation of the Spanish term “desesperado”, or 
“without hope” permeate the territory, creating an image of a cruel Mexican who lies in 
wait to terrorize innocent pioneers. Walter Prescott Webb, in his infamous The Texas 
Rangers, a century of frontier defense, speaks of how “without disparagement, it may be 
said that there is a cruel streak in the Mexican Nature, or so the history of Texas would 
lead one to believe. This cruelty may be a heritage from the Spanish of the Inquisition; it 
may, and doubtless should, be attributed partly to the Indian blood” (Webb 14).  This 
cruel streak, and how it is different from the cruel streak in American, Chinese, French, 
or any other nature, is never clearly defined, and takes in no account the situation of the 
Mexicans who were dispossessed in 1836 or crossed by a border in 1848. They suddenly 
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found themselves deprived of land and possessions and often summarily executed by the 
same officers of the law that should, at least in theory, protect them. Suddenly, they 
found themselves on the wrong side of borders, honor, and law. From the justified 
mistrust of this legal system, arises that many of them would face no choice but to place 
themselves outside of the law, defending their right by their might, dissolving a social 
contract, and aiming to construct other informal collectivities that might help to defend 
their physical integrity, as well as their property.  
In this situation, both in California and Texas, the most densely populated 
territories of the 1848 expansion of the U.S.A., several famed bandits arose, like Joaquín 
Murieta or Tiburcio Vásquez. While in some ways the description of these men as 
bandits may be appropriate, it is most often a discursive construction in bad faith of their 
life and activities. When speaking of Vásquez, a Californio bandit in his play Bandido, 
Luis Valdez remarks on how “the roots of banditry in California run deep” (Valdez 127) 
and how those roots generally make us think of bandits as different kinds of characters, 
maybe not better, but certainly more complex.  
Joaquín Murrieta was most likely a man from Sonora, whose family was 
murdered, and who was deprived of his earthly possessions. He represents a need for 
revenge, a man who has no other purpose but to try to achieve with his own hands the 
justice a biased legal system has denied him. As a historical character he is very difficult 
to depict, as there is very few certifiable data to back any which version of his life. 
Nonetheless, he is a character who inhabits narrative, from corridos to novels, one of 
them attributed to Ireneo Paz. This character is often depicted as blood-thirsty, but in 
Paz’s novel, he conceives of h
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solely by his will to obtain revenge. He describes his situation, himself, in the following 
way: 
Comrades, replied Joaquín with his turn, I have suffered more than 
any of you that rage that inspire americans to hangings, for I have seen 
strangled my poor brother in front of my eyes, he who had done them no 
wrong, and in a time when it was imposible for me to save him or to 
punish the murderers (Paz 154). 
The representation of this rage is outside the legal discourse of America. In the 
representation of bandit violence, there is usually a much more than biased selection. 
History erases the violence carried out by Anglos, placing it behind the phantom of 
legality and focusing upon others the light of illegality. 
The backing of a state apparatus for this selection of representation makes bandits 
an even more complex subject of analysis, as they are rarely studied40 through solid 
historical sources, but rather, as Robert McKee Irwin states: "most representations of 
Murrieta appear to be works of fiction, though each claims basis in historic fact." (Irwin 
39). While he shows himself wary at the difficulty of using him as a historical character, 
he uses the term “cultural icon” for Murrieta. 
A cultural icon is a character that has achieved cultural significance that has 
become real in and of itself, like a performative story. The actual, historical 
circumstances of his life might be hard to ascertain, or contentious, or even fictitious. The 
story however, has found resonance within a culture, as it represents the struggle of many 
and acquires its political power from this process. 
                                                
40 and sometimes it isn’t even possible 
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Irwin’s use of the characters he analyzes as cultural icons seems very interesting 
in these circumstances, as he studies how certain characters achieve a cultural notoriety 
that makes them hyperrealistic, not withstanding how much actual reality is inserted into 
their literary or cinematic representations. This Nietzchean 41 approach to cultural icons 
allows us to fixate a large and solid enough fragment of popular culture, with the purpose 
of studying it and presenting a coherent image of this character. Murrieta, the bandit he 
analyzes, becomes a pseudo-historical character through the way he typifies the 
experience and circumstances of numerous existing characters who have been lost to 
history throughout the years.  
Joaquín Murrieta, nevertheless, is not alone amongst the icons of banditry in 
Greater Mexico, or the American Southwest, or the Aridoamerican deserts. There are 
many more, such as Tiburcio Vázquez and Juan Nepomuceno Cortina. Cortina was a 
condecorated officer who served both in the armies of the Mexican United States and the 
United States of America, as well as Gregorio Cortez, and many others. 
Cortez, very much unlike Murrieta, has a historical persona that is quite clear, 
though not devoid of controversy, as he was not able to clear his name by writing 
memories, or commissioning biographies that could hide his faults from sight. Gregorio 
Cortez, of corrido fame, lived in the Rio Grande Valley, in South Texas. His notoriety for 
academic purposes arose from Américo Paredes’s famous counterhistorical narrative: 
                                                
41 “The falseness of a judgement is for us not necessarily an objection to a 
judgement (…) The question is to what extent it is life-promoting, life-preserving, 
species-preserving, perhaps even species-cultivating.” (Nietzsche 6) 
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With his pistol in his hand, a book written against the representation of ethnic conflict in 
Texas as depicted by Walter Prescott Webb in The Texas Rangers and The Great Plains. 
This is almost a book-form corrido, where Paredes tells of his struggle and that of 
his people facing the cultural production of Anglo-Americans and its political influence. 
In it, Paredes focuses on questioning the representation of Anglos, and more specifically 
Rangers, represented as symbols of law and order, while Mexican Americans are 
portrayed as horse thieves. 
Paredes’s work represents a landmark in the efforts to understand the conflicts 
that take place in border territories. His book, centered on Cortez’s figure, seeks to 
provide a countercultural history of the “population” of the South Texas Valley by 
Anglos. His ethnographic study of the Valley and the variations of Cortez’s story remarks 
on the multiplicity of experiences present in Texas and claims central validity for his own 
experience, not a minoritary position in the periphery. This project becomes more and 
more necessary as we dwelve deeper in histories such as Webb’s that adopt the frontier 
thesis with no problematization, building a heterotopic discourse that hides the vital 
experience of one of the largest population groups in the territory in question. 
Paredes’s territory is very different from Webb’s. Whilst Webb describes one 
forged in strife and violence, one with a population molded from their warrior prototypes, 
Paredes describes Nuevo Santander, the Hispanic name for the Valley, as a mostly pacific 
environment. The main figure in the configuration of this community was José de 
Escandón, who refused to follow the Presidio structure that Spaniards applied in a good 
deal of the now borderlands, and installed a colonist model in the Valley. From this 
moment on wards, the identity of the region was forged around the idea of a shelter: 
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The Lower Rio Grande, known as the Seno Mexicano (the Mexican 
Hollow or Recess), was a refuge for rebellious Indians from the Spanish 
presidios, who preferred outlawry to life under Spanish rule. Thus, at its 
earliest period in history the Lower Rio Grande was inhabited by outlaws, 
whose principal offense was an independent spirit (Paredes, With his 
pistol in his hand 8). 
This calling to be a shelter would return later, as it ended up being one of the last 
shelters for Mexican Americans within the United States. This status was possible 
because of its isolated locale. Before railroads, “In 1846 it took Taylor a month to move 
his troops the 160 miles from Corpus Christi to Brownsville”. (Paredes, With his pistol in 
his hand 10). The idea of a community that managed to sustain class mobility and a 
certain equality amongst its members, where the owner of the land lived and worked the 
land among peasants and cowboys, seems very different from the way Webb describes 
his environment, focusing on the significance of the Texas Rangers in order to 
comprehend it, using mostly the images of racialized conflict in order to inform and 
describe the way life took place within:   
The organization commonly known as the Texas Rangers may be 
defined as a fighting force which had its origin in a three-cornered racial 
and cultural conflict. The history of this conflict, which constitutes a 
unique chapter in American life, is a little less than the history of the 
Texas frontier and a little more than the history of the Texas Rangers  
(Webb 1). 
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This focus on building an environment through conflict and racialization 
represents the point of departure that feeds the confusion between legality and illegality 
in this frontier. The organism in charge of applying the law is conceived from the 
beginning as an instrument of conflict, partial to only one of the groups that exist in this 
territory under the law, and an instrument that seems to course through its history. 
Thus, when in the Mexican American war a shift in political borders occurs, this 
is represented not only by a change in legality, but by a generalized change in the 
conception of the standard status of the social environment. Such an environment shifts 
then from one conceived around the possibility of peace to one conceived in and from 
conflict. The environment was racialized, and the illegality in legality found in this 
divisive line its main axis. The border that settled in the maps was extended through 
several representations. Thus, the ending of the Mexican American war and its 
conclusion in the largely ignored (save for the part of moving the border) Guadalupe 
Hidalgo treaty came to change radically the world in which the borderer lived, adding a 
line, a border in the center of the environment, that served both as an elment of division 
as well as a unifying one. 
It was the Treaty of Guadalupe that added the final element to Rio 
Grande society, a border. The river, which had been a focal point, became 
a dividing line. Men were expected to consider their relatives and closest 
neighbors, the people just across the river, as foreigners in a foreign land 
(Paredes, With his pistol in his hand 15). 
Establishing the border line resulted in the configuration of a set of identities, 
imaginaries and legalities that was extremely complicated, and made people negotiate 
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their enrollment within one or the other in function of the circumstances, or to risk the 
most patent of injustices in the name of justice itself. The difficulty of establishing a clear 
image of this border and its divided imaginary leads us to the common representation of 
the Rio Grande as an open wound, as shown by Gloria Anzaldúa when she says: “The 
U.S.-Mexican border es una herida abierta where the Third World grates against the first 
and bleeds. And before a scab forms it hemorrhages again, the lifeblood of two worlds 
merging to form a third country--a border culture." (Anzaldúa 25) In her metaphors, the 
border is conceived as an element of separation, where Mexico and the United States face 
each other. Nevertheless, her vision of the border as a focal point persists, marking the 
double consciousness in which the people that inhabits this territory live. On the one 
hand, they can trace their presence and heritage to the XVIIIth century, and on the other, 
they are considered foreigners and sometimes not even people.  
The status of these subjects who find themselves trapped between the two states 
have their agency put into question, for the racialized preconceptions use the border to 
deny them participation within the body politic. Reflecting on Paredes’s novel, George 
Washington Gómez, Ramón Saldívar shows it as a reconfiguration of the discoursive 
environment with the purpose of reaffirming Mexican subjectivity and the possibility of 
self-representation in a world that questions its viability. “At virtually the same time that 
C.L.R. James was exploring how the past is conceived in relation to the present and the 
future by subjects whose status as subjects has been open to question, Américo Paredes 
was completing a novel attempting to reconceptualize the past in order to imagine a 
different set of symbols of the future" (155). Paredes thus, takes up the task of reverting 
the process by which Mexican-Americans lose agency and the means of self-
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representation. This allowed the Anglo-American to create a biased image of him, 
creating a myth of banditry that would bring pain and suffering to a great many Mexican-
Americans. Paredes shows this process in a comparison to slavery in the Southern United 
States. 
The 'cattle barons' built up their fortunes at the expense of the 
Border Mexican by means that were far from ethical. One notes that the 
white Southerner took his slave women as concubines and then created an 
image of the male Negro as a sex fiend. In the same way he appears to 
have taken the Mexican's property and then made him out a thief 
(Paredes, With his pistol in his hand 20). 
Through this representational deconstruction, Paredes brings us to the condition in 
which Gregorio Cortez finds himself: a victim represented as the victimizer. A foreigner 
in his native land, Gregorio Cortez (both in fiction as in history, that other fiction) finds 
himself deprived of his rights and of consideration as a man, as guaranteed by the 
Constitution. Anglos, in spite of their obsession with individual development, choose not 
to consider Mexicans as individuals, but rather as a stereotyped collective, almost a part 
of the décor. 
Chicano writers often reflect circumstances that satirize the Anglo officers of the 
law that can’t recognize an individual Mexican amongst the collective. Both Tiburcio 
Vázquez, who argues with the sheriff who is prosecuting him without being recognized, 
(Valdez 105) and Sonny Ruiz, who passes for Japanese in the eyes of military police, 
after deserting during the Korean War (Hinojosa, Korean Love Songs 45) take advantage 
of this lack of interest. These writers parody a historical circumstance by which Mexican-
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Americans are denied individuality. This usually had much more tragic endings, as is 
evidenced in the procedure by which, according to Paredes, Texas Rangers prosecuted 
Mexican-Americans as murderers or horse thieves:  
The killing of innocent Mexicans as 'accomplices' became a 
standard procedure-especially with the Texas Rangers-whenever a Border 
Mexican shot an American. The practice had an important influence on 
Border balladry and on the lives of men such as Gregorio Cortez 
(Paredes, With his pistol in his hand 20). 
 The lack of respect for Mexican American lifes by Texas Rangers that Paredes 
shows is the origin of Gregorio Cortez’s trials. His story begins with an uneven but legal 
deal that his brother, Román, carries out with an Anglo-American. Through his wit, 
Román reverts an attempt by the Anglo-American to fool him, giving him a lame horse 
instead of a healthy mare. He asserts that the Anglo-American points to the lame horse as 
the object of the exchange, even if he doesn’t tell him it’s lame, and he insists that the 
deal, if struck, is irreversible, saying: 
“With just a little arguing you might convince me to trade this 
horse for that worthless mare of yours. But I don’t know; you might go 
back on the deal later on.” 
“I never go back on my word” the American said. “What do you 
think I am, a Mexican?” (Paredes, With his pistol in his hand 38) 
 This probably references a stereotype Webb portrays, where he claims that the 
Mexican "won more victories over the Texans by parley than by force of arms. For 
making promises -and for breaking them- he had no peer" (Webb 14). All the while, 
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Webb ignores how American law reneged on the Guadalupe-Hidalgo Treaty, and 
presents Mexicans as people without honor. In this story, we see how Román fools an 
Anglo-American in a similar way to that in which many of his kind were tricked in real 
estate deals. Trickery, however, does not work both ways, as the Sheriff murders Román 
as a horse thief, while invoking the Texan patron saint: 
Now there are three saints that the Americans are especially fond 
of-Santa Anna, San Jacinto, and Sanavabiche-and of the three it is 
Sanavabiche that they pray to most. Just listen to an American any time. 
You may not understand anything else he says, but you are sure to hear 
him say, 'Sanavabiche! Sanavabiche! Sanavabiche!' Every hour of the day. 
But they'll get very angry if you say it too, perhaps because it is a saint 
that belongs to them alone. (Paredes, With his pistol in his hand 39) 
Paredes uses the Sanavabiche joke to illustrate the division of the proper use of 
language, law, and power in Texas. This helps him emphatize how Mexican-Americans 
are withheld from the community, restricted from discourse and participation. 
Sanavabiche is a good analogy for the law in Texas. When Gregorio faces a Sheriff in his 
property he faces the following situation: A) The Sheriff attempts to carry out an illegal 
arrest, with no warrant, B) The Sheriff is trespassing on private property, C) The Sheriff 
has summarily executed Gregorio’s brother, Román, D) He proceeds to physically 
threaten Gregorio, E) Gregorio kills the Sheriff in self-defense, under the Castle Doctrine. 
Had racial difference been the opposite in this story, the outcome would have been much 
different, and the rule of law would have been imposed. Gregorio Cortez, however, was 
Mexican-American, and like many before him had to take refuge in illegality. He became 
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an outlaw, and, under common usage and tradition, against the law, became a Homo 
Sacer. 
This story becomes symbolic because it isn’t a private exception, nor a novelty 
tale, but the reiteration of a common problem. The story of how it was that Gregorio 
Cortez manages to avoid the Rangers, Sheriffs, and posses that persecuted him 
throughout the fields, happened some thirty years after the Cortina Wars, and only a few 
years after Aniceto Pizaña’s Plan de San Diego42. During the period he lived in, only a 
few years after his chase, the main newspaper in South Texas could declare that: 
The finding of dead bodies of Mexicans, suspected for various 
reasons of being connected with the troubles, has reached a point where it 
creates little or no interest. It is only when a raid is reported, or an 
American is killed, that the ire of the people is aroused. (San Antonio 
Express) 
Even such a biased author as Webb calculates the number of people murdered by 
the Texas Rangers somewhere between 500 and 5000 (Webb 478), with an enormous 
margin of error that bears witness to the lack of importance such victims might have had 
for him. The number of Mexican-Americans killed in Texas during the zenith of the 
Rangers surpasses American casualties in the Spanish-American War by an order of 
                                                
42 The Cortina Troubles and Aniceto Pizaña’s rebellion under the San Diego Plan 
were just two of several uprisings in the Rio Grande Valley meant to protect Mexican 
Americans from the unwarranted brutal treatment they received from the cattle barons 
and law enforcement agents. 
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factors and equals the deaths in the Mexican-American War without provoking in Webb 
enough interest to approximate the number to the thousands. 
It is in this environment that Gregorio Cortez finds himself an outlaw, for he has 
no elements to think that the legal system might offer him the protection that the U.S. 
Constitution should grant him. As Paredes states, there was a common conception of the 
Rangers amongst Mexican-Americans: “The Texas Ranger always carries a rusty old gun 
in his saddlebags. This is for use when he kills an unarmed Mexican. He drops the gun 
beside the body and then claims he killed the Mexican in self-defense and after a furious 
battle.” (24) Presumed guilty by birth and ethnicity, Cortez sought refuge with a friendly 
family, as he fled from the mobs that aided the new Sheriff as he played the role of judge, 
jury and executioner. A hopeless Desperado, he went to the Robledo’s, where Sheriff 
Glover ambushed him. Sheriff Glover’s drunken posse took the house by assault in an 
action described by the San Antonio Express as “a tale of bravery unsurpassed on the part 
of the officers and of desperation on the part of the Mexicans. That more of the officers 
were not killed is little short of a miracle… The Mexicans had the advantage.” (San 
Antonio Express). The alternative story of the fight, as Paredes compiles it is: “The 
shooting stopped, leaving on the field two officers dead-Glover by the hand of Gregorio 
Cortez, Schnabel by that of one of his own comrades-in-arms. On the Mexican side a 
woman and a boy were wounded, both noncombatants. Captured were Martín Robledo, 
his wounded wife, his two youngest sons and the wounded Rodríguez boy.” (71) The 
posse hanged summarily the youngest of the children as an accomplice, with the purpose 
of extracting information. It was not the members of this family that were considered 
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assassins, or outlaws, it was the desperado instead, who fled for his life as the people who 
fed him were physically harmed, with no legal mandate, for aiding an innocent man. 
 If we follow the image of Texas’s police corporations that Paredes presents us, it 
is hard to understand how they could represent a symbol of law and order, specially when 
their behavior was denounced both by Mexican-Americans and Anglo-Americans. Much 
less partial sources, such as General Winfield Scott of the U.S. Army, describes the 
behavior of the Rangers towards Mexican-Americans stating that they "commited 
atrocities to make Heaven weep and every American of Christian morals blush for his 
country…. Murder, robbery and rape of mothers and daughters in the presence of tied-up 
males of the families have been common all along the Rio Grande." (Scott 111) Given 
that the law, now and then, forbade murder, theft and rape, it is hard to understand how 
the Texas Rangers were construed as a legitimate element of police work, and 
furthermore, how they came to represent a valiant corps that was key to establishing 
order in the Rio Grande Valley. If it is accurate that the Valley was a pacific territory 
before their arrival and a territory in chaos after it43; if their stories of conquest represent 
the appropriation of a territory where firearms were illegal, how do we arrive at a border 
ballad like that of W.A. Phelson: 
 They fought grim odds and knew no fear, 
They kept their honor high and clear, 
                                                
43 María Josefina Saldaña-Portillo has studied extensively the processes by which 
Norteño Mexicans used to negotiate peace with Indians throughout the territory, 
achieving by trade and diplomacy a stable form of coexistance with minimal war, at least 
as compared to the relationship Anglo-Americans undertook. 
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And, facing arrows, guns, and knives, 
Gave Texas all they had-their lives” (Webb 17)  
It is more than justified to ask just what Texas it was that they gave their lives for. 
It remains to be seen if it is a sovereign state, Texas, constituted by its whole population, 
or Texas, the private property of cattle barons, with which they were often economically 
partnered. These cattle barons acquired quickly huge expanses of land, by “acquiring” 
land and cattle from Mexicans and Mexican-Americans. 
Even officers of the U.S. Army who were assigned to the region spoke of the 
Sedicioso movement in very measured terms: "General Funston, believing then and 
continuing to believe for several months that the trouble arose principally from actions by 
Texans rather than by Mexicans, considered the problem to be a local and state police 
matter". (Cumberland 289) That is, by judging the problems to be national problems, 
between citizens of their own country, it judges on how inappropriate the description 
along national and ethnic lines was.   
Paredes points towards the possibility of imagining a different territory. He opens 
our perspective by depicting the story of a cultural hero, someone who actually existed 
and lost it all to the illegality wielded by those who were charged to uphold the law. This 
different territory he imagines is one without a small group of people who destroy law 
and order in order to further the profit of a small group of aristocrats. This territory could 
be configured differently if we reorient our view of banditry in it, and recognize its place 
within the multicultural dynamics.  
Banditry is a wrong name to give to the cultural heroes of the border. It depicts an 
unbalanced power relationship that ignores facts selectively. There is scarcely any town 
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in the Mexican bank of the Rio Grande that does not have a history of raids with the 
Rangers as main characters. Would not the story be different when we think of those who 
allegedly uphold the law find themselves looting, and razing civilized towns? Even Webb 
recognizes quite a few of these incidents: "In order to escape from their situation, or to 
cover their plundering in the Mexican town, they set fire to Piedras Negras and crossed 
the river under the protection of the flames. The burning of Piedras Negras was wholly 
unwarranted." (146) We find that even those who supported that group can’t deny their 
behavior. There were several incursions carried out in Mexican territory even after the 
filibuster Stephen Austin succeeded in separating Texas from Mexico in order to 
establish slavery in the territory. In order to establish the ground for a more cooperative 
territory, history must be rewritten in a less biased way, carrying out a much fairer 
attribution of historical facts. One of the things that is most interesting of Gregorio 
Cortez’s corrido, is that it allows us to see how the discourse of legality wielded around 
the Rangers can be turned on its head, and described as one of injustice and illegality.  
Paredes questions the image of Texas Rangers as border heroes, by stating that 
"more than legend seems to have been involved in the heroization of the Rangers at that 
particular time." (80) By observing the results of their actions we should conclude that 
the objective exercise of the law was not exactly their goal. It was alleged that they would 
usually shoot first and ask questions later, killing Chicano landowners. Often, it was 
claimed, cattle barons, with whom several Rangers were in business partnershipa, will 
consequently claim their land. The development of cultural products that would elevate 
the acts of Texas Rangers to legendary status should make us wary of their role in Texan 
history. 
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This process is, in current Anglo-American culture, vehemently condemned as 
social engineering when the color lines are reversed. Nevertheless, it was considered 
useful when it was used to deprive a rather large segment of the population of its material 
wealth in order to transfer it to a rather small segment.44 According to Ramón Saldívar: 
Many [Texas mexicanos] were murdered simply because they 
happened to be working near sites of seditionist action, making for 
terrifying instances of guilt by contingency. This reign of terror virtually 
cleared south Texas of landholding Mexican Americans, making feasible 
the Anglo development of the region into its capitalist agribusiness 
formation in the 1920s" (R. Saldívar, The Borderlands of culture. Américo 
Paredes and the Trasnational Imaginary 155) 
Through the use of a heavily biased use of the law along ethnic lines, a massive 
redistribution of property took place, such a successful one, that some of the largest 
stretches of property in the world were shaped in a very short time. These issues can’t 
simply be considered bygone, as they continue to be influential in very real and present 
                                                
44 Paredes provides evidence and testimony from respected citizens to support his 
claim that, as an example of a selective and unprosecuted murder, a Ranger, identified as 
“Bekar” shot the last Cerda, before his land was bought by a ‘cattle baron’. (30) 
That shooting is documented by Webb (Webb 464)  who gives no further details 
and Dobie (Dobie 32) as the extermination of the raiders of Norias. Then, the process by 
which these selfless rangers offered Texas their lives should come into question, and we 
should wonder whether this Texas represents anything but the interests of a few 
profiteers. 
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problems. The end result is that Anglo barons became scared of social engineering and 
class warfare, because they knew them quite well, and along with the present plutocracy, 
fear destitution as the result of cries for equality. The economic inequality between 
Mexican-Americans and Anglo-Americans is considerable, and has bearing on the 
opportunities both have to lead their lives. Rather than following the stereotype of the 
lack of industriousness, much of the divide is dependent on patrimonial wealth, itself 
derived from the use of Rangers in order to dispossess Mexican Americans of property, 
by starting a process of placing Chicanos on the outside of the law, branding them as 
bandits, or horse thieves, starting a process which would later be continued with the 
construction of illegal immigration. Paredes’s use of tradition allows him to parody the 
history of the Rangers, dearticulating their prejudice through their own resources, but also 
allows him to construct a nodal core of reappropriation of Chicano history.  
By deconstructing the idea of the Chicano bandit in order to start a history of 
cultural heroism, he provides means to reaffirm Chicano resistance to unfair treatment. 
These cultural heroes are ones who like Cortez, find their place in history: "the Chicano 
Murrieta reasserts himself within U.S. culture but as a symbol of defiant Mexican 
American participation in old Californian culture despite Anglo-America's attempts to 
exclude it" (Irwin 76). The replotting of institutions such as the Rangers, is essential both 
to Mexican-Americans and Anglo-Americans, for such institutions might be exactly that 
which motivates Irwin to state that: "Strange conditions are found in the United States, in 
that populace that wishes to be a model for everyone else; there together with the most 
refined civilization appears the most degraded barbarity"  (Irwin 53). The creation of 
institutions that are meant to buttress civilization, and to preserve peaceful ways to 
 164 
interact within a polis becomes the production of barbarism, merely another way to 
manifest organized crime and violence within.45  
We could always reformulate the political narrative that leads us, restructuring the 
way we think of Gregorio Cortez, Tiburcio Vázquez, Joaquín Murrieta or Juan 
Nepomuceno Cortina, going from a narrative that configures them as outlaws into one 
that recognizes the culture for which they are heroes. With their pistols in their hands, the 
corrido says, but what those pistols stand for, is always up for us to say, even if the law 
refuses to ask. 
                                                
45 It could be feasible to understand the U.S. through the best ideas that have been 
thought by its citizens. But the U.S. has to live up to its own ideals. After all, the 
document by which it came into existence begins with the following words: “We hold 
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal” (National Archives and 
Records Administration) 
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GREEKS IN ROMAN COURTHOUSES: PROCEDURAL LAW AND COLONIAL CODES OF 
HONOR 
 
“Los sueños de la razón 
producen monstruos” 
Francisco de Goya. 
 
The great political fantasy of the modern world was the image of universality: a 
utopia of reason that would allow for both freedom and equality while making for an 
ethical political framework. Institutions were built and spread around the world, creating 
entities that would rule us in seeming fairness and equality. As the modern state took 
shape, embracing values of universality, equality, liberty, and reason, institutions and 
non-physical entities were wrought to govern our political units and offer equality under 
the law. One instance from which I argue the promise of equality under the law fails is in 
the encounter between colonial moods of statehood and legal practices. Rolando 
Hinojosa’s work, the Klail City Death Trip Series, a novel in many volumes, shows 
Chicano dwellers of the Rio Grande Valley in Southern Texas and the long history of 
legal discrimination of the United States of America.  
Hinojosa writes about three centuries of Rio Grande Valley dwellers and the fate 
of their families, focusing most importantly on the years during which this territory has 
been a part of the United States. The purpose of this section is to explain how in the 
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works of Hinojosa, commensurability and incommensurability of legal and honor codes 
is played out, following a divide along a cultural divide that is also marked as racial.46 
The arguments I will present are divided in two sections, representing different 
approaches to a problem of cultural coexistence and commensurability. The first one is 
focused on Jesús el Quieto Buenrostro, a cultural hero: a Chicano cowboy who is central 
to a fictional history of resistance that mimics a historical process of self-preservation. 
While inspired in the epic hero, Quieto performs no superhuman feats; he simply uses wit 
and his strict ethics to defend himself, and his people. It is centered on the history of 
confrontation that followed the incorporation of Texas into the United States. This 
section is constructed around the confrontation of the law and honor codes, and the use of 
the universality of the law as a rhetorical strategy of objectivity that hides a heavily 
biased construction of the polis. While pretending that the law is an institution 
independent from them, those who design the legal system get to occupy the law and 
deny commensurability to people who do not share in their culture. 
The second one is centered on the figure of Jehú Malacara, an Odysseus-like 
figure who is a lawyer and works at a bank in Hinojosa’s fictional Belken County. It 
                                                
46 It is very important to point out that this divide is only one amongst many, and 
that the gender divide is also an enormously important one in this context, as both the 
honor and legal codes in the borderlands are heavily masculinized. This critique is 
important, so much so that it would displace the one I am proposing here should I decide 
to pursue it. I, therefore, choose not to pursue a reading of this cultural system along 
gender lines, but recognize it as one of the most serious issues in the mapping of 
borderland culture. 
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constructs a narrative of identitary incommensurability that, historically, I argue, 
succeeded the histories of confrontation in the Chicano Wild West. In this section, I 
analyze how, through Hinojosa’s narrative, Chicanos in particular, but non-whites in 
general, experience law as applied and designed through otherness. A system of 
polycentered honor codes is required to navigate through competing polis without 
succumbing to the siren song of the law. 
The protagonists of these stories of cultural strife dwell in spheres that clash with 
a legal system that is in opposition to their selves and/or culture. They inhabit a space felt 
as foreign and as domestic at the same time, like Greeks in Roman houses, and 
courthouses. Their narratives are politically engaged with mimicry of a legal history that 
has been destructive for Chicanos within a very unequal legal environment. 
At the same time, as we ride a theoretical pendulum, and generalize from this 
particularity, these characters help us to illustrate shortfalls of a legal system proposed by 
the USA. This problematic is not one that arises in spite of the democratic ideals which 
allegedly inspire the polis, but because of the structure of processes intrinsic and ignored 
within representative democracy by which the law is shaped, interpreted and exercised on 
the body (both metaphorically and literally) of minority races or cultures. As Hinojosa’s 
characters state: "Everything within this country's laws, and this country sure has got 
some laws, don't it. A great country, but you've got to watch those laws, leave you naked 
if you don't." (Hinojosa, Becky and her friends 14) Minorities experience laws within, as 
a weapon to dispossess. The history of the Buenrostros might, from the Anglo point of 
view, been characterized as banditry at times, for they took up arms at several points in 
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history. But they experience resistance towards the law not as a crime, but as a defense 
against continuous legal and illegal aggression: a necessary defense, at that.  
To approach this subject, we should begin with a detour, reflecting on the nature 
of the conception of rights towards the state. Ideas acted out in literature, also bring into 
question the feasibility of a universal principle for legal codes. In this, we find a vantage 
point in Chicano literature which, amongst many other kinships might be kin to 
postcolonial literature. I find this kinship, in defining a postcolonial experience as the 
experience of self through otherness, such otherness being in particular the Eurocentric 
imperial modernity. I depart from Natalie Melas’s description of cultural colonialism: 
"Colonialism is indeed the imposition of a single law, at least in the cultural realm, for 
the civilizing mission brings everything into comparison; the world it imagines is 
composed, if one may say so, only of apples [instead of apples and oranges]" (Melas 278) 
In principle the incommensurability of both value systems should not imply 
incommensurability in coexistence between them, provided the existence of a system of 
value relativization. The problem here, however, within the framework of a legislative 
state that aims to mediate between private parties and their values (in representative 
democracy, generally, and the United States, particularly) is that the Law itself is posited 
as a universalizing system, a system dedicated to creating objective parameters to 
establish behavioral patterns for all individuals within the state.  
Though not devoid of virtue, the universalizing discourse of European philosophy 
and political theory, amongst other things, behaved as a masking element for 
reterritorializing colonialized subjects’ cultures. These cultures were never conceived as 
possible parts of a universal globe; but were designed to be replaced with a European 
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culture that, by erasing other cultures, might be conceived of as universal.47 Thus law, 
blind but not egalitarian, conceives of all subjects not as equals but as identical48, which 
might be one of the most powerful means of oppression, creating a situation of internal 
colonialism within a State. In such a tendentious mode of impartiality, a set of common 
values is assumed for anybody subject to it, as if, in any way law would be applied it 
could do so in the same exact way without incurring injustice. The eradication of 
difference that the legislative state offers displaces difference in all particularities that fall 
under its rule, as Melas states: 
The version of inconmensurability which posits a radical 
separation between autonomous systems seems problematic in a colonial 
context simply because colonialism is a complex of social, economic, and 
                                                
47 While for the purposes of this text, discrimination based on colonialist 
processes is the focus, but it does not mean that other kinds of discrimination do not exist, 
or that the process by which a minority is disengaged from the body politic which we 
address here is necessarily different if we changed the optic through which discrimination 
is carried out. We might think of class or gender as other lenses with which to study the 
process and we would find similarities. After all, were not women deprived of 
participation in the body politic in name and effect until the twentieth century? Other 
histories of this process are possible. 
48 And of course, the failure by a subject to achieve identity would be punished by 
de facto, even if not de jure, exclusion from the body politic’s most important 
institutions. 
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cultural practices predicated precisely on the eradication of autonomous 
realms. Subsuming the globe under its law, it sets all differences into 
relation with European metropolitan powers as the economic center and 
the cultural standard (278) 
By establishing a formal system in order to support a universalizing legal code 
that is bound to establish itself as the only behavioral standard in a territory, should make 
us question the theoretical validity of procedural law. It can use difference and identity to 
uphold structural injustice. Perhaps we can trace this tendency to a tradition of legal 
thought that descends from Kantian ethics, whose Categorical Imperative might be 
construed as a clear shape of legal universalizing aspirations: 
But what sort of law can that be, the conception of which must 
determine the will, even without paying any regard to the effect expected 
from it, in order that this will may be called good absolutely and without 
qualification? As I have deprived the will of every impulse which could 
arise to it from obedience to any law, there remains nothing but the 
universal conformity of its actions to law in general, which alone is to 
serve the will as a principle, i.e., I am never to act otherwise than so that I 
could also will that my maxim should become a universal law. Here, now, 
it is the simple conformity to law in general, without assuming any 
particular law applicable to certain actions, that serves the will as its 
principle and must so serve it, if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a 
chimerical notion. (Kant 228) 
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Kant’s intention might be to have a will with no impulses, dedicated only to 
conforming to law without any regard to particularity, which presents itself as the goal of 
the categorical imperative, to find a law that can be accepted in its universal application, 
since the person considering it would accept that it be applied to him or to everybody. 
Even though in some light this is not a test without some value, experience has shown it 
to be deeply twisted.49  
For to imagine a legal system that is merely procedural, is to dream an eerie 
dream that opens itself to everykind of nightmare as we try to find out just what it is that 
is moving those institutions around town.  
                                                
49 In Hannah Arendt’s book, Eichmann in Jerusalem, we find how one of the 
major players in the Holocaust:“suddenly declared with great emphasis that he had lived 
his whole life according to Kant’s moral precepts. And especially, according to a Kantian 
definition of duty. This was outrageous. In the face of it, and also incomprehensible, 
since Kant’s moral philosophy is so closelv bound up with man’s faculty of judgment, 
which rules out blind obedience. The examining officer did not press the point, but Judge 
Raveh, either out of curiosity or out of indignation at Eichrnann’s having dared to invoke 
Kant's name in connection with his crimes, decided to question the accused. And, to the 
surprise of everybody, Eichmann carne up with an approximately correct definition of the 
categorícal imperative: ‘I meant by my remark about Kant that the principle of my will 
must always be such that it can become the principle of general laws’ (which is not the 
case with theft or murder, for instance, because the thief or the murderer cannot 
conceivably wish to live under a legal svstem that would give others the right to rob or 
murder him).” (Arendt 136) 
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Kant’s system did not push discretionality and exceptionality out of the political 
realm. While his system was aimed at countering the whims of absolute monarchs in the 
incarnation of modernity in his time (Let us not forget that he lived most of his life under 
the reign of Frederick the Great, the enlightened despot), it merely pushed discretionality 
to another realm of thought, that of the underlying principles. The impersonal mechanism 
proposed by Kant creates simulacra of equality in the face of the Law. This makes 
individuals disappear in the simulacra, losing sight of the distinction between procedural 
law or substantive law, that is, upholding a method for the discovery of good, rather than 
an agreed notion of good.  
The focus on a procedure that might render a proposition as universal eases the 
passing of such a proposition into a guiding principle for manufacturing notions of duty. 
Thus, when translating the universal principle into duty, we might find different endings 
from those anticipated, for should we find duty bound to such a will, bound to such a law 
to serve, might we not find the same “vain delusion(s) and chimerical notion(s)”? The 
key part of the exercise of power is outside the theorization of law. This makes it possible 
for the elements that guide legal application to be buried in jurisprudence that can slowly 
invert the operating principle of the law. By doing this, substantive notions of rights and 
freedoms are rejected in order to establish procedurally generated laws that in upholding 
law violate its foundations in social contract theory.  
We reflect on this problematization of the social contract implied in representative 
democracy through the Klail City Death Trip Series. In it, Hinojosa constructs a fictional 
Texas, superimposed on the Rio Grande Valley, on both sides of the border, offering a 
reinterpretation of history. He continues Américo Paredes’ project to show another side 
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to Anglo constructions of history, law and justice. Within this system, Hinojosa takes us 
from the 18th century to the late 20th century and shows us how Chicanos circulate 
through the different ethical and legal codes that are presented to them, and the way in 
which some amongst them negotiate honor and law, terms commonly separate for them 
and, often opposed. Hinojosa’s characters react to a body politic that structurally 
misrepresents them, forcing another culture’s notions of honor upon them, and imposing 
laws that systematically disavow their rights. They navigate this situation by negotiating 
abidance to law and to honor, by knowing two disparate social systems and shifting 
between them as needed. 
His narration is constructed as anti-epic narration of modes of honor, where “there 
are no heroes of legend: these people go to the toilet, sneeze, wipe their noses, raise 
families, know what it means to day with open eyes, rarely crumbles, and (like green 
wood) resists cracking up” (Hinojosa, Klail City y sus alrededores 11) In his stories, he 
claims, characters merely act the way they have to, aspiring to being chronicles, rather 
than mirrors for princes. In this genre, he sets out to represent the inequalities of the 
political system his Chicano characters inhabit. 
My first approach to the inequalities of this system is focused around the figure of 
El Quieto, the land owner. Belken County, the center of Hinojosa’s fictionalized Rio 
Grande Valley, is ruled indirectly by a consortium of three intermarried families: the 
Klails, Blanchards, and Cookes. They became rich in the nineteenth century, acquiring 
the largest cattle ranch on the planet and have since branched out into other businesses. 
The source of their riches though, is the illegitimate appropriation of lands belonging to 
Chicanos under the Spanish land grants. The correlation between a historical process of 
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racial conflict and Hinojosa’s Belken county is the motivator for the way the story moves 
throughout. 
As Zilles describes, "In Estampas, (92) we learn that the skirmish betweeen the 
old families and the Rangers-Leguizamón faction later turned into a week-long siege of 
the Rancho del Carmen during which the Buenrostros proved worthy of the Cortina 
legacy and repulsed the attackers." (Zilles 154). In Belken, through the use of both the 
Texas Rangers, and a faction of Mexicans who ally themselves with the Anglos and 
reconfigure themselves as Spaniards50, the KBC clan manages to grab hold of most of the 
land and translate it into capital.   
Whilst Chicanos did not take the oppressive measures lying down (several 
insurrections, most often classified by Anglo historians as banditry are proof), the 
superiority in numbers and weaponry was clear. By the middle of the 20th century, the old 
Spanish land grants were a fading memory. 
                                                
50 The subject of Mexicans reconfiguring themselves as Spaniards in order to 
become allies of the Anglo establishment by claiming “pure white blood” and separating 
themselves from miscegenation is complex and a strong subject throughout the KCDTS, 
Often, characters will point out the differentiation in fragments such as this: "They were 
old Mexicans, mexicanos viejos, but at one time they thought of themselves as Spaniards; 
can you beat that? Just like the Leguizamóns. Oh, sure. The Leguizamóns considered 
themselves Spaniards for a while there… And get this: they'd been mexicanos on another 
occasion, and then they became Spaniards. How 'bout that? Talk about your turncoats!" 
(Hinojosa, Becky and her friends) 34 
 175 
The significance of the changes in land ownership by legal, illegal or dubiously 
legal methods had an impact in the configuration of the polis in Southern Texas. Colonel 
Klail’s counterpart in reality, Captain Richard King, was the main owner of the famous 
King Ranch; the other partner was Gideon “Legs” Lewis, a captain of the Texas 
Rangers51. As Denhardt states: “Having a captain of the Texas Rangers as a partner was a 
real advantage, King realized, for the bitter struggle to tame the strip between the Nueves 
and the Río Grande had now begun in earnest.” (Denhardt 21)  
King began his empire with two broad strokes, after making a small fortune in 
contraband during the U.S. Civil War. First, he acquired the nucleus of his Ranch, 15,500 
acres of land, from the widow of Juan Mendiola who held that land under a Mexican title 
preceding the Texan Independence war. This land was acquired for less than two cents an 
acre. To put this into perspective, one year later, King sold five mules and one horse for 
280 dollars (Denhardt 24). Then, after securing the land, during a drought, King  
in a master stroke, showed the breadth of vision for which he was 
to become famous—and thereby forestalled any future labor shortage on 
his ranch. At a small village south of Camargo (Mexico) he purchased all 
the available livestock. Then, realizing that the villagers were left with 
nothing, he asked all of them to return with him to the Rancho de Santa 
Gertrudis [later the King Ranch] (Denhardt 23) 
                                                
51 We will later, when reading about the San Elizario Salt War, reflect on just how 
far this Alliance between public and private goes. 
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Having secured superiority in the main forms of capital in the región, King and 
his associates became key members of society, and exercised tremendous power within 
the area. It would not be difficult to imagine how a Mexican American might be reluctant 
to contest the legal power of the King Ranch, while living in Kingsville. One colorful 
way to describe the way that cattle barons would go about the business is fictionalized by 
Larry McMurtry in Lonesome Dove. In this nostalgic novel of the western lifestyle we 
can find a peculiar counternarrative, within the mainstream retelling of the west, to 
counter the construction of the Mexican as a cattle rustler, and one that might be more in 
line with the historical experience of the Southern Texas Valley. Captain Call and 
Augustus McCrae use cattle rustling as a way to build up their herds: 
Every now and then, about sundown, the Captain and Augustus 
and Pea and Deets would strap on guns and ride off into that darkness, 
into Mexico, to return about sunup with thirty or forty horses or perhaps a 
hundred skinny cattle. It was the way the stock business seemed to work 
along the border (McMurtry 12) 
Later, the narrator claims Mexicans also participate in the same tactics, but the 
story never shows any of it. By becoming involved in the stock business at the same time 
they were representatives of an institution dedicated mostly to solving murder and cattle 
rustling cases (both offenses punishable by death), Rangers became a pernicious 
influence in the land. They, in association with cattle ranchers, executed people using 
accusations of being cattle rustlers as a pretext, or executed them when they attempted to 
recover their own cattle. This series of actions led to Anglo-Americans appropriating the 
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means of production that used to be in Mexican-American hands, whether land or stock 
was the capital in question. They accomplished this by only marginally legal means, 
helping the cattle barons achieve what they would not have been able to do through legal 
means. 
The way in which people who were by and large the owners of the largest sum of 
capital within a polis is then imagined by Hinojosa in his fictional accounts of Belken 
County. We can listen to Everett Blanchard Cooke, one of the leaders of the Klail-
Blanchard-Cooke clan: 
As for politics, that's what we are all about and that, Galindo, is 
merely farmed out to Noddy; look, we have businesses everywhere, and 
Klail is but a part of it; the money started here years ago, and we started 
the town… from the Anglo point of view, anyway. (Hinojosa, Dear Rafe/Mi 
querido Rafa) 219 
The perspective this clan has on Belken and subjacent counties is one of 
ownership, and the tactics that are shown by the Rangers in Hinojosa’s book are in 
agreement. The politics, farmed out to Noddy Perkins, are run like the family business, 
where NP assigns people to elected positions and removes them at his leisure. Dear Rafe 
is basically a political thriller, told from many perspectives, and intermingled with several 
of the intergenerational stories of the KCDTS.  
El Quieto Buenrostro was a figure of renown within Hinojosa’s series, not only 
because he held on to some of the larger chunks of land amongst Mexicans, but because 
he was able to beat the legal system by his wits. El Quieto divided his land into a myriad 
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of small parcels, and used a system of trust holders to make the legal expenses of taking 
the land over much higher than what it was worth. 
El Carmen. Small ranch, but definitely the most beautiful place in 
the Valley. And we will never buy it. We can’t. It was divided in so many 
parcels that there aren’t enough lawyers and papers to come to an 
agreement. That Quieto was something, wasn’t he? (Hinojosa, Los amigos 
de Becky, 62)52 
Because of the success of his strategy, the Leguizamón family, allies of the KBC, 
executed him in cold blood, and with impunity from the Texas Rangers. Over the years, 
this turns out to be a landmark event for Belken, shaping the lives of several of the main 
characters of the narrative, not only because of the way Jesús Quieto Buenrostro was able 
to outwit the KBC, but also because of the fallout of the violence.  The events are 
scattered throughout the Series, but are more or less summarized in a diatribe against 
Choche Markham, a Ranger: “The Leguizamóns killed don Jesús as he slept and what did 
Choche Markham do?—I ask you, raza—, what did Choche Markham the great raza 
friend do? You know: he did nothing. He did jack-shit.” (Hinojosa, Klail City y sus 
                                                
52 I translate this fragment myself, as Hinojosa’s English language novel does not 
include a direct translation of this dialogue. His novels often differ greatly between 
English and Spanish language versions. The original reads: “El Carmen. Rancho pequeño 
pero decididamente el lugar más precioso del Valle. Y no lo vamos a comprar. No 
podemos. Se dividió en tantas parcelas que no hay bastantes abogados y papeles para 
llegar a un acuerdo…. Otra cosa ese Quieto, ¿eh?” 
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alrededores 19).53 Since representatives of the law would not investigate the murder of 
his brother, Julián (el Quieto’s brother) avenges him and kills the murderer.  
The spiral of violence that surrounded el Quieto’s murder becomes a paramount 
event in Belken, as different strategies were devised by all parties to further their 
interests. These events serve within Hinojosa’s narrative to propose a transition from the 
period in Tejano history characterized by confrontations between “bandits” and Rangers, 
usually for the benefit of a few cattle barons who would often include Rangers as 
associates. 
However, what these events also bring to the fore, is a confrontation of notions of 
honor, that is, ethical codes which are not written into the law, and which guide the 
decisions and actions of people, often running counter to the law itself. As Robert Cover 
states: "The normative universe is held together by the force of interpretive commitments 
--some small and private, others immense and public. These commitments -- of officials 
and of others -- do determine what law means and what law shall be." (Cover 7) The 
beliefs shared by those who are in charge of applying the law give shape to its 
actualization. Law without honor codes used to bring it into being is the realm of pure 
virtuality, pure potential with no manifestation. Without taking into account the system 
by which elected officials arrive at their positions and the belief systems they bring with 
them, the legal procedures by which they must abide hold very little substance. We see 
the following scene in Dear Rafe, where Noddy Perkins sits down a candidate for office 
and insinuates the way power structures within Belken work:  
                                                
53The original reads: “Los Leguizamón mataron a don Jesús mientras dormía y 
¿qué hizo Choche Markham -les pregunto, raza-, ¿qué hizo  Choche Markham el gran 
amigo de la raza? Pos ya saben: no hizo nada. No hizo una chingada." 
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Noddy sat him down (literally) and talked about the importance of 
water rights in the Valley. How the water was apportioned in Belken 
County; who manned the irrigation ditches; who assigned the watering 
days and the amount, and when it was to be let out. (Hinojosa, Dear 
Rafe/Mi querido Rafa 39) 
Those who own the majority of capital within the territory depicted by Hinojosa 
are convinced they own said territory, as might be seen in his construct, as his Anglo-
Texans seem to be operating within a version of the Castle Doctrine, by which, as Texas 
Senate Bill 378 states: “A person who has a right to be present at the location where the 
force is used, who has not provoked the person against whom the force is used, and who 
is not engaged in criminal activity at the time the force is used is not required to retreat 
before using force”. (Capitol) The value system implicit in this law is problematic to say 
the least. 54 It was designed to shift the burden of proof away from the person who used 
deadly force onto the person killed. 55 This might compel us to consider how Mexican-
                                                
54 Even if the reader is inclined to not take into account the numerous murders 
carried out in Texas during the 19th and 20th century, how problematic such a law would 
be that would allow men to use murderous force when threatened with such wide limits 
might be more than apparent in the recent Trayvon Martin murder trial. 
55 This law provides an excellent example of the way a honor code is forcibly 
implemented by a majoritarian party. Republican Senator Jeff Wentworth of the 25th 
district describes the current iteration of Texas Castle bill in the following way: “This 
means that if we are standing in our front yard, a mall, a grocery store, or any place we 
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Americans (who, under the Guadalupe Hidalgo Treaty were supposed to be accepted as 
citizens of the United States should they desire to do so) are seen and treated as invaders 
and trespassers by the descendants of the Anglos who invaded and appropriated the 
territory. The generalized exercise of violence on brown bodies throughout the narrative 
leads to consider their status within this body politic, denied their basic constitutional, 
even if the state de facto, if not de jure, is held not belong to them. 
There are many ways in which the de facto and de jure states diverge. Most often, 
it likely arises from divergences between what law and honor require of a man (male), the 
way the cultural narratives of world order compel men to interpret the path of the law. 
“No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it 
and give it meaning. For every constitution there is an epic, for each decalogue a 
scripture." (Cover 4) It is my argument that notions of honor are basic to the underlying 
substantive aspect of the law. Substantivity within a legal system evolves from the 
culture’s concepts of honor feeding into the notions that give shape to the positive and 
procedural law that serves as epicenter for legality. For the sake of this argument “honor” 
                                                                                                                                            
have a right to be legally, we are not required by law to retreat but may defend ourselves 
if attacked.” (Wentworth) Thus, a man in Texas is allowed to fire a weapon in “self-
defense” should he feel threatened in any part of the territory where they have a legal 
right to be in. It is, however, much more interesting the way the senator describes the 
motivation for the law, for which he states that: “This law was needed because many 
Texans believed that they already had the right to use force in these situations. My bill 
clarified that right and shifted the burden of proof under the law to favor the intended 
victim instead of the criminal intruder or attacker”. (Wentworth) 
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would be defined as an aesthetic configuration of social codes, shaped as a mythopoeic 
collection of narratives that are utilized in order to weave collective ethics. In order to 
illustrate the particularity in what I mean by honor, let me refer to a fable proposed by 
Amartya Sen:  
Three children - Anne, Bob and Carla - should get a flute about 
which they are quarrelling. Anne claims the flute on the ground that she is 
the only one of the three who knows how to play it (the others do not deny 
this), … In an alternative scenario, it is Bob who speaks up, and defends 
his case for having the flute by pointing out that he is the only one among 
the three who is so poor that he has no toys of his own. The flute would 
give him something to play with (the other two concede that they are 
richer and well supplied with engaging amenities) … In another 
alternative scenario, it is Carla who speaks up and points out that she has 
been working diligently for many months to make the flute with her own 
labour (the others confirm this), and just when she had finished her work, 
‘just then’, she complains, ‘these expropriators came along to try to grab 
the flute away from me’. If Carla’s statement is all you had heard, you 
might be inclined to give the flute to her in recognition of her 
understandable claim to something she has made herself. Having heard 
all three and their different lines of reasoning, there is a difficult decision 
that you have to make. Theorists of different persuasions, such as 
utilitarians, or economic egalitarians, or no-nonsense libertarians, may 
each take the view that there is a straightforward just resolution staring at 
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us here, and there is no difficulty in spotting it. But almost certainly they 
would respectively see totally different resolutions as being obviously 
right (13).  
Very clearly when faced with a choice such as this, one could not argue that 
reason on its own could solve the problem at hand without referring to different sets of 
beliefs that, while reasonable on their own, might exclude each other's rationality, and 
might appear or be cruel to someone approaching from a different angle. The rational 
behavior exhibited by a person requires a departure point, which can’t be defined by 
reason alone. It is not possible to build an objective system to resolve all moral dilemmas 
without the intervention of actual humans. The system Schmitt describes as one where 
“"Laws govern," not men, authorities, or nonelected governments” (3), is not feasible. 
Thus, different approaches that could be taken towards this fable are informed by a set of 
narratives that cloud the aporias reached by rational discourse. The partiality of this 
process, however, can be easily hidden because such narratives are often shared 
throughout a culture.  Perhaps even it could be said that the sharing of such narratives is, 
in and of itself, the defining aspect of a culture. Honor, conceived in such a way, would 
be a social norm for behavior entailing sets of rights and duties towards the rest of the 
community. One aspect in which honor might appeal more than law to a collective may 
have to do with its flexibility. Honor codes depend upon existence in a community, made 
up of different members in different stations of different characters. It can be construed to 
guide people in their private behavior, based on an interpretation of narrative paradigms.  
The results of the trend to exclude minorities from participation in the 
construction and application of public policy has often derived in armed conflict and the 
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breakup of a social compact which is later enforced by military action. One good 
example of how such a thing happens can be found in the San Elizario Salt War of 1877, 
near El Paso, TX. In most official renderings of the uprising, "Mexican-Americans and 
Mexicans involved in it were, at the time, referred to as 'hot blooded' and 'deluded' their 
actions assumed to be triggered by their 'ignorance and disorganization'" (Notes 942) In a 
different way from that in which minority exclusion was framed on African Americans, 
in this case, Mexican Americans were excluded on the basis of language, as the whiteness 
of Mexican Americans has often been a very contended issue, usually shifting to exclude 
Chicanos from political power. In Lyles v State, 1874, the Texas Supreme Court ruled 
that only English speakers could serve on juries, thus excluding Mexicans from the legal 
system on an apparently pragmatic and neutral basis. As the Harvard Law Review states:  
For newly arrived Anglos, the persistent use of Spanish was 
frequently an annoyance. For the mexicanos already established in the 
area, however, the advent of an Anglo-American justice system --along 
with its abuse by some Western Anglos-- too often proved a serious threat 
to their persons and property (Notes 945).  
The notion that mexicanos might have felt threatened by such a political and legal 
system is predicated on the fact of their exclusion from the system:  
In the 1870s, the area that is now known as El Paso County 
boasted a population of  approximately 3700 people, only 80 of whom 
were not of Mexican descent. (…) Despite their small numbers, by 1870 
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Anglo settlers held a variety of important posts, including county judge, 
sheriff and customs inspector. (Notes 947) 
This adverse system derived in an armed conflict when, in 1877, Charles Howard, 
a Virginian by birth, attempted to claim a Salt Lake that had been, under Spanish Land 
Grants, conferred to the town of San Elizario as communal property, and which had been 
communally exploited, maintained and improved upon. Howard had two mexicanos 
arrested for claiming they would extract salt from the lake Howard had claimed and was 
still disputing. After many attempts to negotiate the release of Juárez and Gándara, the 
arrested parties, a conflict arose which was negotiated with Howard posting a bond of 
twelve thousand dollars to back his promise never to return, and the release of Juárez and 
Gándara. Not long after leaving, Howard came back, and shot Louis Cardis, (a state 
legislator who helped negotiate a resolution and represented mexicano interests) point 
blank and in public. In this war:  
there were two legal injustices, rarely noted by Anglo writers, that 
especially angered local Mexican residents: the release of Howard, a 
known murderer, on bail without a proper examination; and the arrest of 
two Mexicans for a crime that did not exist on the law books. (Notes 957)  
Numerous attempts to resolve the conflict peacefully were unsuccessful, as the 
courts and officers of the law broke the law in order to protect Howard, using Texas 
Rangers as personal bodyguards, releasing him on bail, and refusing to judge him for 
Cardis’ murder. Only after recurring to the Texas Constitution, presenting signed papers 
and agreements that were refused by courts and being refused all legal succor, did 
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mexicanos resort to force, (which was construed as the violence of a wild, fanatical mob) 
and resorted to the same behavior Anglos incurred in and was de facto sanctioned by the 
law.  
The conflict ended with 12 dead people, 50 injured parties and a regiment of the 
armed forces that settled the conflict by force, establishing a precedent where "Members 
of the board did not assume that the contest over resources was one between equals, but 
rather that it was one that American military force would have to-- and could 
legitimately-- bring to an end." (Notes 963) The lack of participation on the part of 
minorities in the processes of creation, interpretation and application of the law are 
central to the relationship that is developed between the law and minorities, and a serious 
issue in the legitimacy of the legal system that rules over Chicanos in the U.S.A. Most 
often the conflicts that arise were solved by paralegal means or legal means that 
systematically hurt Chicano interests, leading to a world where Chicanos become 
dispossessed of means of production and capital. This was the world in which Quieto 
lived, is the history within which the KCDTS is set. However, Hinojosa does depict a 
more complicated environment than that of his forebears, where Chicanos do participate 
in the legal processes, even if they do so from a disadvantageous place.  
The ethnic struggle in Hinojosa’s valley is a reinterpretation of a history of ethnic 
violence which is officially compiled and framed from the point of view of the Anglo 
Texan majority. He makes this history of conflict hinge between two parts, an initial 
history of direct confrontation that ended mostly in physical violence, which took place 
when there were no Chicanos occupying structures of power, symbolized by the struggles 
of Quieto, and another period, where some Chicanos, still in a minority, occupy some of 
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these structures, where conflict tends to result mostly in structural violence, a period 
marked mostly by subversion of political structures, a struggle reflected in Jehú. In an 
interview where Rolando Hinojosa was asked whether he shared Gloria Anzaldúa’s 
perspective of the border as an open wound, he answers: 
that Valley of Anzaldúa began to disintegrate after World War II; 
the Veterans’ Entitlement Act, popularly known as the G.I. Bill, became 
the source of higher education for many Mexican Americans or Chicanos. 
In 1915, for example, there was one Valleyite in the Texas Legislature. 
Now? They are in sufficient numbers that some are heads of the Texas 
House and Senate committees. (…) It’s another world and has been since 
after 1950. Why 1950? Because that was when the first mass of Chicanos 
graduated from colleges and universities, that is, five years after the end 
of World War II. (Raab) 
Even as the history of clear cut strife of the older Valley never disappears from 
the KCDTS, it mostly depicts the more nuanced ways in which this struggle continues, 
mostly through Jehú Malacara. 
In the Odyssey, there is a moment when on their way home, the Danaans must 
sail through a pass that will put them within reach of the siren song. Circe had warned 
them that their song was beautiful, but it will lure men to their death, having them jump 
from the ship in an attempt to follow the song. And so Odysseus instructs: 
First she said we were to keep clear of the Sirens, who sit and sing 
most beautifully in a field of flowers; but she said I might hear them myself 
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so long as no one else did. Therefore, take me and bind me to the 
crosspiece half way up the mast; bind me as I stand upright, with a bond 
so fast that I cannot possibly break away (Homer The Odyssey Book XII). 
Just like the Siren song of Odysseus, institutions and modernity sing their song, 
entice us to let them loose and set up our polis in this or that way. But the wise man, the 
hero of wits, arranges it so he can participate and be withheld from them. And it is in this 
situation that we find Jehú Malacara. In his functions as a lawyer and banker within the 
KBC Bank, he represents a character that negotiates the schism between the universal and 
the particular. His involvement in banking leads to a continuous negotiation of the 
multitude of behavioral codes in the KCDTS, an exploration of a bridging of multiple 
polis on the same territory. 
In many ways, Jehú, the banker, is a very different cultural hero in this 
mythopoeia of the Rio Grande Valley than Gregorio Cortez or Juan N. Cortina would be. 
Jehú undertakes his role from within the Anglo machinery, living on a sharp edge 
between becoming a sellout and being excluded from power, inhabiting two legal, 
religious, and honor systems, and navigating through them freely. In this guise, I would 
like to compare him to a different kind of hero of legend, Odysseus. 
 Clearly a cultural hero, Odysseus never quite conforms to the epic hero character 
that Achilles, Hector, Nestor or Theseus represent so keenly. He always was a little off, 
willing to do things other heroes wouldn’t, taking shortcuts or roundabouts in order to 
achieve his objectives . "When the typical hero found his path to fame and glory blocked, 
his instinct was to batter his own or someone else's head against the obstacle until 
something broke... Odysseus was no less determined to gain his purpose; but he was far 
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less intransigent. He was prepared to undermine an obstacle or to look for another path, 
to imitate the mole or the fox rather than the rhinoceros" (Stanford 131)  
Several installments of the KCDTS make a comparison between Jehú Malacara, a 
relative of the Buenrostros and Ira Escobar, a relative of the Leguizamóns. The old 
conflict between El Quieto, Alejandro Leguizamón and the KBC is renewed in a different 
guise, utilizing finances instead of guns. The difference between Jehú and Ira is not so 
much in the sphere of being but in the sphere of belonging. Their circulation through the 
geography of Belken marks them: "Ira es buena gente; él ni se arrima al Aquí me quedo y 
menos al Blue. Jehú sí" (Hinojosa, Dear Rafe 194). In this context, the Aquí me quedo is 
an emblematic bar for the Chicanos of Belken, one used in earlier novels as a public 
forum for the Mexican part of town, conferring a political affiliation.  Ira is clearly 
aligned with the KBC, devoid of certain qualities integral to Chicano political identities, 
and involved in shady political dealings. Meanwhile, Jehú works for the bank, but he 
does not identify with it: "The mexicanos weren't going to vote for him [Ira]–he's 
Noddy's boy. On the other hand, they got nothing against Jehu, he works there. That's 
different." (Hinojosa, Becky 19) In a way, Jehú acts as a peace-maker, being somewhat 
unattached to either side in the conflict.  At times such an attitude is termed as selfish, but 
it is the only path through which Mexicans can negotiate themselves into power 
structures.  
Jehú’s virtues, much like those of Odysseus, are not the virtues of excess of 
passion or selflessness as would be the case with Quieto, who gives away his lands in 
order to keep them in the community, but the virtues of the fine line, ambiguous traits 
that can easily turn to excess or lack. Stanford also describes this as a key trait of 
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Odysseus: "one other aspect of Odysseus' Homeric character needs to be kept in mind at 
the last. In a way it is the most important of all for the development of the tradition. This 
is the fundamental ambiguity of his essential qualities. We have seen how prudence may 
decline towards timidity, tactfulness towards a blameworthy suppresio veri, serviceability 
towards servility and so on" (137). We find him described as someone who cares little 
about the ways either the Mexican or American establishments can limit him, and he is 
always willing to negotiate himself to a position of advantage: "Jehu doesn't give a damn 
if someone says something about him. They just better not say it to his face. Think about 
that. He has a very good idea of who he is and gossip or rumor are just that and nothing 
more to him" (Hinojosa, Becky 100). Curiously, it is by accepting loss of face from both 
perspectives of what and how a society is, that Jehú is able to maintain his position 
between the two of them. And it is exactly this focus on perspective (which his figure 
better represents in Hinojosa’s conception of the political) that is central to what we can 
derive from the KCDTS for this analysis. It is not only a bilingual novel, where the 
narrative is introduced in two languages, but Jehu is a character that is immersed in 
several social codes: Protestant and Catholic religions; Anglo and Mexican identities; 
Napoleonic and Common law; racial and cultural ordering principles.  
I will now return to Melas’ allegory, where instead of apples and oranges, 
universalization only proposes a world where everything is apples, where apples and 
oranges or bananas are always compared in function of their appleness. In this system, 
the disenfranchised can only lose, as Melas’ points out in the analogical situation of 
Fanon: 
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Heeding the call of assimilation, the evolue endeavors to acquire 
French civilization through education, language, culture, behavior. From 
his standpoint on the distant islands, he takes whiteness figuratively as the 
sign for the most advanced stage of the civilization whose universal 
standard has deemed his society inferior. Indeed, the civilizing mission, 
predicated on an evolutionary teleology that has determined whiteness the 
cultural standard, necessarily makes that culture available to acquisition, 
to general dissemination. But, along the way, on his journey to the 
metropolis, the evolue will encounter in racial difference an insuperable 
obstacle to assimilation (277)  
The disenfranchised individual within this system is always in a situation of 
multiple consciousness. In function of racial status, several cultural standards are 
imposed upon him, and all behaviors should take them into account while attempting to 
surpass them. The aesthetic notions of whiteness or private property that are masked via 
the pretense of universality are not as absent, or as all embracing as the legal codes that 
arise from them are imagined to be.  
In attempting to simply transfer one culture into another one, European 
imperialism disguised Euro-centrism as universalism. By bringing its precepts into a 
territory, it attempts to erase particularity in it. Narratives such as Walter Prescott Webb’s 
history or US cowboy films attempt to dissolve these differences. Characters like Jehú 
Malacara show us how it is that Belken is not a discrete territory, but a polyvalent mesh 
that is, both from political and cultural perspectives one and many things at once.  In his 
role as a lawyer at the KBC Bank he subverts its land-appropriating machinery from 
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within. Unlike Quieto, who was unable to survive while attempting to use similar legal 
strategies through direct confrontation, Jehu cracks open a barrier, allowing Chicanos 
access to capital and legal strategies that were denied them before attempting subversion. 
Having worked as a goat shepherd, protestant preacher, altar boy, sweeper in a 
barbershop, barkeep, soldier, law student, and loan officer within a bank, Jehú has gotten 
knowledge of the world that allows him to situate himself both from within and outside 
the Raza. His job at the KBC is a Trojan Horse within the Anglo oppression machine. 
Much like Odysseus, Jehu allows himself to listen to the siren song of the Law, while 
tying himself to the mastpost of his honor codes, in order not to succumb, like Ira, to the 
othering lying in wait in that song. 
There is a general situation of structural injustice from within legality56. Jehú is, 
in the face of it, detached from the machinery that is being used by Anglos to oppress 
Chicanos, while working within it.  In the meanwhile, he manages to stay out of politics, 
as Zilles states, since the Bank’s board think that Jehú “is too honest and not maleable 
enough to be our boy” (Hinojosa, Dear Rafe/Mi querido Rafa 128) Even though the scale 
in which Jehú manages to counteract the land-grabbing attempts on the part of the KBC 
is small by comparison, it is a path towards resistance. Jehú intervenes, along with Rafa 
                                                
56 A good example of how Jehú initiates his opposition to the bank has to do with 
an episode in his youth, where he meets with a counselor who tries to persuade him to use 
his GI Bill money to train as a shipwright, instead of studying at UT Austin. (Hinojosa, 
Estampas del Valle 127). After a while, he finds out that the Bank was indirectly, but 
profitably involved in the schools that trained the shipyard’s workforce, as well as the 
shipyards (Hinojosa, Rites and witnesses 55).   
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Buenrostro, in a plot by the Bank to buy land and sell it to the Leguizamóns by creating 
an alliance that buys and repartitions land into multiple parcels. By repartitioning this 
land in Dellis County, the Mexican families manage to contain the Leguizamóns and the 
KBC advance, elevating the legal costs that would be required to appropriate it, 
preserving some power.  
The focus on creating universalized law and institutions, sets the basis for 
injustice, as they are created with bias. While apparently setting an even ground for 
everybody under the law, the transfer of labor related to capital and disenfranchisement 
related to race57 should bear weight on reflections about the structure of justice in the 
“democratic” representative republic. While institutions are developed within a tradition 
that focuses on setting up a system around one notion of justice and expanding it to the 
fullest, can we expect that they might not commit larger injustices than the ones they 
right? 
As we reflect on the situation of the multicultural state58, we might find that the 
model of representative democracy is hardly appropriate, as most of the nation-states in 
                                                
57 Even in the age of affirmative action, Native Americans are still recognized as 
wards of the state, and have limited political rights. In a much less clear manner, the 
differential in capital between white people and brown or black people sets everything 
but an even ground, as the educational or professional opportunities for either group are 
heavily limited because of the capital differential. 
58 Multicultural states are rather the norm. The homogenous state was a 
particularly European development, arising mostly from the consolidation of early 
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which this model arose presupposed the erasure of difference, as is apparent even in 
Europe. After the process of Italian unification, Mazzini is quoted as stating: “Having 
created Italy, it remained to create Italians” (Hammerton 310). The process by which the 
nation becomes an issue of appleness, or oneness, in which everything is inscribed as 
unity is the underlying political principle behind representative democracy.  If we go 
back to Rousseau’s notions of the state59, the state is considered at war with any 
opposition: "any wrongdoer, attacking social right, becomes by his own doing, a rebel, 
and a traitor to his country; violating its laws, he ceases to be a part of it, and it might 
even be said that he wages war on it.” (Rousseau, On the social contract 40). Non-
compliance with the law is conceived of as waging war upon the state. The identity of 
citizen and state is assumed as automatic, though the identity between the citizen and the 
prince might not be presumed.  
As the nation state came into being, the opposition that gave rise to the 
enlightenment uprisings was that between the people and the aristocracy. The solution 
that was sought for was to unify the people into a state, but that state allowed for no 
difference, and yet, required the existence of difference on the outside. The nation “seeks 
to represent itself in the image of the Enlightenment and fails to do so. For Enlightenment 
itself, to assert its sovereignty as the universal ideal, needs its Other; if it could ever 
                                                                                                                                            
modern monarchies, which strove to create states with one religion, one language, one 
people. 
59 Though we must point out that Rousseau did not fully believe in the virtues of 
democracy: “Were there a people of gods, it would govern itself democratically. So 
perfect a government is not suited for men” (Rousseau, On the social contract 79) 
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actualize itself in the real world as the truly universal, it would in fact destroy itself.” 
(Chatterjee 17) The state endeavors to create its apples, and to suppress any oranges. 
Universal law, in theory would rule equally over all. But minoritary groups, either 
because of race, gender or ethnic makeup find themselves excluded from the making of 
the law, creating a different class of aristocracy, a class that owns the nation. Or, as 
Hinojosa reflects, in Klail City, "We are Greeks, don Manuel. Greeks in Roman homes… 
I say we are Greeks, don Manuel, slaves in Roman homes… we must educate the 
Romans” (137). By self-design, but also by imposition, Chicanos identify as such, around 
a different language and a different culture. This identification, however, means that they 
are not incorporated as citizens, that there is a hidden particularity to universality. 
Anglo-American control of private and public structures excludes ethnic 
Mexicans from participation in the body politic. Fictions of equality under the law are 
constantly denounced as such for Hinojosa’s characters, which see the butt of the joke 
thrust upon them constantly. As Noddy Perkins, in Dear Rafe, hosts a party of the most 
influential people in Belken in order to fix the elections, Jehú notices the divide: “As 
soon as she gets in: Well, just how many Mexicans did Noddy invite? (…) I believe we 
all need to experience something like that every once in a while so we don’t forget, and 
so we can drop the ungrounded idea that everything is allright.” (Hinojosa, Dear Rafe/Mi 
querido Rafa 151) No matter what strategy towards integration is followed, an individual 
belonging to a political minority remains segregated. A different system built around the 
possibility of multiplicity is needed in the globalized world, to be able to account for the 
multiplicities now implicit in most of the globe. So long as the honor codes of multiple 
cultures in interaction under any one legal system are not accounted for and we attempt to 
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ignore the particularity of people in favor of an alleged universality our systems are 
doomed to failure. For in the search for universal law, we disperse particular crimes. 
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INCONCLUSION: LAUGHING AT VOLCANOES 
 
 Whenever I hear anyone arguing for 
slavery, I feel a strong impulse to see it tried on 
him personally. 
Abraham Lincoln 
 
 
In his Politics, Aristotle devotes a few pages to slavery, and presents us with a 
theme that is, I believe, central to discussion of legality. Even though he establishes from 
the beginning of the book that there is a difference between the master and the statesman, 
it is all too proximate, all too often. In it, Aristotle tells us that 
 there is a difference between the rule of master over slave and the 
rule of a statesman. All forms of rule are not the same though some say 
that they are. Rule over naturally free men is different from rule over 
natural slaves; rule in a household is monarchical, since every house has 
one ruler; the rule of a statesman is rule over free and equal persons. 
(Aristotle 74) 
His analytic method is used to analyze the necessary parts of a state. He begins by 
studying the domestic sphere, which, to Aristotle is not a nuclear family, but a political 
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association, as “it was out of the association formed by men with these two, women and 
slaves, that a household was first formed” (Aristotle 57) In the same way that there is a 
class system in the private, where men rule over women and them both over slaves, 
Aristotle proposes a class system for the state, the Athenian democracy which is a state 
ruled by free men, not one where all men are free and they all rule. 
At the core of this democratic system is the notion of citizenship. This distinction 
allows for Aristotle to find purchase in what was the central political theory of his time, 
focused on arriving at the concept of aristocracy, ἀριστοκρατία, from the roots ἄριστος, 
which means excellent, and κράτος, power. For Aristotle, eudaimonia, (εὐ, good and 
δαιµον, spirit) is the most important human aspiration. In the pursuit of eudaimonia, it is 
understood that citizens need assistance, for as Saunders states: “it is taken for granted 
that a citizen, if he is to develop the qualities worthy of a citizen, must not do work that is 
felt to be degrading. But it is recognized that if the citizens are not going to do their own 
dirty work, there must be a subordinate class to do it for them; and this class is bound to 
be a source of trouble.” (Aristotle 140) The structure that he presupposes for a state 
implies dividing human beings between those who relate to laws, and those who, even as 
they form a part of the state, are excluded from it.  
The configuration of this state guarantees ritualized violence in favor of one class 
to the detriment of everybody else. Such a class, that of the citizens, who in theory 
represent society’s values, take up the position of rulers and masters: “if the state is to be 
classed as a composite thing; so clearly we must first try to isolate the citizen, for the 
state is an aggregate of citizens. So we must ask, Who is a citizen? and, Whom should we 
call one?” (Aristotle 57) The citizen becomes the main and almost only participant in 
 199 
legality, arriving at a system that bases the constitution of the state upon a system of 
circular definitions. 
The citizen, pillar of the state, must dedicate his life to developing civic virtues, 
whatever they are, a task which absolves him from manual or economic labor that may 
distract him from martial, political, or philosophical prowess. And since excellence in 
martial, political, or philosophical matters is the only excellence that matters when 
Greeks thought of aristocracy, those who had to undertake menial labor where 
incapacitated for public preparation and denied citizenship.  
Aristotle explains it in the following way: “What effectively distinguishes the 
citizen proper from all others is his participation in giving judgment and in holding 
office.” (Aristotle 169) Then, in this system, we find that political participation is that 
which allows a man to become a citizen and that being a citizen is what allows for 
political participation. The rest of the population is divided between free men who have 
only nominal participation, women, and slaves.  
It is very important here, however, to point out one thing when we think of these 
disenfranchised populations in the Athenian state or πόλις (city). Here, slaves, women, or 
Thetes (θέτης, free men who did not have enough property to occupy political or military 
offices) held more fluid positions (downwardly of course) than might have been 
expected. They could be, depending on the moment and definition, be considered either 
as property, or subdued peoples. The true definition for them, however, derives from the 
rights that they lack.  
Moses Finley offers us a set of categories that are very helpful to understanding 
the gradations of liberty (or lack thereof) in a slave’s conditions in Helas. These 
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categorizations of rights, duties, and privileges could be described in the following ways: 
property rights, authority over other people’s work, the power to punish other people, 
legal rights and duties, family, religious privileges and rights (Finley, Economy and 
society in Ancient Greece 131). Landless freemen would have family, religious, and 
military rights and duties, as well as property rights, but would lack many legal rights, 
such as participating in judgments, or having authority over other people’s work.  
We begin with slavery in order to analyze institutionalized violence in the 
Athenian state, due to the fact that it is an most extreme and clear example of its cruelty. 
In spite of this, the phenomenon of interest is not slavery per se60, but the precedent for 
defining a procedure by which the state can claim to be fair at the same time it 
disenfranchises entire sectors of the population, conceding privileges and rights to a 
group of people and bestowing all the duties into another one.  
The process of disenfranchisement is one of the most basic for the notion of 
legitimacy in legality, for it represents a disparity in the principles of basic equality that 
should be assumed at the moment of establishing a law. If we harken back to the idea 
Rousseau presented that might was in no way grounds for legitimizing political action, it 
stands to reason that disenfranchisement cannot be a fair political process. Montesquieu, 
in The Spirit of Laws, presents the injustice of slavery in the following way: 
 The lawfulness of putting a malefactor to death arises from this 
circumstance: the law by which he is punished was made for his security. 
A murderer, for instance, has enjoyed the benefit of the very law which 
                                                
60 Most importantly because it is a long-abolished system of slavery. 
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condemns him; it has been a continual protection to him; he cannot, 
therefore, object to it. But it is not so with the slave. The law of slavery 
can never be beneficial to him; it is in all cases against him, without ever 
being for his advantage; and therefore this law is contrary to the 
fundamental principle of all societies. (Montesquieu 229) 
A state cannot be wholly configured in such a way that it would establish such 
different classes while retaining legitimacy. To create an underclass for whom the law is 
never advantageous is not a way to produce legitimacy. This happens when it proves 
impossible to persuade a section of the population to perform a specific role in the 
community and oppressive and violent methods are required. Here, a similar situation is 
produced to that which Montesquieu describes: 
All these laws operated even against persons whose innocence was 
proved; the intent of them was to inspire their slaves with a prodigious 
respect for their master. They were not dependent on the civil government, 
but on a fault or imperfection of the civil government. They were not 
derived from the equity of civil laws, since they were contrary to the 
principle of those laws. They were properly founded on the principles of 
war, with this difference, that the enemies were in the bosom of the state. 
(Montesquieu 235) 
In such a State, non-citizens can be construed as an internal colony, and the State 
is in a perpetual path of war. For classical ancient societies, the legality of slavery was 
akin to a legality of illegality. According to Aristotle, in the Politics, the legality of a 
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slave arose from the natural, spiritual inferiority of the slave in respect of the master, but, 
as we saw earlier, this justification affords a host of unresolved problems.  
One of the most problematic issues in this narrative (and let’s not forget, it is a 
story) is what exactly is spiritual superiority? And even more crucially, what does virtue 
mean? Amongst the Laecedemonians, Aristotle’s favorite study subject, virtue was 
construed around martial prowess, and Lycurgus certainly had this in mind as he wrote 
the Spartan constitution. This constitution, amongst Greeks, was widely praised and 
esteemed, even more so during the centuries of Spartan hegemony in Helas. In Aristotle’s 
time, this was no longer so, as hegemony had moved to Pella, in the kingdom of 
Macedon. Time had shed light on Spartan failures, and brought stronger criticism towards 
its political organization, but admiration remained.  
The Laecedemonian state was built for ever-lasting war, both inwardly and 
outwardly. Somewhere around 10,000 Σπαρτιάται, or Spartans, constantly on the 
warpath, kept watch over Mesenia. The Εἵλωτες, or helots, or formerly, Mesenians, were 
crushed under the Spartan foot, as they were fiercely kept in check. They were in charge 
of all productive labor, and had no option to be a part of the Σπαρτιάται, or Spartans, the 
“noble” warriors of Laecedemonia. Helots were hunted ritually, every year, to keep their 
population numbers stable, and to prevent them from being able to organize and rebel. 
This oppression allowed for Spartans to focus on their most cherished virtue: the ability 
to kill. 
This martial Weltanschauung never suspended the state of war against Mesenia, 
refraining from incorporating its population into the state. Its main moral justification in 
exercising this role as an army of occupation was very simple: Spartans could. Greek 
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affectual matrixes tended to state that when someone was victorious, it was because he 
was good. That is, until they lost their independence to Romans, when they seemed to 
change their mind. In most of their constitutive political treaties, opinions such as this 
abound: 
 The reason for this difference of opinion, and for the overlap in 
the arguments used, lies in the fact that in a way it is virtue, when it 
acquires resources, that is best able actually to use force; and in the fact 
that anything which conquers does so because it excels in some good. It 
seems therefore that force is not without virtue, and that the only dispute is 
about what is just. Consequently some think that ‘just’ in this connection 
is a nonsense, others that it means precisely this, that ‘the stronger shall 
rule’. But when these propositions are disentangled, the other arguments 
have no validity or power to show that the superior in virtue ought not to 
rule and be master. (Aristotle 71) 
In times of Aristotle there had actually been arguments against slavery, most 
notably those that arose from Solon’s reforms. These reforms prohibited the use of a 
person as collateral for a loan, and therefore, the enslavement of an Athenian citizen as 
repayment for a loan. But such arguments had been confined to ethnic criteria. Solon’s 
reforms forbade enslaving Athenian citizens, as it would diminish the polis to have them 
enslaved: “For this reason they will not apply the term slave to such people but use it 
only for non-Greeks” (Aristotle 72). Slavery for non-citizens was undiminished however. 
And things stayed that way for centuries on end. It was not that Athenians did not 
conceive of slavery as wrong, for they forbade it amongst themselves. It was that they 
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thought another section of the population disenfranchisable because they had told 
themselves a story about their virtue, their superiority and their entitlement. 
I have gone on at length about slavery in Ancient Greece in a study about the 
contemporary political stories of the Aridoamerican desert because the Greek self-
deception should be obvious, in ways that perhaps ours are not. For our current system is 
not much different. The rich, the entitled, tell themselves stories about how they picked 
themselves up by their bootstraps, and have earned their lot in life. Bill Gates might say 
he became the richest man in the world after being a nobody, but he was wealthy enough 
to have access to a computer mainframe in 1968, when the public’s idea of what a 
computer looked like was much like the chrome painted cardboard boxes of El Santo 
movies. 
We attend the cinema in order to watch films where a billionaire replaces Jesus as 
the messiah and frees us from our own self-government, sacrificing his life in the process. 
And we loved to watch The Dark Knight Rises (Nolan). We tell ourselves all sorts of 
stories to affirm what it is that we want to be true, to build affectual matrixes so strong, 
that it will not even matter if it is true.  
Before the iron curtain acquired its current rusty red tone, while the dust from the 
demolition of the Berlin Wall was still settling, back in the summer of 1989, Francis 
Fukuyama, thinking he was riding history’s wild steer, said that history, what we really 
meant by history, was done for, finished, saying "What we may be witnessing is not just 
the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the 
end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the 
universalization of Western Liberal Democracy as the final form of human government". 
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(Fukuyama 1) We tell stories about how we became victorious or victimized. We tell 
ourselves stories about how we think our political system works. Which perhaps ends up 
being more like how we think it should work. And possibly, even, the stories might end 
up being about how a political system not anything like ours except in name works. 
In My heroes have never been cowboys, Sherman Alexie speaks about the role 
cowboy movies had in his self perception, how these films made him into an extra in his 
own film: “Did you know that in 1492 every Indian instantly became an extra in the 
Great American Western?” (Alexie) Much like my father watching Toro (Tonto) on the 
screen, or me dancing to Mowgli’s song, Alexie’s experience was one of dislocation with 
himself. We look at all these naturalizations of inequality and discrimination, all the ways 
politics become self-evident through narrative, and adopt the gaze of the other. We look 
at them and mock. 
We all look at those people, those savages, getting ready to toss the white man 
into the volcano and laugh. Oh, we laugh. 
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